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Abstract
What is absent in much of the literature on executive compensation reform is a deeper
appreciation of the shift that has occurred since the latest financial crisis away from
performance-based corporate governance arrangements to an approach that seeks to put the
brakes on a runaway train, the shareholder value model and its relentless pursuit of shareholder
wealth at all costs. By situating this debate into a broader discussion of corporate purpose,
corporate governance and the law’s role in how business corporations are run in their social,
economic and political environment this project seeks to shed some light onto what really is at
stake in this debate, whether the existing shareholder primacy paradigm for conceptualizing and
fashioning a solution for constraining managerial power in the firm is a viable solution moving
forward from the crisis.
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CHAPTER ONE:
Introduction
“In the day of the free market, where our country was the top industrial power, there was
accountability to the stockholder…because it was their money at stake…today, management has
no stake in the company…altogether, these men up here [referring to directors and managers], own
less than 3% of the company…you own the company…that’s right, you the stockholder, you are
being royally screwed over by these bureaucrats, with their estate palaces, their hunting and fishing
trips, their corporate jets and golden parachutes…the new law in corporate America seems to be
survival of the un-fittest…well in my book, you either do it right or get eliminated…I am not a
destroyer of companies, I am a liberator of them…the point is ladies and gentlemen, that greed,
for lack of better words, is good.” (Gordon Gekko, 1987, Wall Street The Movie)

SECTION A
Almost five years have passed since the global financial crisis began and many economies
are still feeling its devastating effects. In addition to slower than anticipated economic recovery in
the United States, it is unclear what lessons if any were learned in the corporate governance realm
and whether changes implemented in the wake of the crisis had any substantive impact on lowering
risk-taking and encouraging firm sustainability. When the US economy does eventually recover,
we will again be faced with the question of how the next scandal or crisis can be averted. It is
crucial not to let recent history casually slip by and to further avail ourselves of the opportunity
for learning and reform.
Being at centre stage of the regulatory narrative that unfolded after the crisis, the story of
executive compensation in the liberal market context has remained relatively unchanged. While
CEO pay in the US remains staggeringly high, other market economies have seen a stabilization
of pay levels and a recent trend towards reforming developments which previously militated
towards US style, market-driven compensation packages. Germany is just one example where
executive compensation has been tied to the sustainability of the corporation and amongst other
things has incorporated the interests of other groups that are essential to the firm's success and to
the smooth functioning of the broader political economy. Consequently Germany has emerged as
an economic leader on the European scene in light of Europe's deep financial troubles.
1

While the crisis presented a multitude of opportunities to further advance the case against
shareholder primacy, the executive compensation debate never quite escaped the confines of
agency theory, as the dominant analytical framework. Even with the staggering blows dealt by
progressive corporate law scholarship to shareholder primacy's cause, the compensation debate
continues to be framed from this perspective, reproducing a narrow set of discourses that have
yielded relatively limited results.
What is absent in much of the literature on executive compensation reform is a deeper
appreciation of the shift that has occurred since the latest financial crisis away from performancebased corporate governance arrangements to an approach that seeks to put the brakes on a runaway
train, the shareholder value model and its relentless pursuit of shareholder wealth at all costs. By
situating this debate into a broader discussion of corporate purpose, corporate governance and the
law’s role in how business corporations are run in their social, economic and political environment
this project seeks to shed some light onto what really is at stake in this debate, whether the existing
shareholder primacy paradigm for conceptualizing and fashioning a solution for constraining
managerial power in the firm is a viable solution moving forward from the crisis.
This work seeks to step outside the narrow law and economics paradigm from which
executive compensation has been problematized since at least the 1990's. By disentangling the
separate lines of argument inherent in the executive compensation debate and viewing these in a
forum where their interrelation can be adequately assessed, we can highlight the various interests
at play and the broader significance of how executive compensation has been problematized to
critically assess whether the existing dominant paradigm can be sustained in light of the
prospective changes to corporate governance that post crisis compensation reform has identified,
mainly the need to operate large public corporations sustainably and in the public interest.
The broader dimensions of this debate can be assessed by first situating the parallel and
sometimes competing narratives on executive compensation into a wider corporate legal
framework. By then tracing the evolution of this framework and the compensation issue within it,
we begin to see today's debate as a particular point in the trajectory of corporate law and how the
firm is governed. The picture which emerges is one where the debate over compensation in the
1990's was at the centre of a key shift in governance thinking characterized by a drastic re-thinking
of the business corporation's legal nature, the role that law should play and how the rights and
2

duties of actors are defined.
This shift is representative of competing views between the role that mandatory norms of
behaviour should play versus the prospects of performance and efficiency based norms of
governance. With the purported limitations of trust and loyalty based norms for solving the
problem of managerial performance, the vulnerability of shareholders under the framework of
corporate law and the putative inadequacies of corporate law's division of power, the shift to a
performance-based model of governance is seen as a repudiation of corporate law's key attributes.
Excessive executive pay is a symptom of these broader limitations and solutions within this
paradigm for addressing it, namely by reducing its size and constraining profit-maximization, are
seen as contributing to the ongoing set of problems facing shareholders.
Going further back however, it is crucial to understand the strengths and prospects of this
model, and the previously articulated challenges of protecting society from the far-reaching effects
of managerial power it was tasked with solving, as expressed in the post-Great Depression debate
over who corporations should be run for. In this context we can gain an understanding of the role
served by the existing division of power and legally and structurally entrenched Board discretion.
We can then understand the larger corporate governance problem represented by executive pay in
this context and only after assessing more broadly the strengths and weaknesses of this model can
we approach the issue of what is going in the post-crisis context and how executive compensation
has played a central role. Only then can we begin to see the consequences of shifting away from
the former model and of overemphasizing the latter, how the gradual evolution of this approach
led us to where we are now and how the goals that each approach seeks to achieve conflict, with
significant consequences for corporate governance.
Yet the lens for assessing the current state of corporate governance is not complete.
Building on this historical corporate legal analysis comparative political economy necessarily
allows us to further broaden the scope of inquiry, this time revealing the contentious relationships
and political contestations between the interests of actors inherent in the differing approaches to
constraining managerial power and to conceptualizing the legal nature of the firm.
What begins to emerge is not only a bigger picture of the executive compensation debate
as a political contest between economic actors over who's interests the firm should run in and how
the risks and benefits of economic activity distributed, but also a contest between broader political
3

forces of finance and labour over instituting the self-regulating market versus measures aimed at
social protection. This enlarged perspective of the compensation debate allows us to engage with
neo-classical economic assumptions which underpin the existing debate and make it challenging
to step outside of it and critique compensation from any other perspective, other than to adjust and
improve the various performance-based mechanisms from within the framework to avoid another
crisis.
In many respects the status quo approach to compensation reform which entails working
within this paradigm represents the fundamental point of contention over how our system of
political economy should be organized and which improvements to it will ultimately prevail. It is
crucial to step outside this box and assess whether the latest crisis and the role that our current
approach to corporate governance has played in it, namely through executive pay, has highlighted
the inherent shortcomings of the model's current place in its trajectory.
Thus the other role of comparative political economy in shedding light on the current state
of affairs is to help broaden our understanding of the impetus behind and consequences of the
previous shift to a more liberal form of market capitalism, the limitation of the approach before,
and the prospects and limitations of the existing approach. This culminates in the question, “how
far can liberal market capitalism be ultimately pushed before it breaks and are we at that point with
the current state of corporate governance?”
The final step then to complete this assessment is to look beyond common, technically
based distinctions of rules versus principles based regulation to gain a deeper understanding of
what post-crisis regulatory responses represent and how differences in the approaches of two major
economies, the United States and Germany can be accounted for. Examining their responses to the
crisis in light of how these changes stand to impact the management orientations of some of the
world's largest corporations, reveals in certain respects that the shareholder primacy based
paradigm is incapable of carrying out what post-crisis reform is calling for, to run public
corporations sustainably for the benefit of shareholders as well as in the public interest. A more
balanced approach is needed within the liberal market context between emphasizing the profit
motive and constraining the actions of managers through legal norms of behaviour that are more
inclusive of a wider set of interests.

4

SECTION B
The recent string of corporate scandals and crises that have plagued our economic
systems have reminded us of the far reaching effects of corporate power on economic and social
welfare and have highlighted the integral nature of the business corporation as an institution of
contemporary capitalism. Like before, questions have been raised over what drives corporate
decision-making and what influences a corporation’s values and priorities. During the past two
decades we have witnessed a progressive but influential shift in the role of the business
corporation in Anglo-American society in the context a changing political economy marked by a
shift from industrial to financial capitalism. 1 This in turn has cast a spotlight on the dynamic that
exists between the various corporate constituents that influence and are impacted by the
outcomes of corporate activity and in particular has highlighted that these interests are often
juxtaposed in the contemporary context of financial capitalism. The trade-offs between these
interests inherent in how business corporations have been managed recently draws attention to
how the risks and benefits of corporate activity are managed and distributed amongst the
corporation’s various stakeholders and how this impacts our economic and social welfare. This
coupled with the devastating effects of the most recent financial crisis prompts us urgently to reevaluate the set of arrangements that have underpinned our economic systems.
At a fundamental level corporations are not only sites where economic actors coalesce to
engage in exchange and voluntary contracting for the purposes of meeting their individual needs
and achieving a collective set of economic goals but also organizations in civil society that wield
tremendous amounts of power and influence over our individual and societal welfare. 2 In most
industrialized democratic societies the state through its various organs has an interest in both the
benefits that business corporations create such as innovation, employment, and the provision of
valuable products and services and the potential harms caused by corporations to the commons
and to the interests of those who contribute to and rely upon their success and continuity. 3 The
role of the state in this regard has varied from interpreting, mediating and enforcing the various
contractual arrangements between corporate actors to facilitating and reinforcing processes for

Sanford M. Jacoby, “Labor and finance in the United States” in Cynthia A. Williams and P. Zumbansen, The
Embedded Firm (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
2
David Sciulli, Corporate Power in Civil Society: An Application of Societal Constitutionalism (New York: NYU Press,
2001).
3
Ibid.
1
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corporate actors to follow and structure themselves by and finally to legislating the behavior of
actors as a means of protecting the interests of a particular group. 4
Corporate governance as both a study and a practice focuses on mediating the source of
power in the corporation for the private benefit of those who contribute to and derive benefit
from this type of organization and also for the protection of those who are impacted by the
corporation’s activities but are not direct participants in its governance. 5 Corporate governance
deals both with the practices engaged in by those who exercise power in the corporation and
partake in its management and with the network of legal and economic factors that constrain or
facilitate how these actors behave. From a broader perspective, corporate governance is a narrow
yet decisively important aspect of how a political economy is organized and for that matter
integrated into an increasingly interconnected global market society. 6 In sum, the types of
corporate governance arrangements present at the national level represent a particular set of
solutions and compromises to the conflicts and tensions that arise between actors engaging
within and around the business corporation in its contemporary context. 7
The latest financial crisis demonstrates just how serious the implications of such
economic arrangements can be not only at the national level but also trans-nationally as
evidenced by the widespread effects of the financial meltdown in the U.S. banking sector and the
unprecedented level of regulatory responses at the national and supranational levels aimed at
correcting the perceived imbalances and deficiencies in how these arrangements are structured. 8
This further highlights the integral role that such institutions play in our economic and social
welfare and the necessity of properly balancing the need to facilitate the contribution and
participation of a particular set of corporate actors with the need to constrain a particular range of
behaviours of these actors in the course of their involvement in corporate activity. In the context
of financial capitalism in much of Anglo-American world the balance not surprisingly has
favoured the relentless pursuit of shareholder wealth at the expense of a wide range of other
Jacoby, supra note 1; Simon Deakin,”Corporate Governance and Financial Crisis in the Long-Run” in Cynthia A.
Williams and P. Zumbansen, The Embedded Firm (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 15-41; Kent Greenfield,
5
Sciulli, supra note2; See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis (Washington
DC: Beard Books, 1976.
6
See Klaus Hopt, Hideki Handa, Mark J. Roe, Wymeersch and Stefan Prigge eds., Comparative Corporate
Governance: The State of the Art in Emerging Research (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) at v.-ix.
7
Ibid.
8
Eilis Feran, Niamh Moloney, Jennifer G. Hill, John C. Coffee Jr., The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial
Crisis (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge UK, 2012).
4
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interests. 9
Executive compensation reform has been central to the post-crisis re-evaluation of
corporate governance norms and practices. 10 The crisis has revealed the importance of the
executive compensation issue to deeper questions of how the firm should be run. Not only does
executive compensation represent a set of governance arrangements that have particular
consequences for how the risks and benefits of corporate activity are distributed but also how
managerial power in the firm is constrained and to what end. 11 Executive compensations has
played an important part of the equation of how a nation should approach and resolve the sets of
issues that arise between the actors that are involved with, derive benefit from and contribute to
the success of the business corporation in the context of its broader economic role. Executive
compensation has the potential to act as a determinant of managerial behaviour and also serves
as a mechanism for aligning the interests of corporate constituents into particular coalitions. 12
On this basis, it has been used as a corporate governance mechanism for constraining the
managerial power in the public corporation where ownership and control out of necessity are
separate. 13 In sum, getting the compensation issue right is crucial to averting another crisis.

9
10
11
12
13

Stout, infra note 16.
See Hill, supra note 8.
See Jacoby, supra note 1.
Ibid.
See Berle, infra note 188.

7

CHAPTER TWO:
The Current Debate of Compensation Reform and This Work’s Contribution

SECTION A: What This Work Is Trying to Achieve
The post-crisis debate over executive compensation, as some have argued, represents a
possible turning point for the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance and an
indicator of this model's limitations. 14 The aim of this work is to evaluate this premise. The key
problems identified with the current state of compensation incentives aside from executive pay
being excessive, are that compensation incentives aimed at increasing share price performance
by stimulating greater risk taking and efficiency have led to chronic short-termism and excessive
risk-taking in public corporations and more notably the financial sector, culminating in the
collapse of systemically important financial institutions and leading perhaps to the greatest
economic crisis since the Great Depression. 15
Corporate law scholarship has dealt a significant blow to the shareholder value norm
since the financial crisis. 16 While several of these criticisms echo the weaknesses in governance
that emerged after Enron, there are key differences in the post-crisis critique which strike to the
heart of the current model's efficacy by challenging the prospects of self-regulation, performance
based norms of conduct and the market as a governance tool. 17 Yet the post-crisis re-evaluation
of executive compensation in the US is still being framed predominantly from within the agency
theory paradigm. 18 The critique of the current approach has not extended this far, yet the
development of executive compensation as governance tool is founded upon and inseparable

See Feran et al., supra note 8: See also Jennifer G. Hill, “Regulating executive remuneration after the global financial
crisis: common law perspectives” in Randall S. Thomas and Jennifer G. Hill eds., Research Handbook on Executive Pay (Edward
Elgar Publishing: UK, 2012) 219-240.
15
Jaap Winter, “Corporate Governance Going Astray: Executive Remuneration Built to Fail” in Randall S. Thomas and
Jennifer G. Hill eds., Research Handbook on Executive Pay (Edward Elgar Publishing: UK, 2012) 199-218; Sanjai Bhagat and
Roberta Romano, “Reforming Financial Executives’ Compensation for the Long-Term” in in Randall S. Thomas and Jennifer G.
Hill eds., Research Handbook on Executive Pay (Edward Elgar Publishing: UK, 2012) 136-158.
16
Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, the Corporation and the
Public (Berrett-Koehler Publishers: San Francisco, 2012).
17
See David Millon, “Enlightened shareholder value, social responsibility and the re-definition of corporate purpose
without law” in P.M. Vasudev and Susan Watson, Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (Northampton: Edward Elgar,
2012) 68-100.
18
See Romano, supra note 15; see also Yannick Hausmann and Elisabeth Bechtold-Orth, “Changing Remuneration
Systems in Europe and the United States: A Legal Analysis of Recent Developments in the Wake of the Financial Crisis” (2010)
11(2) European Business Organization L R 195.
14
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from the shareholder primacy model and the shareholder value norm. If legislators, regulators
and corporations themselves seek to develop and implement lasting reforms, it is imperative they
examine compensation reform from outside this paradigm and not take for granted the
foundations it rests upon might be poised to shift.

SECTION B: Problems with the Current Debate
The ongoing debate over compensation reform in the US is framed from an agency
theory perspective which accepts shareholder primacy's efficacy and unproblematic continued
existence. 19 This entails the same intensity of reliance on capital markets and performance-based
governance norms as before. Proponents of this model continue to argue that global responses to
the compensation problem are rooted firmly within this paradigm, intimating that convergence of
corporate governance to a liberal market based model persists. 20 However, there are several
indicators, which will be examined herein, that the crisis has called into question various aspects
of this approach. Corporate law scholarship has recently examined several aspects of the current
model's weaknesses, namely the limitations of performance-based governance norms, the
ineffectiveness of shareholder governance, and the inability of capital markets to signal that
management's strategy is unsustainable or that the firm's existence is at risk. 21 The impact on
other stakeholders of overemphasizing the profit motive has also been a central theme. The
recent revival of an alternative theory to neoclassical economics called the Double-Movement
has opened inquiries in this area which shed some light on recent events such as Enron, the
Financial Crisis and the growing disparity of incomes in many liberal market economies. 22
The problems identified and norms disseminated by supranational bodies such as the
Financial Stability Forum (FSF), Council of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and various
shareholder and labour organizations reveal several key differences when compared with the

See also, Lucian A. Bebchuck and Holger Spamann, “Regulating Bankers’ Pay” (2010) 98(2) Georg L J 247.
Hausmann and Bechtold-Orth, supra note 18.
21
See Leonard I. Rotman, “Re-evaluating the basis for corporate governance in the post, post-Enron era” in P.M.
Vasudev and Susan Watson, Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2012) 101-119; See
also Millon, supra note 17; Jacoby, supra note 1, Deakin supra note 4.
22
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Farrar and Rinehart:
1944); Jacoby, supra note 1.
19
20
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post-Enron global response. 23 In the post-crisis regulatory environment the approach has shifted
from improving managerial performance by encouraging greater profit-seeking and risk-taking
towards ensuring that compensation incentives do not pose a risk management problem and
encourage short-term gains at the expense of the corporation’s long-term viability. 24 This postcrisis dimension of executive compensation reform and its focus on the societal effects of
corporate power has unfolded at the transnational level. Having global ramifications, the crisis
has spurred a need across several jurisdictions to put the brakes on a runaway train, the
shareholder value norm and its relentless pursuit of shareholder wealth at all costs.
Finally, the magnitude of required change that post-crisis compensation reform has
identified, namely the need to run large corporations sustainably and in the public interest, raises
questions of how this can be achieved within the existing paradigm. Several regulatory themes
emerge from post-crisis regulation of executive pay, indicating a shift away from the current
approach towards a more stakeholder-inclusive form of governance. 25

SECTION C: The Promises of Agency Theory and Optimal Contracting
Before the 1990s during the period of 'managerialism' executive compensation was
viewed as a potential governance problem in the firm. 26 The challenge was to ensure that the
CEO was paid adequately for their talents but not excessively. 27 While this dimension of the
debate still persists today, from the 1990’s onwards it has been viewed more dominantly as a
mechanism for controlling managerial power. 28 While corporate law imposes mandatory duties
onto directors to manage the corporation, executive pay has developed alongside statutory norms
as a self-regulatory mechanism for constraining and harnessing managerial power and talent. 29

Guido Ferrarini and Maria Cristina Ungureanu, “Economics, Politics and International Principles for Sound
Compensation Practices: An Analysis of Executive Pay at European Banks” (2011) 64 Vand L R 431.
24
See Hill, supra note 14.
25
Ibid.
26
Charles M. Yablon, “Bonus Questions: Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance: (1999) 75 Notre
Dame LR 271.
27
Ibid.
28
See Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, “CEO Incentives: It’s Not How Much You Pay But How” (2010) 68
Harv Bus R 138.
29
Ibid.
23
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Compensation as a governance solution seeks to address managerial power in the firm. It
defines managerial power narrowly in terms of agency costs, a lack of performance and risktaking. 30 Preoccupied with increasing the pursuit of profit and risk-taking this approach justifies
significantly higher levels of pay as long as share price is increased. 31 It defines the principleagent problem as the propensity of managers to withhold maximum effort, play it safe, accept
higher pay for lower performance and divert the firm's resources to non-productive, self-serving
ends. It attempts to solve this by replicating for the executive shareholder's incentive for greater
efficiency, risk and profit-seeking, as measured by market value. 32 Thus, profit maximization
becomes the sole measure of good governance. This is based on the assumption that current
share price is an accurate reflection of total firm value and that raising share price is the desirable
outcome of properly functioning compensation incentives. 33

SECTION D: How This Governance Orthodoxy Has Now Been Challenged
The post-crisis response to compensation reform recognizes that the performance-based
approach to addressing managerial power in the public corporation introduces a new set of
problems into corporate governance. Executive compensation, as a solution to the agency
problem has itself become a risk-management problem according to several post-crisis
assessments. 34 There exists widespread recognition not only that the structure of pay can be
flawed and fail to enhance shareholder value, but also that incentive compensation can lead
executives to damage the corporation for the sake of short-term profits while harming a range of
societal interests. 35 Corporate governance scholars have been preoccupied with the shareholder
value model's outwards effects for quite some time. The CSR movement and its proponents have
adeptly documented the externalities generated by profit maximization and corporate activity
generally, namely the growing wealth, benefit and risk disparity between front-line workers and
top management of public corporations as well as top income earners in associated finance-based

30
31
32
33
34
35

Jensen and Murphy, supra note 28;
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occupations. 36 However, the crisis represents an additional problem. The outwards negative
effects of profit maximization have gone so far as to overwhelm the checks and balances of the
entire governance regime, leading many to comment that the governance by performance
approach is unsustainable.

SECTION E: How This Is Not Being Recognized
Amongst post-crisis assessments of compensation systems and their reform, divergent
views exist on what post-crisis responses represent. The minority view holds that executive
compensation has undergone a paradigm shift away from the optimal contracting model and
performance based norms of conduct. 37 This is viewed as a partial reversal of the shift in
approach that occurred in the 1990's after law and economics thinking had been firmly
established in corporate law and with the advent of the Jensen and Murphy's influential piece
advocating that “it’s not how much you pay but how.”

38

However, the majority approach attempts to explain all post-crisis responses as being
consistent with optimal contracting and fails to assess whether a paradigm shift is occurring. It
acknowledges that post-crisis pay reform centres on reducing excessive risk-taking and
promoting a long-term sustainable approach to running the firm, yet fails to consider the
magnitude of this shift and what it actually entails in the liberal-market context. These are crucial
starting points for determining how to proceed with effective and sustainable reform and for
assessing whether the current shareholder primacy paradigm is equipped for dealing with the
changes that post-crisis compensation reform has identified. Thus, to proceed with this project, it
is essential to ask the following three questions:

See Kent Greenfield, “Saving the World With Corporate Law?” (April 3, 2007) Boston College Law School Research
Paper No. 130, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=978242 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.978242 : Jacoby, supra
note 1; See also E. Merrick Dodd Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, (1932) 45 HARV L. REV 1145.
37
See Hill, supra note 14.
38
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1. What is the magnitude of the current shift in governance thinking?
2. What does the required shift entail?
3. Is the shareholder primacy paradigm equipped to accommodate this shift?

SECTION F: The Magnitude of the Current Shift
The overarching theme of controlling excessive risk-taking and advancing a longer term
approach to running the firm calls forward an economic rationale on the part of directors that is
inconsistent with efficiency and performance based norms of directorial conduct. Despite the
attempt by mainstream scholarship to reconcile some of the differences that appear in regulatory
responses between jurisdictions as fitting within the optimal contracting paradigm, these
differences, it is argued, represent fundamentally divergent approaches to market governance.
While this has potentially significant implications for the convergence-divergence debate
which underlies post-crisis assessments of compensation reform, from a methodological
standpoint the issue is two-fold. 39 First, it is important to assess whether differences in
regulatory approach can be reconciled with shareholder primacy or whether they diverge. The
result of this determines the position we can take on whether corporate governance is continuing
to converge towards a more liberal market based model or whether the approaches of certain
jurisdictions are diverging.
While this in itself is instructive of shareholder primacy's efficacy in the post-crisis era, it
does not demonstrate whether shareholder primacy in its own context reveals any internal
consistencies with the need to constrain risk-taking and the pursuit of short-term profit. This
gives rise to the second issue, whether post-crisis responses in the United States reveal at best a
shift away from shareholder primacy and at least inconsistency with the need to run large public

For a seminal contribution to the convergence-divergence debate, see Jeffrey N. Gordon and Mark J. Roe eds.,
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press: UK, 2004).
39
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corporations sustainably and in the public interest. Here we ask a principle research question,
how do post-crisis regulatory responses to compensation reform stand to impact the management
orientations of large public companies in liberal and coordinated market economies? We examine
the United States and Germany with respect to the regulation of executive compensation.
We find that regulatory responses in Germany reinforce stakeholder-based norms of
conduct and strengthen directors' responsibilities towards protecting the corporate entity and
advancing its long-term interests. The measures implemented are specifically aimed at
preventing executive pay from rewarding short-term gains for shareholders or incentivizing
short-term behaviour and excessive risk. The level of discretion protected under the business
judgement rule is constrained through new standards for executive pay. These are implemented
through increased director liability rather than increased exposure to capital market pressures.
With respect to the US we find a greater emphasis on mandatory norms of conduct
centred on protecting the corporate entity. This is evident with the enhanced claw-back provision
requirement under Dodd-Frank requiring directors to implement policies for detecting and
recovering executive pay based not only on misrepresented earnings but also on inaccurate data
in the absence of fraud. 40 Despite not requiring directors to actually make recovery, this
constitutes and enhancement of directors' responsibilities to the corporate entity. Likewise, the
requirement to publicly disclose the CEO to worker wage ratio under the same Act demonstrates
recognition of the role that workers play in the entity's long-term sustainability. 41 However, both
provisions along with the others examined are reliant on the capital market's purported
preference for non-financial assessment criteria and long-term sustainable corporate management
as a means of enforcing these norms. We highlight the problematic aspects of this reliance.
This work concludes that German responses in several respects diverge from optimal
contracting and a broader shareholder-based approach. Responses in the United States aside from
demonstrating a greater emphasis on mandatory norms of conduct are to a large extent
incompatible with what post-crisis compensation reform seeks to achieve, a long-term
sustainable approach to running the firm in the public interest.

40
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See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010, s 954.
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SECTION G: What Long-Term Sustainable Governance Entails
This is the subject of a long-standing debate over how the corporation should be run, in
the interests of whom and the most effective means of constraining managerial power. 42 How
managerial power is defined and how the legal-institutional nexus of corporate law is
conceptualized for the purposes of reform is also at issue. At the heart of this debate are
competing theories of the firm which purport to deal with managerial power in differing
capacities. It is crucial to understand the consequences of either approach, the historical
relevance of each, and their relationship today. To apply such a broad analysis to the executive
compensation issue we need to step outside the law and economics paradigm and examine how
executive pay has evolved within a historically shifting political economic and legal context.
The entity metaphor of corporate law evolved from the previous framework to deal with
the problem of managerial power in the context of a neo-corporatist political-economy in the
post-Great Depression era. 43 Referred to as the traditional legal model, this approach was the
subject of intense academic debate around how directors’ duties ought to be defined and which
management orientation should prevail. 44 At issue were the outwards effects of managerial
power on stakeholder groups and the optimal means for ensuring shareholder value. 45 The
debate touched upon the appropriate consideration of stakeholder interests in order for investors
to achieve sustainable returns and whether the shareholder wealth maximization norm were
suitable avenues to effective governance. Directorial discretion to consider multiple interests in
accordance with the best interests of the corporate entity has consequently prevailed.
The contractual metaphor evolved in the 1970's to address purported weaknesses of the
legal model at the time, namely the inability of this model to address the problem of managerial
slack, characterized as inefficiency and sub-optimal risk in corporate operations. 46 These factors
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were attributed by economists to weak market forces which failed to adequately constrain
managerial power. 47 The lack of competitiveness amongst large public corporations in the LME
context was cited as the source of the rampant economic stagnation of the 1970's that ushered in
an era of 'Reaganism' in the US and 'Thatcherism in the U.K. This re-conceptualization of
corporate law served as a basis for reforming corporate governance and also to explain the
effects that the rapid growth of capital markets in the 1980s had on the orientations of corporate
managers. 48
In sum the answer to this question of what sustainable governance entails is that a longstanding debate continues on between competing theories of the firm and the differing
approaches they represent. While these approaches purport to deal with different aspects of
managerial power, performance versus rent extraction, the crisis shows that the goals they seek
to achieve conflict with drastic repercussions for how managerial power is constrained. This in
turn highlights the need to constrain the overemphasis of the profit motive and balance profitseeking against long-term sustainability, responsible risk-taking and stakeholder interests.

SECTION H: Prospects of the Current Approach
Here we assess whether the shareholder-primacy paradigm is equipped to accommodate
the needed changes identified for post-crisis executive compensation reform to be effective. It
becomes apparent that the debate over how to proceed in corporate governance towards averting
another crisis and creating sustainable capitalism is divided three ways. At the heart of deciding
which to accept lays a choice between competing assessments over the governance orientations
that develop from director's existing level of discretion and exposure to capital market pressures.
The first approach is to increase shareholder rights and re-balance power between
directors and shareholders. This entails accepting that current market forces are inadequate to
achieve effective constraints on managerial power and that shareholders are better equipped at
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disciplining directors for excessive risk and unsustainable short-term profit seeking. 49
The second approach accepts that the state of management's exposure to capital market
pressures and directorial discretion are not only optimal market outcomes themselves but are
suitable for constraining managerial power and ensuring sustainable profit-seeking provided that
the model can be internally improved. 50 This entails getting the structure of executive pay right
through better norms of conduct.
Drawing on contradictions found within these former approaches, an emerging third view
holds that existing market forces and the current level of directorial discretion are untenable for
ensuring corporate sustainability. 51 The current level of discretion protected under the business
judgement rule in some respects is undesirable. Although it protects the Board's discretion to
consider a multitude of stakeholder interests and rebuff investors' demands for short-term profit
in favour of a longer term strategy, the Board's management orientation is equally susceptible to
being influenced by demands for short-term profits and excessive risk-taking. Perverse executive
compensation incentives are an outcome of these factors premised on the Board's overemphasis
of the profit-motive and unfettered acceptance of performance-based norms of conduct. As long
as directors have discretion to favour extreme profit-seeking as a goal on which to base
compensation, unprecedented levels of pay will be justified by current share price. 52
We argue that this latter approach is the most accurate for approaching post-crisis reform
and advance evidence to demonstrate its persuasiveness. This requires answering three questions:

1) What arrangements do existing market forces under the current level of directorial
discretion lead to?
The answer is that current market forces in conjunction with directorial discretion

This view is advanced by shareholder rights scholars. See for example Lucian A. Bebchuk, “The Case for Increasing
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51
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produce results that are unsustainable. To support this premise we turn to scholarship on the
'Double Movement' and its application and revival by political-economists and corporate law
scholars. 53 Evidence is presented from progressive corporate law scholarship which shows not
only that the current legal-institutional framework permits such governance orientations to
develop but also that current market forces are incapable of producing sustainable firm
governance and a more stakeholder inclusive approach to running the firm without more. 54 The
prospects of corporate law under the current business judgement rule are assessed.

2)

What would increasing shareholder power result in?

The answer to this question is premised on much of the same scholarship as above, which
addresses the argument to increase shareholder rights and reduce the power of the Board. The
arguments against such an approach are presented and then assessed. The overarching conclusion
is that shareholders are incapable of monitoring managerial power in a manner that will ensure
sustainable firm development and the inclusion of stakeholder interests for both legal and
structural reasons. 55

3)

To what extent can directors consider the interests of other stakeholders in the face
of capital market pressures?

Here the nexus between markets and management orientation is examined. The structural
limitations of the existing legal-institutional framework for tolerating managerial slack have been
well-documented. In the absence of adequate pressures from product and capital markets,
managerial slack is said to persist, rendering firms stagnant and unable to compete. 56 In the
presence of robust market pressures, firms are said to find new efficiencies to improve
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competition and satisfy investor demands. 57 By exercising discretion and considering the
interests of other stakeholders, managers are said to generate agency costs, signalling to investors
to discipline management through their market power. 58 This includes ensuring that corporate
governance mechanisms tightly bond managers’ interests with shareholder wealth maximization,
leaving little room for considering interests outside if this relationship. 59
Recent scholarship from Australia, a liberal market economy similar in many ways to the
US, demonstrates that management is able to consider the interests of stakeholders beyond what
is thought to be possible in the liberal market context. 60 Such 'high road to economic production'
appears to be a feasible alternative for creating competitive firms which are sufficiently
profitable to investors over time. 61 This demonstrates that the optimal line between shareholder
value maximization and directors' discretion to consider other interests might need to be reassessed. However, as already mentioned, the current framework militates towards producing
outcomes that are fixated on short-term returns that are unsustainable. Thus, to affect such a
change, stakeholder based norms are needed along with a means for their enforcement.

SECTION I: Thesis
After assessing the magnitude of the changes that post crisis compensation reform is
calling for and what these changes actually entail, we can address the ultimate question this work
seeks to address, whether the shareholder primacy model is equipped to accommodate this
change or whether and to what extent directors should be required to consider the long-term
interests of the firm and its stakeholder when setting executive pay? This work argues that the
attempt of mainstream corporate legal scholarship to conceptualize and analyze the changes that
have occurred with respect to executive compensation and its ongoing reform and regulation
from the dominant paradigm is problematic because it ultimately reveals several inadequacies
and inconsistencies in this approach and is an inaccurate rendition of the significance and
Ibid.
Ibid.
59
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60
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magnitude of these changes and what they represent for corporate governance. This in turn has
practical consequences because it informs the types of norms that will underpin corporate
governance arrangements moving forward from the crisis which are supposed to prevent a
similar economic meltdown and its widespread societal repercussions.

SECTION J: Can the Current Approach to Compensation Reform Support Sustainable
Governance?
To apply the broader question of whether shareholder primacy is suitable for attaining
sustainable governance, specifically to executive pay, we must ask the following two questions:
1.

Should agency costs be predominantly defined as a lack of performance and does

attempting to constrain managerial power through performance-based norms of
conduct exacerbate its outwards effects?
2.

Can excessive risk-taking and short-term profit-seeking be effectively constrained
by adjusting the structure of executive compensation to better align shareholder
and manager interests without changing the existing level of directors’ discretion
and exposure to capital market pressures?
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PART I- STEPPING OUTSIDE AGENCY THEORY

CHAPTER THREE:
Disentangling Narratives on Executive Pay
Several narratives can be identified in the literature which often overlap but are conflated
in assessments of the executive pay problem. Disentangling the debate on executive pay in this
manner allows us to identify which interests are at play, the underlying tensions between them
and how the debate has evolved historically. This serves to further an understanding of the
debate’s basic concepts and to orient our analysis outside the law and economics paradigm. The
pay for performance perspective is but one paradigm for conceptualizing the problem.

SECTION A: Excessiveness as Societal Fairness
This narrative represents a debate over the distribution of the firm’s value added amongst
economic actors. It raises the question, “how much do corporate executives really contribute to
the firm’s success to deserve a disproportionate share of its wealth?” and juxtaposes the interests
of the firm’s executives against the well-being of its employees. More broadly, it represents a
conflict between the wealth extracting function of the corporation and society’s interests in fairer
wealth distribution.
From this perspective, critics call into question the size of the executive’s total
remuneration and the issuance of stock option mega grants by Boards of Directors on the basis
that production is a team effort and that excessive pay harms society by contributing to
inequality. 62 This argument was dominant in the period leading up to the 1990’s when labor
unions and public interest groups in the U.S. began to vociferously challenge the level of
compensation being awarded to those at the helm of large U.S. publicly traded corporations. 63
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During this period which spanned the 1980’s executive compensation on average rose a
staggering 212% which stood in sharp contrast to the preceding decade in which executive
compensation on average rose only 30% between the years 1971 and 1981. 64
The 1990’s ushered in a period of economic recession which markedly impacted the
performance of U.S. public firms who were forced to shed hundreds of thousands of jobs to
maintain profitability. While factory workers statistically received on average a 2.8% increase in
wages for that year, inflation was pegged at 6.1%. 65 Corporate profits declined by 7% during
the same period while the average total compensation for the top executive continued to rise.
This line of the excessiveness critique highlights the juxtaposition that emerges in this period
between the interests of workers, executives and shareholders. 66
This conflict is further exacerbated by executives receiving even higher levels of pay than
the previous decade while invoking severe cost cutting measures in the recessionary economy
that impact front-line workers. This rapid expansion in overall executive compensation is driven
by the proliferation of stock option mega-grants justified by compensation consultants and
Boards of Directors as paying for performance. 67 While, corporate profits on average are down,
workers bear a disproportionate share of these economic losses, while executives are rewarded
for making difficult decisions aimed at maintaining profitability for shareholders. 68
The excessiveness problem highlights how a conflict over fairness between managers and
workers maps over a more fundamental debate on corporate purpose. The question of whether a
particular level of pay is merited can be answered in reference to multiple iterations of
performance goals corresponding to different visions of corporate purpose. One such possibility
is to view the executive’s compensation as being merited because it rewards ruthlessly efficient
and unmitigated exploitation of the resources necessary for the creation of wealth for investors
without any regard for the societal effects of this strategy, the so-called shareholder value norm
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as some have criticized it. 69 Another such possibility is to view the executive’s compensation as
being merited because it rewards the executive for being a ‘good corporate citizen’ and for
implementing ‘partnerships-at-work’ style employee management systems where employees fare
better overall in the enterprise. 70

SECTION B: Excessiveness as Corporate Waste
A second branch of the “excessiveness” narrative is found within corporate governance
discourse. Directors entrusted to promote the corporation’s well-being and safeguard its assets
are influenced by managers to approve compensation that grossly exceeds the reasonable and fair
value of what the executive is worth. Excessive pay damages the corporation because it
generates waste and undue costs which affect its competitiveness. 71 It rewards executives for
under-performing and encourages sub-standard effort which affects value over the long-run. 72
This narrative of the over-compensation problem is two-fold. On the one hand it
represents a critique of managerial power in the firm, the problem of self-interested behavior and
a lack of directorial oversight. It focuses on protecting the corporation’s assets from being
appropriated by the firm’s managers. This problem invokes the basic function served by
fiduciary duties, to provide a mechanism for the stockholders to protect their investment from the
most basic forms of malfeasance and to act as guardians of the corporation’s property.
Under statute, shareholders have the right to bring suit on behalf of the firm to discipline
managers and recover any losses for the corporation. 73 In earlier suits by shareholders alleging
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that the executive’s compensation was unreasonable, courts would distinguish between interested
and disinterested Boards. 74 If a substantial portion of the Board had an interest in the
compensation being awarded, courts would not presume reasonableness or good faith on the
Board’s part and would shift the burden onto directors to prove that the compensation was
reasonable. 75
If the Board for the most part was made up of disinterested directors and no evidence
existed that it failed to inform itself of all reasonably available material concerning the
compensation then courts would presume that directors acted in good faith in a manner that they
believed to be in the best interests of the corporation, extending the protection of the business
judgment rule from liability for unreasonable or poor decisions. 76 Being concerned only with the
quintessential problem of self-interested behavior, courts were careful not to heighten the ability
of the stockholders to readily allege fraud and excessively scrutinize expenditures. 77
Realizing the problem with appropriation and opportunistic behavior of this type in the
period following the Great Depression, legislators enacted requirements for public corporations
to disclose compensation details. A variation of this problem still persists (and is arguably
exacerbated) with incentive compensation and stock option plans. Having been well
documented since at least the early 1990’s executives have been known to manipulate earnings
and engage in fraudulent misrepresentation of financial information to enhance the value of their
options or hide internal problems that might lower their value. 78
Another related phenomenon documented since the 1990’s is “stealth compensation”
which amounts to extractions of the corporation’s wealth in the form of high pay. 79 By failing to
declare or account for the true costs of stock option grants to the corporation until several years
down the road when these costs have multiplied, shareholders are in effect misled over the actual
sums of money being paid to the executive and its impact on future share value when the options
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vest. Both the former and the latter practice has since been a target of legislation in the post
Enron era. 80
On the other hand, recognizing the vulnerable position of stockholders, courts in some
cases began to recognize that scenarios existed where directors even when acting in good faith
failed to ensure that the compensation awarded was reasonably. 81 The earliest of such cases was
Rogers v. Hill 82 in which a group of minority shareholders through a derivative suit challenged
the level of pay awarded by American Tobacco’s Board to its CEO George Washington Hill.
Despite being approved by a majority of the stockholders the Supreme Court recognized that the
sheer amount of the compensation awarded could amount “to a spoliation and waste of corporate
property” for which the corporation receives no equivalent benefit even if directors or a majority
of shareholders approve the payments in good faith. 83
The requirement created by the doctrine of corporate waste, at least in the earlier cases,
goes beyond the role that fiduciaries play in stemming self-interested behavior. By prohibiting
directors from wasting corporate assets, it seeks to protect the vulnerable position of the
shareholder. Essentially the doctrine creates a positive, albeit limited, requirement for
performance when dispensing with the corporation’s assets. Despite assertions the doctrine fails
to go far enough, 84 the basic function of guarding against mismanagement without juxtaposing
the interests of shareholders against the corporation is fulfilled.
The doctrine of waste represents a set of trade-offs between the rights and interests of
shareholders and directors and between different groups of investors. By sanctioning poor
judgment with how assets are deployed, the doctrine gives shareholders limited rights to protect
their vulnerable position against more than just fraud, to ensure the corporation's economic
survival. Through procedural burdens and evidentiary thresholds, courts have drawn a line
between excessive and meritorious litigation, both impediments to corporate organization. 85
Courts have been careful to restrain shareholder power through a reluctance to substitute their
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judgment for what ought to have been reasonable in hindsight. 86 Directors are allowed to be
wrong as long as they acted informed and diligently. 87
Caution to not discourage risk-taking is balanced against the reality that shareholders are
inherently risk bearers, can mitigate this risk and can benefit greatly if the risk pays off. The
doctrine therefore sets a minimum standard for the benefit that directors must endeavor to obtain,
but stops short of requiring that benefit to actually materialize. For instance, high compensation
levels can be approved to attain top talent and superior performance, yet there is no recourse if
the performance fails to materialize.
In general, corporate law prevents shareholders from dictating that the profit motive must
be emphasized. It affords discretion to balance competing interests in a manner directors believe
in good faith benefits the corporation. The courts have been careful not to enable shareholders to
place their interests ahead of the corporation’s and limit their intervention to enforcing norms of
trust, not efficiency. 88 However, the standard is broad enough to allow managers to favor
strategies that are closely aligned with their own interests in extracting high compensation and
expanding the firm to increase their power.

89

SECTION C: Excessiveness as a Lack of Performance
This narrative problematizes excessiveness in relation to performance only and is not
necessarily based on the overall size of the compensation being awarded. Accordingly, the largest
detriment to the corporation of overindulging its top executive is the cost of lost economic
benefit. Paying excessively in relation to performance means for the same amount of
compensation directors could have obtained better results, which translates into better returns for
the stockholders who invest on unspecified terms. Yet for several reasons directors either fail to
obtain value for the firm when hiring the executive or fail to discipline the executive for poor
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performance. 90
Although not clarified in the literature, excessiveness as gauged by performance
presumably exists on a spectrum at which one end the executive exerts a satisfactory effort in
running the company efficiently and creating growth while at the other they drive growth
aggressively to secure the maximum rate of return for shareholders. There are short-term versus
long-term trade-offs involved in either of these approaches and they impact the interests of the
corporation’s constituents in various ways, depending on how performance is measured and
defined.
Although intertwined with the discourse over improving incentives for performance, this
is not a critique that pay incentives fail to properly motivate but that they fail to curb
overindulgence by rewarding sub-standard performance. 91This viewpoint criticizes the size of
executive compensation and views mechanisms such as incentive compensation as failing to
ensure that executives are being rewarded for actual performance, regardless of how that
performance is defined. Thus, stock option plans fail to reward the executive for actual
contributions and hard work because they tie overall pay to the market which rises and falls,
allowing the executive to profit from lucky circumstances and crafty tactics. 92
This particular problem reflects the propensity of managers to exploit weaknesses in their
compensation schemes and to extract rents from the firm. This is related to but differs from
managerial slack. It also serves to highlight the limitations of allowing capital markets to

This is attributable to the quintessential problem of self-interested behavior by managers and the influence they have
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Fried and David I. Walker, “Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation” (June 2002), 69
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determine what the executive is worth. 93 Finally it speaks to the reluctance and inability of
directors to ensure that pay is in line with performance by making better bargains with executives
and ensuring that pay remains proportionate to performance over time.

SECTION D: Performance Perspective
The “performance” perspective builds on the latter by extending the problem to a lack
shareholder wealth maximization. The excessive pay aspect is downplayed and superseded by
the need to ensure executives are performing at the highest level possible. This approach places
no maximum value on compensation and views high pay as a necessary tool for creating high
levels of performance by capital market value. The focus is on ensuring compensation is tightly
linked to performance as opposed to reducing its size. 94
In response to the perceived inability of the corporate waste doctrine to curb excessive
pay and the inadequacies of corporate law to solve the managerial performance issue, 95 the over
compensation problem was re-conceptualized from being a corporate governance problem to a
corporate governance tool. 96 Unlike positing that performance exists on a discretionary
spectrum, this view posits management’s sole function is to maximize shareholder wealth. This
entails redefining corporate value metrics and a narrow conceptualization of managerial power in
the firm. 97
I. Optimal Contracting Model
The use of incentive compensation is supported by optimal contracting theory. This
Barris, Ibid. (noting that many compensation packages are constructed so that the executive profits in good times and is
protected in bad).
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model defines managerial power as agency costs, which are created when managers deviate from
the shareholder value norm. 98 Agency costs include the propensity of managers to withhold
maximum effort, divert corporate strategy in non-efficient ways to further their own ends, and to
take sub-optimal risks by playing it safe. 99 The aim of executive pay is to replicate shareholder
incentives to take greater risks, maximize returns for shareholders and to refrain from
considering non-shareholder interests. 100 This can be summarized as follows:
“At its most basic level, the granting of incentives is based upon the “greed” principle: An
executive will make decisions which he believes will increase the value of his corporation’s
stock, which in turn will increase his personal wealth. While the executive is busy assuring his
personal gain, he assures gain for all. 101

This narrow definition of managerial power minimizes the problematic perceptions
around wealth extraction and corporate waste. If shareholders are experiencing high returns,
significantly higher levels of pay are tolerated.

102

Excessive pay is relevant only in relation to

performance as an indicator that incentive contracts are not functioning well enough. 103 High
levels of pay are seen as being necessary for creating incentives that work. 104 The biggest cost of
excessive and improperly structured compensation is lost performance.

105

Optimal incentive contracts are assumed to arise in the existing framework of corporate
law if two essential conditions are met. 106 The first is that directors understand their duties are to
maximize shareholder wealth and act accordingly. 107 The second is for capital markets to work
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efficiently and convey sufficient information about the firm to shareholders. 108 Provided that
directors are professional, independent and disinterested they will heed to the demands of capital
markets and bargain for compensation that is optimal in structure and size. Likewise if
shareholders are privy to accurate and timely disclosure on earnings and other relevant data, they
can gauge how agency costs are being managed. 109
This model relies on the efficient markets hypothesis (“EMH”) which posits that capital
markets are efficient at pricing firms accurately and reflect available public data. 110 Moreover,
the price changes instantly to reflect newly available public information such as quarterly
earnings. 111 Thus, current market price reflects shareholders’ future expectations of the firm's
performance. 112 Many have argued that capital markets are poor at reflecting hidden financial
information about the firm, especially when the costs of short-term strategies materialize much
later.

113

In 1990’s when high executive compensation became a popular solution to controlling
agency costs as opposed to a product of managerial power itself, the principle problem identified
was that compensation incentives were not high-powered enough. 114 This criticism advanced by
Jensen and Murphy and others was levelled at the design of executive compensation and posited
that if directors were truly acting in shareholders’ interests they would do away with bureaucratic
compensation schemes. 115 The problem defined was not a failure of the market to place
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sufficient pressure on directors, as the clamour by shareholders over excessive pay was quite
loud. It was that directors needed to develop better practices as opposed to giving into pressures
from public interest groups to reduce the size of pay. 116
II. Managerial Power Approach
Another theory from within this paradigm is the managerial power approach. Like
contemporary proponents of optimal contracting, these scholars attempt to explain why
incentives fail to create performance in the long-run. While accepting the validity of the optimal
model, this approach explains why optimal contracting fails to occur and proposes a solution for
ensuring that Boards develop optimal compensation contracts. 117
The managerial power approach challenges whether markets within the existing
framework of corporate law exert adequate pressure onto directors. While they acknowledge
shareholders exert pressure on directors to set pay in their interests they posit that managers exert
significant counter-pressure that undermines the sensitivity of pay to performance and interferes
with the design of compensation as a form of rent extraction. 118 The implications of this are
significant both inside and outside the performance paradigm because it highlights the limitations
of what compensation incentives can achieve. It demonstrates that incentive compensation is not
a comprehensive solution for all manifestations of managerial power. While incentives can
motivate managers to pursue value maximization, they cannot prevent managers from undoing
their own restraints.
The managerial power approach posits the design of executive pay not only as an
instrument for addressing the agency problem but as part of the agency problem itself. 119 In fact,
two agency problems exist. The first, between executives and the Board, while the second,
between the Board and shareholders. Ineffective arrangements are negotiated when the Board
succumbs to managerial influence through non-arm’s length bargaining. These include higher
than optimal pay amounts, golden parachutes, executive loans and stealth compensation. This has
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two consequences. One is that managers extract a rent from the firm by receiving higher levels of
pay than those obtainable at arm’s length. The other is that performance is decoupled from pay
resulting in forgone earnings and firm value which are substantial in size.
A key distinction is made between differing manifestations of managerial power and how
they should be addressed. Managerial slack, suboptimal risk-taking and empire building is
purportedly addressed by properly functioning compensation incentives. The effective control of
rent extraction, executive greed and the propensity of managers to undo their own restraints
depend on the Board’s willingness and ability to resist such pressures. 120 The Board’s propensity
to negotiate pay that is highly sensitive to performance and to keep rent extraction in check is
impacted by the extent of managerial influence on the Board, the quality of directors and their
practices, and shareholders’ ability to effectively discipline the Board. Without adequate
shareholder pressure on directors to resist managerial power, the Board is unable to negotiate
optimal performance incentives. 121

Section E: Stakeholder Perspective
The stakeholder perspective fits neither into the excessiveness nor performance based
category of critique but instead looks at how the size and structure of compensation plans impact
the corporation as an entity and its various constituents. Focusing more on the net benefits of
compensation schemes and their outcomes, one sub-set of this narrative in particular
problematizes the size of high-powered incentive schemes arguing that they undermine worker
morale and productivity which in turn impacts the firm quite markedly in the long run. 122 These
effects arguably outweigh the immediate benefits that high- powered compensation incentives
might have on the firm’s performance and call on directors to carefully weigh the costs and
benefits of compensation arrangements in accordance with their duties to the corporation. 123
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Unlike the optimal contracting model which posits directors’ sole focus as creating
powerful incentives for the CEO to maximize shareholder value through maximizing their own
wealth, this perspective invokes directors’ discretion to determine whether the size of executive
pay should be limited for the best interests of the corporate entity. This is not necessarily for the
purposes of controlling corporate waste but to account for how incentive compensation, or more
generally the side effects of aligning shareholder and executive interests more closely, impacts
other corporate constituents and how this in turn impacts the firm’s long-term performance. 124
In response to growing levels of CEO pay in the post-Enron period and the flurry of
proxy activity by activist shareholders claiming that high levels of CEO to worker wage disparity
are harmful to society, Professor Randall Thomas poses the question, should corporate directors
respond to these claims and do such executive pay practices harm their firms and implicate
Boards’ fiduciary duties? He argues that:
“Wide gaps between the top and bottom of the pay scale can, in certain circumstances,
directly and adversely affect firm value, that corporate boards should be informed about these
effects and in many cases they should reduce internal pay differentials to address them.” 125

Professor Thomas canvasses numerous empirical studies that link wide disparities
between top management and front-line worker pay to poor long-term performance. As these
disparities grow, workers begin to feel resentment towards management and their own
performance, productivity and commitment towards that firm begin to diminish. Thomas cites
that stock option mega grants, defined as grants of over $10 Million, are the primary contributors
to such disparities.
These effects are further exacerbated in a recessionary economy when CEO’s begin to
lay-off workers to maintain profitability. Often, massive corporate lay-offs will cause temporary
gains in stock price, triggering the cashing-in of CEO stock options. Executives, knowing that
the future of their company is uncertain, utilize their inside knowledge to cash in their options at
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the opportune time. Thomas argues that “directors’ duty of care obligates them to be informed
about the value of these plans as that constitutes material information about their firm.”
At its core this perspective calls on directors to weigh the benefits and costs to
shareholders of short-term versus long-term modes of running the firm and ties the interests of
stakeholders into the latter as being necessary of consideration for achieving this end. Given that
the desired aim of incentive compensation is to effect sustained shareholder value, this argument
questions whether key inherent features of the optimal contracting model such as the need for
extraordinary levels of compensation and a sole focus on shareholder returns can actually
achieve the task of creating value over the long-run. In doing so, it makes an assertion that the
firm should be run with the interests of stakeholders in mind and that mandatory norms in
corporate law should play a more central role in the setting of executive compensation. 126
The same critical lens can be applied to analyzing some of the other effects that
compensation incentives might have on managerial behavior such as increased risk-taking and
aggressive pursuit of short-term returns and the consequences this has for stakeholders in the
context of corporate organization. From this perspective the issue of perverse incentives can be
problematized not as a misalignment between shareholder and executive interests, but as an
inherent feature of incentive compensation and the optimal contracting model.
The phenomenon of managers extensively pursuing short-term goals instead of
positioning the company for the future can be construed as an effect of using incentive
compensation to improve a firm’s market value, of rendering shareholders more responsive to the
short-term demands of shareholders and as a by-product of pursing the shareholder value norm
without considering the impact of its externalities. In effect pursuing higher levels of profitability
more aggressively through increased risk-taking has its own set of consequences for the firm
which directors from this standpoint should be poised to assess and differs from the dynamic that
arises when a more long-term approach to managing the firm is pursued.

This refers to the directors’ duty to act in the best interests of the corporate entity as an ongoing concern and not to
jeopardize the entity’s well-being for the sake of short-term shareholder wealth. The basic concept is that economic benefits
should flow from the entity if directors act in its best interests, which necessarily entails profit maximization, as opposed to
seeking profit maximization as an end in itself.
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Unlike the performance perspective from which the goal of incentive compensation is to
limit the extent to which managers might consider other interests, which is defined as an agency
cost 127 or as political interference in the effectiveness of the compensation incentive, 128 this
approach allows us to examine the externalities of emphasizing the profit motive. At the far end
of the spectrum, these externalities have the potential to bear systemic risk by threatening the
firm. By utilizing a stakeholder perspective to problematize incentive compensation and optimal
contracting, several juxtapositions and trade-offs become evident. These can be analyzed across
three key areas: 1) short-term versus long-term performance 2) excessive versus inadequate risktaking and 3) wealth appropriation versus inadequate performance.
I. Short-term versus Long-term Performance
Several trade-offs exist between pursuing short-term versus long-term performance and
incentive compensation being tied directly to the capital market, renders executives sensitive to
the short-term demands of shareholders. 129 In simple terms, incentive compensation is designed
to induce managers to pursue more profit without differentiating necessarily between short and
long term performance. 130 This raises an important question, what can corporate executives do
to raise share price and what are the limits on how high profits can be raised?
II. Excessive Risk versus Inadequate Risk
Given that the purpose of incentive compensation is aimed at increasing risk-taking in the
firm and not at curbing it, which could be perceived as an agency cost, it can be expected that
this is exactly what executives would do, especially if they are rewarded for success and
immunized from the costs of failure which are distributed to other constituents. 131 In fact, this is
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arguably what some shareholders seek, high gains for high risk-taking without being exposed to
significant costs. 132 This is justified under the economic theory of the firm because other
constituents are presumed to take these externalities into consideration when they bargain with
the firm. 133
However, it has been argued that this scenario in some cases poses a moral hazard in
which shareholders and the CEO can afford to take greater risks because the consequences of
failure are spread to several other parties who are not direct beneficiaries of the risk. 134 For
shareholders this is not usually a problem until the risk becomes so great that it results in firm
failure, undermining confidence in markets. On the flip-side, inadequate risk-taking leads to
firms that cannot compete effectively in the global market economy because managers fail to
innovate, find efficiencies, and instead extract high levels of pay for sub-substandard
performance. 135 In economic terms, risk aversion can lead to sub-optimal allocation of
resources 136 which is damaging to shareholders who invest for high rates of return. 137
III. Wealth Appropriation versus Inadequate Performance
The third key area where the inherent trade-offs of incentive compensation and the
optimal contracting model can be analyzed is the constraining of managerial power. At one end
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of the spectrum, without the use of incentive compensation, managers have the propensity to
appropriate excessive levels of pay and to put forth a sub-par effort in securing shareholder
returns. At the other end of the spectrum, with the use of incentive pay, managers purportedly
have an incentive to appropriate wealth by damaging the firm and imposing externalities onto
economic actors outside of the firm. The potential effects of this are firm failure and systemic
instability, both having drastic social consequences. The question that arises from this
perspective is where should the line be drawn between the competing consequences of either
approach?
PART II-WHAT DOES SUSTAINABLE GOVERNACE ENTAIL?
CHAPTER FOUR:
Competing Theories of the Firm in a Political-Economic Context
What does sustainable governance entail? Answering this question involves examining
the broader significance of a shift in thinking for executive pay, from a corporate law problem
associated with self-dealing to a solution for improving performance in the firm. The broader
implications of this shift and its underlying impetus are seldom discussed in the literature on
compensation reform, yet they represent a fundamental shift in thinking about corporate law, the
legal nature of firm, how the rights and responsibilities of these actors should be defined, and the
role of law versus the market in reconciling competing claims.
The “entity” metaphor served as the dominant paradigm for conceptualizing managerial
power in the post Great Depression era in the context of a “managerialist” framework of rights
and powers in corporate law, 138 against the backdrop of neo-corporatist economic relations
between capital, management, and the state, supporting a system of industrial capitalism. 139 The
debate which ensued from within this paradigm, over which constellation of rights and powers
best constrains managerial power, 140 underlies today’s debate over executive compensation, as a
political contest between labor and capital, raising questions of how these interests should be
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reconciled to facilitate effective economic organization.
The “contractual” metaphor began to take hold in the late 1970’s to address some of the
concerns that capital had with the existing system’s perceived deficiencies in the context of a
relatively stagnant period of economic growth. This was attributed in part to inefficient
production and managerial slack attributable to high agency costs being imposed by social
democratic pressures vying for a larger piece of the corporate pie. 141
The model which began to take hold was referred to as “shareholder primacy” which was
built largely on the existing “managerialist” framework but re-conceptualized how this apparatus
functioned and where market-based corporate governance mechanisms needed to be employed to
correct its perceived deficiencies and to alter how the benefits and risks of corporate activity
were distributed. 142
These changes occurred during a period of economic liberalization which witnessed the
rapid expansion of capital and product markets which placed constraints on managerial
discretion, 143 paving the way for the growth of financial capitalism, the dominant driving force
behind corporate strategy since. 144 Focusing not on the externalities of managerial power, but
on improving returns for shareholders, this approach removes labor from the equation, focusing
on the relationship between capital and management. The debate centers on the extent to which
the existing level of managerial discretion under corporate law is accepting of or resistant to
market forces which demand increasing levels of efficiency and profitability 145 and how this
model can be improved to better address certain aspects of managerial power defined narrowly in
terms of efficiency, performance, and current market value.
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The debate between optimal contracting and managerial power 147 defines how executive
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compensation has been problematized in the period leading up to the crisis. 148 Being
historically related in the context of the shift from an industrial neo-corporatist regime to a
liberalized market economy dominated by finance capitalism the entity and contractual
metaphors define and purport to solve different aspects of managerial power in the firm and
represent differing constellations of interests within and around the business corporation, a
distinct yet interrelated set of debates, and a differing set of solutions to how economic crises and
corporate scandals might be mitigated. 149
In moving forward from the crisis, it is crucial to understand the prospects and
consequences of viewing the executive compensation debate from either of these paradigms, to
understand how and why these debates might conflict. In viewing this conflict we can either
reconcile these differences or if irreconcilable then understand the sets trade-offs involved in
overemphasizing either of the approaches they represent.
Before venturing further into such an analysis, it is essential to introduce a framework
based on comparative political economy to enlarge the assessment of competing bases for
approaching executive pay. The Varieties of Capitalism (“VOC”) literature by Hall and Soskice
is suitable to gain a better understanding of the relationship that institutions such as the market
and the corporate legal framework have with particular corporate governance orientations, the
structure of capital holdings, and the labor management style practiced by firms and to assess the
significance and limitations of change within the current paradigm. 150

SECTION A: Varieties of Capitalism Framework
The principle innovations that Hall and Soskice bring to the table from the standpoint of
comparative political economy are that economic behavior consists of multiple economic actors
engaging in ‘strategic interactions’ in an effort to advance their own interests in a rational way;
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that the institutions which condition this interaction are the most important to study; and that
firms are the most crucial of these actors due to their overall effect on economic performance.
The key elements of the VOC approach relevant to this examination of executive
compensation reform are: 1) its relational view of the firm 2) its hallmark distinction between
liberal and coordinated market economies 3) the role it ascribes to institutions, and 4) its
conception of institutional complementarities. This approach takes a relational view of the firm
which constitutes actors as seeking to “develop and exploit core competencies and dynamic
capabilities” by establishing high-quality relationships with a wide range of economic actors and
corporate stakeholders. 151
Accordingly, this entails ‘coordination problems’ and the firm’s economic success
depends on its ability to coordinate in five principle spheres: industrial relations, vocational
training, governance, inter-firm relations, and with its employees. 152
How effectively firms coordinate in the corporate governance sphere determines the
availability of finance and the terms on which it can be secured while its ability to coordinate
bargaining over wages and working conditions and to ensure that employees are highly
competent and cooperative with the firm’s objectives determines the firm’s ability to produce
efficiently and profitably. 153 The other key tenet of the Hall and Soskice approach is its dual
model classification of capitalist economies distinguished by how these ‘coordination problems’
are resolved. This distinction between the ‘Liberal Market’ and ‘Coordinated Market’ economy is
premised largely on the system of corporate finance utilized and the governance arrangements
that develop in the presence of particular institutional constellations.
To overcome the barriers to coordination in Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) firms rely
on well-functioning and highly competitive markets to organize relationships based on supply
and demand considerations and arm’s length formal contracting. 154 In ‘Coordinated Market
Economies’ (CMEs) firms rely on non-market relationships and collaboration as opposed to
competition, based on relational contracting and private information to coordinate their

151
152
153
154

Hall and Soskice, supra note 150 at 6.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Hall and Soskice, supra note 150.

40

endeavours and “to develop and exploit core competencies.” 155 The institutions of the political
economy play a crucial role in providing support for how firms resolve coordination problems.
156

It is this relationship between institutions and coordination strategies that forms the basis of

the model’s ability to explain why firms in a particular national setting favour a given set of
arrangements, pursue a particular set of strategies or develop a particular structure.
According to the authors all capitalist economies “contain hierarchies that firms construct
to resolve the problems that cannot be addressed by markets alone. 157 However, in CMEs firms
rely more heavily on strategic interaction and networks (a third type of arrangement) to secure
the commitment of the actors involved while firms in LMEs rely almost exclusively on markets
and hierarchies. In the corporate governance sphere the coordination problem that initially arises
is the potential for shareholders to renege on their capital commitment and undermine an
otherwise successful enterprise. 158 This problem is overcome by instituting a Board of Directors
which is statutorily mandated in both types of economies. 159 This delegation of the firm’s
management to a centralized organ gives rise to a further coordination problem, the potential for
managers to act self-interestedly and against the interests of the organization.
In addition to relying on the institution of corporate law and the ex-post solution it
imposes through fiduciary duties, actors in LMEs rely on market mechanisms such as the
markets for capital and corporate control to monitor and discipline managers while actors in
CMEs rely on institutions that facilitate the sharing of information and collaboration such as
business associations and trade unions that allow parties to make credible commitments. 160 It
follows then that legal institutions in the LME context will tend to support market-based
coordination through measures such as disclosure, securities regulation, and rules designed to
facilitate arm’s length bargaining and competition such as anti-trust legislation and insider
trading rules. 161 On the other hand, legal institutions in CMEs will facilitate the sharing of
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inside information and grant legal rights to a wider group of corporate constituents to participate
in the firm’s oversight. 162
Hall and Soskice claim that the type of monitoring arrangements prevalent in the political
economy will also determine the terms on which investors supply capital. 163 In the context of
well-established and deeply liquid capital markets with rules against insider trading, investors
will commit capital based on short-term performance criteria. 164 This is also shaped by their
ability to diversify risk through small holdings in multiple companies and to exit the investment.
In a context where inside information is available, ownership is closely linked to management
and employees have influence over the firm’s strategic planning horizon, investors will commit
capital on a long-term basis. 165 This is also shaped by the difficulties investors face in exiting
the investment and by the presence of business networks that facilitate the exercise of voice
instead. In sum, the structure of ownership and the types of monitoring supported by the legal
framework influences the terms on which capital is supplied. Accordingly, this also impacts the
strategies that managers pursue to attract capital.
While the Hall and Soskice approach sketches out a complex relationship between
institutional arrangements and how firms coordinate, it presents a crucial question that cuts
across much of the work on comparative corporate governance. Why do firms ultimately
gravitate towards one particular set of arrangements and what gives rise to particular institutional
constellations in the first place? The explanation provided is that firms attempt to gain
advantages stemming from ‘institutional complementarities’ in that particular national setting,
reinforcing the differences between LME’s and CME’s. 166
Like complementary goods in economics where the price increase of one product affects
the demand of the other, institutions of the political economy can mutually reinforce each other's
existence if they confer advantages onto a group in the form of efficiencies created by the
presence of both institutions.167 They cite the examples of disclosure and insider trading rules in
Ibid at 22-27 (Codetermination laws in Germany allow labor to sit on the Supervisory Board).
This does not conflict with their previous claim that the terms of capital are influenced by the quality of governance
provided by firms, which is true, however the legal framework supports a certain type of governance arrangement (in this case
market-based). If firms deviate from this and favour employees more than shareholders (in the case of LMEs) than it should
negatively impact their ability to raise capital on favourable terms.
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LMEs reinforcing the returns that investors can make trading on the stock market and of fluid
labor markets and less employee protection being complementary to a highly developed stock
market and higher levels of market-based coordination.
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Yet Hall and Soskice point out, it is not the presence of a particular set of institutions
alone that determine the precise strategies pursued. Even in the presence of widespread
ownership and deeply liquid capital markets, multiple equilibriums can exist, on which firms can
coordinate. In other words, the presence of these institutions alone do not always dictate that
investors will commit capital only on a short-term basis and will prefer exit over voice. 169
Hall and Soskice identify history, culture and informal rules as having influence over
which outcomes are pursued more prevalently. 170 This is due in part to a nation’s political
economy being bound up with its history and culture which includes political contests or
previous forms of cooperation between corporate constituent groups. The tensions between
labour and finance in the U.S. for instance have been well documented. The waxing and waning
of capital markets as the principle ordering mechanism for corporate relations has been to a large
extent shaped by the political contest between capital and labour.
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This has important implications for understanding the trajectory and development of U.S.
corporate governance since the late 19th century which has fluctuated within the LME context
between a highly liberalized form of market capitalism in the period leading up to the Great
Depression followed by a period of coordinated industrial capitalism which began to shift in the
1980's towards financial capitalism characterized by “the self-regulating market writ large.” 172
It militates towards the view that shareholder primacy is not necessarily the ideal solution for
corporate law's perceived failures, but instead the end result of an evolutionary trend determined
by an outcome of political contests and their resulting legal institutional matrices.
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In sum the direction of causality set out by VOC is that historical, legal and political
actions shape the overarching institutional structures of the political economy, such as capital
markets, which shape the opportunities available to firms which in turn conditions the strategies
they pursue in areas such as corporate governance and employee relations. Accordingly, the
presence of widespread ownership and liquid capital markets, rules that support market-based
monitoring in corporate governance, and weaker protections for employees should make it
advantageous for firms to coordinate on strategies that yield short-term gains as opposed to
longer-term projects and likewise gravitate away from working in close partnership with their
employees.
However, if multiple equilibriums can exist and firms coordinate more prevalently on
some of these due to history, culture, and the outcome of political contests, the question
remaining is whether these factors can generate significant differences in what equilibriums
firms can coordinate on within a particular national context? Can this explain swings in the
prevalence and dominance of market-based monitoring mechanisms and corporate governance
norms in the LME context? Moreover, what is the potential for variation within this framework
and to what extent can and should the market be constrained? From a broader perspective of
political economy, executive compensation in the post-crisis era is located in this debate.

SECTION B: Application of VOC to Corporate Legal Scholarship
The Hall and Soskice approach to VOC has provided fertile ground for corporate legal
scholarship to examine national divergences in corporate governance practice. Amongst the
more notable of these has been the work of corporate legal scholar Mark J. Roe on the ‘Political
Determinants of Corporate Governance.’
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Carrying through with the overarching theme that

politics, society and the ordering of markets are interrelated Roe begins with the proposition that
for a nation to produce it must attain a level of social peace otherwise “investors invest
reluctantly, or not at all, and the factory is not built.” 174 He relates this macro-political claim to
the firm’s micro-economic structure and to the micro-political dynamic between owners,
managers and employees, acknowledging that these particular interests are often juxtaposed in
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the course of production. Social conflict between these groups, he continues, leads to political
settlements which impact directly the types of corporate governance arrangements pursued in a
particular national economy. The aim of Roe’s study is to examine the effects of one such
political determinant, labour’s influence on management’s strategy and how it determines
ownership structure in a national economic setting. His principal claim is that the manner in
which social conflict has been settled “powerfully affects how firms are owned and how
authority is divided [and that] politics at times requires boardrooms and ownership structures to
be a certain way... making [a particular structure] less likely to arise and prosper.” 175
He argues that the politics and legal framework of such an economy “wedges open the
gap between shareholders and managers by pressing managers to expand, to avoid downsizing,
and to go slow in taking risks that would affect the work place.” 176 This generates managerial
agency costs for shareholders who gravitate towards a concentrated ownership structure as a
means of controlling them. In LMEs, politics and the legal framework support shareholderoriented goals and mechanisms that align shareholder and manager interests. In fact, he suggests
that for diverse ownership to have ever taken hold in the U.S. weak social democracy was a
necessary precondition. 177 While this specific claim has been highly contested, it illustrates
more broadly that certain regulatory climates are perhaps more conducive to the persistence of
certain ownership patterns and hence governance strategies.
The economic liberalization of the past three decades and changes to labour market
regulation permitted immense reorganizations of corporate ownership structures to occur across
LMEs wreaking havoc onto the organization of labour.
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However, the question that remains to

be answered, is to what extent does the presence of certain ownership structures necessitate
particular orientations in corporate governance? For instance, if managers endeavour to work in
partnership with their employees in a broadly LME context and give them a larger piece of the
corporate pie than shareholders might otherwise expect, does this necessarily translate into a
push-back from shareholders to cut costs and maintain workplace flexibility? Roe’s theoretical
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application of VOC to corporate governance seems to suggest that it might.
Roe posits that firms operate in environments where product and capital markets are
either weak or strong. Weak product markets which lack competitive forces enable firms to raise
the cost of their products and to reduce their supply to extract monopoly rents from their
customers. Under competitive circumstances, the firm’s revenue from its product sales covers its
basic costs and the normal level of profit it needs to pay to capital. Consumers receive a surplus
by obtaining a quality good at a competitive price. By reducing supply, firms lower their overall
costs and by concomitantly raising prices they capture from the consumers who are still willing
to buy at the higher price, this surplus. Consumers who cannot afford to buy are deprived from
having access to the product in the marketplace, the so-called ‘monopolist’s sin’. The rent
captured is referred to as the ‘monopolist’s rectangle’ and according to Roe, its gives rise to
political contests between labour, management and capital.
These contests impact not only how the firm is run but also corporate governance
structures, laws and practices. Weak market pressures and the prevalence of monopoly rents
loosen constraints on managers to produce efficiently and to favour the interests of shareholders,
which they would otherwise be inclined do to where profits margins are narrow. 179 In the
absence of such pressures management's interests are highly compatible with those of employees
who favour a less aggressive pursuit of profits, lower levels of risk-taking, and a greater share of
corporate wealth than otherwise obtainable. Thus coalitions are formed within the firm between
labour and management on the one hand or management and shareholders on the other, which
fluctuate based on the strength of market forces.
According to Sanford Jacoby, the period between the Great Depression and the 1980’s
was characteristic of a coalition between labour and management against capital which was
marked by the lessened ability of shareholders to earn high levels of short-term profit from large
industrial corporations who were managed predominantly for the long-term. 180 Product and
capital markets were less developed at the time. The levels of wage inequality between the elite
class of managers who ran these firms and the masses of employees who worked on the front
line, was significantly lower than present. Corporate governance arrangements such as
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performance-based pay incentives were less prevalent, which enabled higher levels of discretion,
which in turn afforded protections against the exploitation of labour by capital.
Roe suggests that pressures from labor to capture rent and lessen the extent to which
managers run the firm in shareholders’ interests generate high levels of costs for shareholders in
the form of 1) rents directly extracted by managers (2) rents given by managers to labour and 3)
slack in managerial performance which impacts the generation of shareholder wealth. 181 On the
one hand, a modest managerial rent in corporate control can yield large monopoly rent losses to
the shareholders. This is typically what legal rules designed to control self-dealing and conflict of
interest transactions are designed to address. Fiduciary duties for instance prevent managers
from dispensing with corporate assets for their own or other constituents' interests. On the other
hand, a small managerial rent resulting from slack could result in a huge monopoly rent in
forgone profits for the shareholders. Corporate law’s traditional legal mechanisms and its entitycentric structure, it is argued, prevent this type of rent extraction from being effectively
addressed and weak markets preclude shareholders from controlling these types of agency costs.
As Roe indicates, “one powerful means to reduce managerial agency costs is for the
stockholders to act cohesively in a block.” 182 This in turn explains why ownership patterns in
Germany tend to be more concentrated. With co-determination being mandatory in large public
firms and capital markets being less developed, capital in Germany, at least in theory, organizes
into large blocks to ultimately secure less aggressive but steady long-term returns, maintaining a
semi-stable equilibrium between labour, capital and management. However, where widely held
ownership structures and their concomitantly supporting legal framework have been historically
present and embedded in the political economic framework, it is less likely, in theory at least,
that ownership structures would develop along these lines. Instead, the legal framework develops
to compliment such ownership by providing greater protections to investors, placing greater
demands onto managers to favour capital.
Roe posits that in such a context where active product and capital markets create a
competitive environment, managerial slack is constrained and the potential for labour to compete
Roe, supra note 47 (noting that “the monopoly yields a bigger pot of value (bigger, that is, than the pot an equivalent
competitive firm would produce) into which managers can stick their fingers.”); See also Ibid at 129 (noting that “there is evidence
that market concentration reduces productivity and that competition enhances it”).
182
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for and extract a share of monopoly rents is virtually reduced, due to a lack of the monopolist's
rectangle. In effect, labour is removed from the equation and precluded from competing for a
greater share of the corporation's wealth due to the narrower scope of profit available to
shareholders. The contest within the firm for a greater share of resources becomes predominantly
between shareholders and management, although labour still engages with fending off the
imposition of risk and other externalities associated with aggressive profit-seeking. However, in
this context shareholders are less concerned with capturing a maximum share of rents, as their
entitlement to them is viewed as a given. Instead, the focus is on expanding the corporate pie
through greater efficiency and risk-taking. However, the extent to which increasing returns to
shareholders represents the creation of increased corporate value is questionable.
In sum, the contest over corporate wealth in the firm becomes a struggle between capital
and management to ensure managers perform at a maximum level. While corporate law's role in
preventing rent extraction still holds relevance, if profit maximization is achieved, excessive rent
seeking becomes a secondary concern. Effective performance incentives become the key
mechanisms for making managers more profit-oriented. This in turn equates to effective
corporate governance, rendering corporate law redundant, as some have suggested.
However, what remains unaddressed is the potential for negative consequences if these
pressures to maximize profit exceed certain limits, which are unclear. Acting in both their own
and shareholders' interests, managers can attempt to capture rents from the firm itself by
sacrificing re-investment into long-term growth, impacting the firm's ability to provide long-term
stable employment and to invest in production locally. The 'Political Determinants' literature
inadequately addresses the extent to which the erosion of such benefits undermines the prospects
for long-term sustainable firm governance. In other words, where is the line between a
sustainable versus unsustainable governance approach and how it should be reflected in law?
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CHAPTER FIVE:
The Organizational Model of the Firm

It is necessary herein to deconstruct the legal/organizational model of the firm to locate
the key facets of the sustainable governance debate, how they have evolved, the aspects of
managerial power they seek to address and the trade-offs inherent in this approach. Before laying
out how this model is constituted, it is important to review the political-economic functions
performed by corporate law. To then locate these debates, the organizational model of the firm
can be examined across three distinct layers, its structural, legal and normative components
which shape the parameters of managerial power. Once identified, these debates can be
correlated with the competing narratives of the executive compensation debate to realize the
deeper implications of competing solutions to executive compensation reform.
The entity model of the corporation is rooted corporate law’s traditional role of defining
power in the corporation, the legal responsibilities of those who exercise it and the relevant
standard of behavior. 183 It posits the corporation as an organizational structure and the law of
corporations as serving a constitutional function. 184 By creating a separate entity with a
collective set of interests embodied in the corporate form with an internal governance structure
which determines how and to what end the corporation’s resources will be deployed, corporate
law provides a legal solution to a set of organizational problems. 185 It represents a particular
configuration of relationships between the law, markets and the state and between labor, capital
and management, supported by a system of legal rights, processes, and structures that enable
these constituents to overcome their competing economic and normative issues. 186
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SECTION A: Corporate Law's Role in Economic Organization
By giving rise to the basic corporate form and its internal governance structure and
powers, corporate law enables a wide array of investors in the context of a regulated market
exchange to pool their resources and commit capital on terms for which ordinary contracts
cannot provide. 187 By the 1930’s the corporate landscape in the United States consisted of giant
industrial conglomerates that were owned by a large and widely dispersed base of small
investors. Unlike business partnerships or closely-held corporations who were managed by their
owners or delegates, these entities were run by a professional cadre of elite managers who were
separated from the shareholder base, providing them with vast control over large pools of
resources. 188 By supplying capital on uncertain terms of repayment, these constituents played a
crucial role in enabling giant corporations in the post- Great Depression era of industrial
capitalism to innovate, engage in necessary risk-taking, and to meet their fixed obligations. 189
However, these groups often had diverging interests and risk tolerances. 190 By providing
a standard template for organization, insulation of management from capital and a guaranteed
means of locking in capital, corporate law provided a vehicle for capital, labor and other groups
to pool their resources and balance their competing interests. 191 This form of economic
organization offered a more efficient alternative to single market transactions. 192 Labor market
regulation influences corporate managers to maintain certain standards and incur certain costs
while capital markets influence managers to focus on efficiency and on securing the benefits
from the exploitation of labor. 193 The firm's governance organ acts as an intermediary to balance
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these interests so that either party can commit their resources over the long-run.

194

Power in the

firm is balanced between capital and management via the structure of rights. 195 This leaves a
high level of discretion for the Board regarding major aspects of the corporation's existence
including transactions, structure, strategy, how its resources are utilized and how it deals with
outside stakeholders. 196 This is further constrained by legal norms of behavior through fiduciary
duties which define and shape discretion. 197

SECTION B: Structural Determinants of Managerial Power
The legal structure of corporate law gives rise to managerial power and establishes its
parameters. Through defining the decision-making rights of shareholders, corporate law balances
power between management and capital. 198 In the Anglo-American system, the broad decisionmaking power of the Board is an outcome of how shareholder rights are structured. 199 The scope
of directors' decision-making power is defined by de jure and de facto limits on shareholders'
voting, appraisal and proxy rights. Where the application of these rights is unclear or imprecise,
fiduciary duties, as interpreted by the courts, attempt to fill in the gaps. 200
In LMEs corporate law provides shareholders with the right to vote on major structural
transactions including dissolution, the sale of substantial assets and major restructurings. With
exceptions, the right to initiate proposals rests with the Board. 201 Shareholders also have the
right to sell or transfer their shares without the Board’s consent with some restrictions 202 and
have the right to initiate and vote on dissolving the corporation if all consent. 203 However, there
are restrictions on shareholders' ability to influence ordinary business operations. 204
Delaware corporate law further provides shareholders with a right to require the firm
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repurchase their stock at fair market value. 205 Different jurisdictions have either expanded or
curtailed this right. 206 As a remedy available to shareholders who dissent against fundamental or
structural changes however, the right in practice, is limited by procedural barriers. 207 Proxy
rights in Delaware derive both from corporate statute and federal securities regulation. 208
The right is two-fold. First, shareholders can nominate and elect members to the Board,
however the right to nominate in practice is curtailed. 209 Second, shareholders can initiate
proposals for matters other than election such as the removal of directors, dissolution and certain
structural transactions. 210 Some proposals can be voted on by the shareholders while others
require Board approval. 211 In practice, directors have numerous advantages over shareholders in
nominating and electing members to the Board, such as greater access to the corporation’s proxy
machinery and resources to wage proxy battles and elect an incumbent director. 212

SECTION C: The Debate Over How to Structure Rights
The question of how to structure rights is at the center of an ongoing debate over
corporate law reform. The key issue at stake is how to effectively constrain corporate power and
which constituent group is ideally suited for this role. Three normative models exist, each having
strengths and weaknesses.
I. Shareholder Democracy
This model was canvassed as a post-Great Depression alternative and underpins the
shareholder rights movement of today. It posits that shareholders are ideally situated for
constraining corporate power by having greater decision-making power than management. 213
Placing more power in the hands of shareholders disperses the concentration of power,
democratizing corporate decisions with far-reaching effects and creating less conflict between
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corporations and societal welfare. While this lessens the concentration of power in a few hands,
some have suggested that shareholders are more interested in profit than corporate managers,
creating a greater conflict between corporate power and civil society. 214
II. Client Group Participation
This model posits that various constituents including labor, customers, suppliers and
government could have joint decision-making power over corporate affairs, such as a sale or
merger of an enterprise. 215 This would give client groups an opportunity to vote in a manner
which represents how corporate decisions impact their well-being. It could also serve as a
counterbalance to intense profit-seeking which conflicts with societal welfare. However, client
groups would more than likely vote to serve themselves which could also conflict with the
corporation’s goal of economic longevity. 216 If we accept that corporations exist to make a profit
and need growth to prosper, groups such as labor might impede this goal by voting on
transactions which favor less productivity and an unsustainable share of corporate wealth.
III. Managerialism
This model closely resembles corporate law's existing structure of rights. It concentrates
immense power in the hands of managers. 217 Despite allowing large scale economic
organization to occur, it has several weaknesses. One is the broad decision-making power of
directors which concentrates power. 218 Widely dispersed shareholders are disinterested in
exercising control and in fact are powerless over most decisions. In terms of major structural
decisions and director elections, directors wield enormous power over the proxy process by
controlling votes. 219 Directors might own voting shares which can be exercised against new
candidates who are already disadvantaged.
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SECTION D: The Legal Determinants of Managerial Power
The existing structure of rights under corporate law creates wide discretion for managers
when governing the corporation, entrenching managerial power in the corporate form. This
creates positions of trust and dependence, requiring management's power to be defined and
constrained by law.

220

Corporate law shapes the parameters of managerial action, primarily

through prescribing management with fiduciary duties, owed to corporation. The application of
fiduciary duties is contextual and is based on regulating particular types of behaviors in a range
of situations. As Professor Kenneth Scott explains:
One can postulate a continuum of situations involving conflicts of interest between
controlling managers and owners, with the conflicts becoming less sharp (and perhaps the legal
rules less useful). At one extreme would be outright theft, embezzlement, and misappropriation;
without effective legal (usually criminal) sanctions in these cases, only the gullible would part
with their money. A somewhat less transparent form of achieving the same end is the self-dealing
transaction between the manager and his firm. By buying too low or selling too high, the
controlling party transfers wealth from the firm to himself, but the picture can be confused by
intricate transactions in nonstandard assets or subject to varying degrees of price unfairness.
Enforcement becomes more difficult, but still seems essential if agency costs are to have any
bound. The appropriation of corporate opportunities, excessive managerial compensation, and
consumption of managerial perks can be still more judgemental, and probably the legal rules less
effective, but the order of magnitude is also often less. 221

Two principle contexts, where longstanding debates over controlling managerial power
can be located, are: A) the context of corporate takeovers, dominated by competing views on
whether a duty exists to maximize shareholder wealth and B) the context of deploying the
corporation's assets, dominated by the doctrine of corporate waste. Each represents a set of tradeoffs for how competing constituent interests can be reconciled and the consequences this has for
managerial power. Both areas implicate the duties of loyalty to the corporation and the duty of
care, juxtaposed against a broad interpretation of the business judgment rule.
The duty loyalty is a mandatory norm of conduct and is owed to the corporate entity. In
breaching this duty, directors can be held personally liable for damages which arise in connection
with the breach. The duty of loyalty “most fundamentally requires that a corporate fiduciary’s
actions be undertaken in the good faith belief that they are in the best interests of the corporation
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and its stockholders.” 222 While corporate law has typically protected valid business judgment
from civil liability and judicial review, it imposes the condition that managers must exercise their
powers in accordance with a valid a business purpose and not for personal gain. 223
The duty of care exists to ensure that management operates the firm above a certain
standard of conduct. As Baums and Scott explain:
A second aspect of the fiduciary duty of officers and directors comes under the heading of
the duty of care, which requires them to act “with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.” The standard
as thus expressed is one of reasonable or ordinary diligence, knowledge and skill, and would
seem to create possible civil liability for ordinary negligence.

Fiduciary duties are enforceable through a derivative action, available in the context of
self-dealing and corporate decision-making that lacks a valid business purpose. 224 This includes
blocking a transaction which creates value for shareholders in order to protect employee interests
without a proportional benefit to the firm, 225 or selling the entire assets of a corporation and
diverting the funds to employees to compensate them for their job losses as opposed to
distributing the proceeds to shareholders. 226 Employees in the latter example benefit but cannot
reciprocate because their jobs might no longer exist. There is no valid business purpose
connected to giving employees this compensation. The derivative action enables shareholders to
discipline managers on behalf of the firm and to protect their own interests in the process. 227
In sum, the legal tools of corporate law are not a mechanism for achieving high levels of
performance but for ensuring managers do not appropriate the firm’s assets, damage the firm in
the context of deploying its resources, or resolve conflicting interests in a manner that neglects a
valid corporate purpose, in which the need to make some level of profit is reflected.
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I. Takeover Context
While change of control transactions implicate both structural and legal constraints on
managerial power, courts have been the battleground for settling competing claims in this
context. They involve an unsolicited bid from an acquiring entity for a target firm who is underperforming in the market. Approval of the transaction is sought directly from the shareholders
and a premium is paid for their shares, often substantially above market value. The acquiring
entity's management calculates, despite the premium being offered, that the purchase is still a
bargain given the efficiencies that can be found by restructuring the firm. This often involves
substantial cost reductions, the sale of major assets or subsidiaries, the shedding of various
operations and the closing down of plants. While takeovers implicate the right of voting class
shareholders to approve major transactions and their right to remove and re-elect the Board, an
issue involving fiduciary duties arises over the Board’s use of defensive tactics in response to a
hostile takeover bid. Views diverge over the extent to which maximizing wealth in the takeover
context is synonymous with the corporation's best interests and whether the duty of loyalty in
fact extends into a duty to maximize shareholder wealth. 228
There are two competing theories, the shareholder interest hypothesis and the
management entrenchment hypothesis. The first theory holds that defensive tactics are used
beneficially by management because shareholders would prefer to hold out so that management
can defeat a low bid, bargain for a higher offer, or attract other bids. 229 This is based on the view
that takeovers are exploitative and fail to create the high value purported. The following reasons
have also been advanced to justify the right of target management to defend a takeover: 1) tender
offers fail to increase welfare for shareholders over the long-term 2) target shareholders gain
more value when the hostile bid is defeated and 3) target managers have obligations to other
groups who might be negatively impacted. 230
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The second theory holds that defensive tactics are used abusively by management as a
means to entrenching their positions. 231 If takeovers result from a potential value gap between
the current level of agency costs and the acquirer’s plans to restructure the firm, then managers
surely face loss of their employment. 232 Thus, managers have an interest in perpetuating their
power and insulating themselves from the market for corporate control which consists of firms
seeking to exploit new found efficiencies in large public corporations. Proponents of this view
argue that fiduciaries duties should be interpreted as a duty to maximize shareholder wealth.
State courts in the U.S. have typically favoured the latter theory. Although, under
Delaware jurisprudence, courts have upheld the rule in Revlon Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings Inc., 233 requiring management’s duty to the corporation to shift from canvassing
alternatives to a sale to maximizing shareholder value, once the company’s sale has become
inevitable. 234 The functioning of a market for corporate control and its effect on managerial
behaviour can be further understood by looking at the third layer of factors, the set of normative
determinants which exist outside of corporate law's reach.
II. Corporate Waste Context
As discussed, the development of the corporate waste doctrine is characterized by a
tension between protecting the corporation from management's improper use of corporate
resources on the one hand and insulating managers from liability for failed risk driven by
shareholders' hindsight bias on the other. The weakness of this balance is the moderate
protection it provides against managerial rent-extraction and its failure to address the problem of
managerial slack for shareholders. However, as discussed, this balance necessarily insulates
shareholders from the firm's central governance organ by upholding managerial discretion and
enabling directors to balance competing claims in the corporation's best interests.
The executive pay debate, when located in the organizational model of the firm,
necessarily implicates a broader debate over the trade-offs inherent in the corporate waste
doctrine on the one hand and the inability of this legal tool to address the problem of poor
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managerial performance and rent diversion on the other. This can be further viewed as a conflict
arising within the collective entity between interests. While excessive pay in this context can
constitute mismanagement (a breach of duty of care) or self-dealing (a breach duty of loyalty),
the question raised is what standard should directors be held to?
One scenario is to hold management strictly accountable to the profit motive when setting
executive compensation and ensure that executive pay spurs high levels of performance despite
its grossly disproportionate size to workers’ pay. Doing so could have negative consequences for
social welfare by contributing to inequality. If management is motivated to seek out new
efficiencies, it could result in job cuts, wage freezes, and a reduction in benefits.
The Board has power over two essential variables, the overall size of the compensation
and the corporate goals to which it corresponds. 235 The corporation's labor constituency has an
interest in constraining both what the CEO makes and such corporate goals. 236 In general, labor
is opposed to large bonuses which reward gains in share price and risk-taking which might be
synonymous with reductions in the workforce, the scaling back of benefits and a shift to more
flexible labor arrangements. 237
Shareholders on the other hand benefit most from a norm that requires directors to do
what is economically superior for the corporation. Executive pay that encourages high efficiency
improves competitiveness and enhances firm value. 238 This is consistent with the firm’s profit
motive. Yet doing so entails that directors suppress the corporation’s social role. However,
approaching executive pay as an equity issue between workers and executives might not result in
sufficient accountability to the profit motive. 239
Notwithstanding the broad limits on executive compensation under both the doctrine of
waste and business judgement rule, there is currently no legal standard for balancing competing
interests when setting executive pay. The debate over which goals to reward and how, ultimately
falls outside of corporate law's reach. The question then is what are the consequences at either
end of the spectrum for how managerial power is constrained?
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SECTION E: The Normative Determinants of Managerial Power
The debates over what directors' duties should be in the takeover context and which goals
are appropriate to reward in the corporate waste context both have dimensions outside of the
narrow legal debates discussed above. At the operational level of the firm, these debates have
fundamental implications for determining which management orientation should prevail. It is
essential to recognize two points regarding these contexts.
One is the importance of identifying what drives particular executive pay arrangements at
this level, their consequences for how managerial power is constrained and how they should be
constrained, if at all. Two is recognizing the analogous points between the executive pay debate
and the evolution of the takeover debate, namely the response of corporate law to the negative
effects of the market for corporate control as compared with the negative externalities of
incentive pay and the potential for corporate law to provide a solution.
Outside of the corporate law box, directors' discretion is subject to forces competing over
which interests managers should consider. The primary drivers of this orientation are varying
norms of directorial conduct driven by market forces. These range from the shareholder value
norm to more stakeholder-inclusive norms underpinned by market versus entity-based norms of
directorial responsibility. The level of risk taken and the time horizons set by management are
economic considerations that hinge on market conditions, the availability of inputs, managerial
skill, capital market pressures and the pervasiveness of particular norms. Courts typically will
not second guess these decisions and are reluctant to involve themselves in running business. 240
While shareholders are vulnerable to exploitation, they also act as bearers of residual risk
and accept this position with the understanding that if management acts with a valid corporate
purpose, which includes profit maximization, then shareholders could realize above average
returns if the firm is efficient. The question that remains is, how do shareholders ensure that
managers perform adequately?
Market based mechanisms are available to shareholders for addressing the performance
issue. These are disclosure rules, the ability to sell in a deeply liquid capital markets exchange,
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and the ability to diversify their holdings. There are prospects in theory for the Board to act as a
protector of shareholders’ interests in “maintaining good performance and limiting self-dealing
and other private benefits”. 241 While director elections and the proxy contest in the closely held
corporation is an effective means of influencing the role of the Board, in the widely held firm,
the Board must be influenced by other means. 242
The basic assumption of director orientation is that “directors will meet their legal and
moral obligations out of sense of duty and internalized norms”. 243 At the very least they seek to
preserve their reputations. 244 However, there is no clear imperative for whose interests should
take priority. 245 Directors are also motivated by the desire to keep their position and might be
inclined to serve the interests of those who put them on the slate which in the closely held
corporation might be the majority shareholder while in the widely held firm the CEO. 246 In the
absence of strong market pressures, labor could have a significant influence in management
orientation, as labor's interests in low risk, stability and slow growth are compatible with
management's. Three roughly categorized modes exist for the role that the Board can play in
operating the firm. 247 They are identified as the following:
1. An advisory role to top management in which the Board attempts to oversee
management and ensure its compliance with the law but otherwise defers to its judgement
in how it balances interests in conjunction with a valid corporate purpose.
2. A shareholder agent role in which the Board acts only on shareholders behalf,
replacing under-performing managers and implementing contractual measures that ensure
maximum performance and shareholder returns.
3. A stakeholder role in which the Board consistently reconciles the interests of those
parties that are regularly impacted by the firm’s actions.
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All three roles are consistent with profit maximization for shareholders but to differing
degrees and time horizons. Each mode has consequences for managerial performance,
controlling self-serving and managing the outwards effects of pursuing the profit motive. Viewed
on a spectrum of how managers can govern the public corporation, at one end the potential exists
for management to take high levels of risk and to focus exclusively on profit maximization while
at the other, they can balance profit maximization with other factors such as environmental
stewardship. There is no evidence that corporate managers alone wish to expose the environment
to high levels of risk and carelessness by taking excessive risks and aggressively pursuing
profits. 248 In fact, corporate managers in the absence of any incentives or stimuli prefer to play it
safe and maintain their reputations as good corporate citizens. 249
II. The Effect of Market Forces on Normative Discretion
It is crucial then to recognize how market forces operate in the legal model. Rights of
election could enable shareholders not only to discipline a poorly governed Board but also to
exert pressure to improve efficiency, risk-taking and profit. However, because the ability to
nominate and remove directors is curtailed in practice, an internal market for corporate control is
impeded from operating. 250 Corporate law strikes a balance between capital and managerial
prerogative namely to enable constituents to commit their resources for the long-term. Giving
shareholders effective rights to demand greater profit might conflict with long-term corporate
organization after a certain point.
The effect of external market forces on operational strategy depends on the liquidity and
prevalence of capital markets. 251 It is also important to realize that historically these forces have
differed. In the New Deal period capital market pressures were weak. 252 Under deregulation in
the Reagan era, they flourished. 253 While this is an oversimplification of the complex factors
present at the time, the general trend can be observed. This is evidenced by the wave of corporate
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takeovers in the 1980's. 254 Firms who were under-performing in the capital market were boughtout by corporate raiders through hostile takeover bids. 255 These investors would make
sometimes drastic changes to how the target company was structured and operated in an effort to
find new efficiencies and raise the firm's current market value. 256 It has been suggested that such
investors would use the hostile bid as a form of arbitrage to extract short-term wealth from the
target. 257
In response to this frenzy of takeovers, corporate legal scholars theorized into existence
the market for corporate control. 258 They posited that the threat of being taken over prompted
management to run the firm efficiently as possible to keep corporate waste and rent extraction in
check, otherwise it would be removed and replaced. 259 It is important note that while this market
exerts pressure on management's normative discretion, the threat of takeover can be realized only
when shareholders have the ultimate right to approve an incumbent hostile bid for the
corporation and directors cannot legally block such a sale.
II. The Role of Executive Pay
Normative views on how directors should run the firm pervade the culture of business
and finance, translating into certain performance and governance metrics. 260 The shareholder
value norm underpinned by an elaborately theorized law and economics justification has been
influential to this end. 261 Incentive compensation combined with finance-based metrics has been
a powerful tool for shaping managerial conduct. 262 As theorists have suggested, the current
framework of rules and market forces have supported such arrangements.
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III. The Consequences of a Labour-Oriented Executive Pay Norm
Germany's system of Board co-determination provides an example of how labouroriented pay norms impact corporate constituents and constrains managerial power. 264 Both the
size of CEO pay and its underlying goals reflect a focus on long-term, stakeholder-inclusive
management. 265 Shareholder wealth maximization is not the overriding imperative and rent
extraction by management is constrained relative to the US approach. 266 Co-determination gives
labor almost half the seats on the Supervisory Board. 267 Share ownership is closely held,
enabling capital to monitor the Board more effectively. 268 However, shareholder power is not
absolute, but balanced against Board discretion.
Having well-functioning rights to appoint the Board, both capital and labour influence
directorial discretion through their representatives on the Board. The outcome tends to be a
negotiated compromise between labor and capital's competing interests leaving less room for
interpreting what valid a business purpose should be.

269

The result of this balance is a labour-

oriented executive pay norm that entails lower overall compensation and less short-term profit
seeking and risk.
Viewed comparatively Germany's corporate governance framework is less tolerant of
excessive pay and performance goals which reward short-term profit-seeking. 270 While the
content and application of Germany's business judgement rule is similar to that of the US, 271 the
scope and substantive impact of its application differ, at least in the area of executive pay. It has
been recently settled in Germany, in the Mannesmann case, that creating short-term profits is not
a valid corporate purpose that can be used to justify large bonus payments to executives. 272

Hopt et al., infra note 399; See also Baums and Scott, supra note 95.
Ibid.
266
Ibid.
267
Gerhard Wirth et al., infra note
268
Hall and Soskice, supra note 150.
269
Ibid.
270
Brigitte Haar, “Executive compensation under German corporate law: reasonableness, managerial incentives and
sustainability in order to enhance optimal contracting and to limit managerial power” in Randall S. Thomas and Jennifer G. Hill
eds., Research Handbook on Executive Pay (Edward Elgar Publishing: UK, 2012) 486-505.
271
For a comparison of US and German business judgement rules see Kaal and Painter, supra note 135.
272
This is consistent with the German Federal Court's pronouncements in the Mannesmann Trial where it held that shortterm profits come secondary to the corporation's long-term interests and that bonuses rewarding short-term profits where the
264
265

63

In Mannesmann the German Federal Court elaborated on the permissibility of AngloAmerican style pay bonuses rendered for extraordinary gains in shareholder wealth. 273 Despite
creating over 50 Billion Euros for the shareholders, the bonuses were deemed excessive because
they failed to benefit the corporation. 274 Shareholders in this case stood to make an
unprecedented short-term gain and were complicit in resisting the awards despite their detriment
to the firm itself. Approving the awards in this case represented a conflict between shareholders'
and the corporation's interests.
Even in Germany's stakeholder model, where compensation levels are comparatively
moderate and coupled with lower-risk strategies, shareholders have the propensity to favour
higher levels of compensation in exchange for greater short-term profit. 275 On the one hand, this
case demonstrates that where the Supervisory Board fails, shareholders also lack the incentive to
discipline Boards when they stand to benefit immensely from short-term gains. On the other
hand, the response to Mannesmann, illustrates that such orientations are perceived as
undermining the labor constituency's interests and the co-determination model's ability to
constrain rent-extraction or create a fair distribution of wealth and risk amongst corporate
stakeholders.
The period preceding the rise of finance and the shareholder-value norm was marked by
lower overall compensation for executives and so-called bureaucratic compensation schemes in
public firms. 276 This began to change in the 1980's with the deregulation of markets and
subsequent rise of incentive pay, culminating in 1990 when the need for high-powered pay
incentives was theoretically justified and embraced. 277
It was documented by several theorists that high levels of executive pay, albeit not so
high by today's standards, were problematic mainly in relation to firm performance. 278 In other
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words, excessive pay was symptomatic of a larger gap in potential firm growth and wealth
creation caused by managerial slack. 279 Boards of large public companies, it was said, were
sensitive to public pressures to reduce executive compensation which precluded companies from
incentivizing top managers to maximize shareholder wealth. 280 Stimulating economically
stagnant sections of the economy to become more efficient became the focus of executive
compensation reform in the LME context. 281
While it is clear that a labour-oriented pay norm in the US contributes to high levels of
managerial slack, it is equally unclear to what extent it can be repudiated and replaced by a
shareholder value norm. A certain degree of restraint on both the profit goal underlying CEO pay
and its size might be essential to sustainable corporate performance. 282 The amount of rent that
management could extract before the proliferation of incentive pay, was arguably less than under
the current approach. While incentive compensation both in theory and fact stands to create
higher firm value, much larger amounts arguably create greater incentives for rent-extraction.
IV. The Consequences of a Shareholder-Oriented Executive Pay Norm
Boards can potentially approve compensation schemes that are connected to a relatively
modest set of performance goals that maintain moderate efficiency levels, and a pro-labour
management style. 283 Such compensation schemes and their underlying performance goals can
enable managers to withhold their maximum efforts, avoid taking risk, and undertake inefficient
strategies to safeguard their positions while extracting high levels of pay. This mainly impacts
the shareholders. Alternatively, a shareholder value norm impacts non-shareholder groups and
creates a counter-effect for how managerial power is constrained.
In the context of industrial capitalism, the debate centred on reducing the size of
remuneration and bonuses. 284 A financially modest iteration of corporate purpose was valid from
an entity perspective and compatible with the existing corporatist labour-capital-state nexus that
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dominated this period. 285 It focused on slow growth, stable operations, and prudent levels of
risk-taking which ensured the survival of the enterprise as an institution of the industrial-based
political economy, benefiting more than just the stockholders.
In the context of greater market pressures under financial capitalism, whether domestic or
transnational, shareholders are purportedly better served by ensuring that high levels of
compensation actually reward high levels of performance. 286 Thus increasing managerial output
is the desirable solution from the standpoint of the shareholder who seeks greater value from the
executive's pay check. Several consequences emanate from this.
Shareholder wealth maximization as the overriding imperative to gauge the
appropriateness of executive compensation narrows the scope of goals that could otherwise be
used to justify rent-extraction. This approach presupposes that the level of executive pay is only
justifiable in relation to profit. Yet to earn high levels of profit, appropriate corporate goals need
to be set and the CEO remunerated accordingly with the requisite pay arrangements. The more
profit produced, the higher the pay arguably deserved.
Holding managerial power accountable exclusively to profit when setting executive pay,
shifts shareholders' focus away from the corporation’s internal governance and reinforces the
parallel role they play as outside constituents who implicitly contract with the corporation to
meet their own financial needs. 287 This former role benefits all constituents involved with the
corporation by enabling shareholders to protect the corporation from harm and ensuring its basic
survival. The latter approach begins to separate the interests of shareholders from the well-being
of the corporate entity along separate threads. Instead of viewing profit as a product of a
successful corporation, this approach views profit as an end in itself and seeks to assess the
appropriateness of executive compensation solely in relation to what shareholders gain from the
corporation and nothing more.
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Since constraining wealth appropriation and corporate waste in the setting of executive
compensation is assessed against profit maximization, shareholders have minimal incentive to
control the former if the latter materializes. 288 Thus, if an adequate share of the corporation’s
surplus is being diverted towards satisfying the needs of capital, as they perceive their needs in
the context of a competitive market, and away from other groups including the corporation’s
retained earnings which it uses to plan and invest for the long-term, then capital has a limited
concern over how much wealth management actually extracts. 289
The challenge with holding the size of the executive’s remuneration accountable to the
profit motive as opposed to a more moderate articulation of the corporation’s best interests is
establishing a balance between short-term wealth creation and a longer-term approach to creating
sustainable wealth. If the size of the executive’s paycheck is of minimal concern to shareholders
receiving high rates of return, then what interest would shareholders have in restraining profitseeking that is overly risky, unsustainable, or damaging to the corporation? The answer to this
question is complex and dependent on the risk tolerances of individual shareholders, their level
of sophistication as investors, and the quality of information they receive. To propose that capital
should assert greater influence on Board decision-making is to assume that shareholders would
be able to discern when the profit motive is being overplayed and would be inclined to question
the firm’s sustainability when current profits are exceptionally high. 290 In deeply liquid capital
markets selling, diversifying and holding for the short-term are effective risk-mitigation
strategies by which shareholders can address these concerns.
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cannot be unlimited if after a certain point shareholder wealth maximization begins to harm the
corporate entity. Yet, courts have been reluctant to limit executive compensation as long as it
corresponds with a valid business purpose. 292

CHAPTER SIX:
The Nexus of Contracts Firm

The nexus of contracts model re-conceptualizes the organizational model of the firm. At
the 'structural' level, contractarian orthodoxy proposes to change the structure of shareholder
rights by giving shareholders more power. Notwithstanding minor rights, such as the precatory
vote on executive pay, contractarians have been largely unsuccessful on this front. At the 'legal'
level, contractarians propose that directors' fiduciary duties to the firm, obligate them to
maximize shareholder value. As many have argued, there is no basis in law to support this claim.
Some contractarians have responded by suggesting that courts should recognize such a duty in
'change of control' transactions and by failing to do so are blocking the disciplining force of the
market for corporate control. At the 'normative' level, contractarian orthodoxy has its most
serious traction. By justifying shareholder wealth maximization as the principle operating norm,
it seeks to approach good governance through the implementation of self-regulating, contractual
tools for spurring high performance, namely high powered executive compensation incentives.
In brief, the contractual metaphor defines the corporation and the relationships between
corporate actors in narrowly economic terms. It views the corporation as a nexus of contractual
relationships entered into voluntarily by shareholders, creditors, managers, employees, customers
and suppliers as opposed to a governance structure that contains positions of trust and
dependence. 293 Firms are less costly alternatives to market transactions where various parties
join their assets in production. 294 Corporate relationships and the allocation of rights, benefits
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and risks are determined by the markets in which the firm operates.

295

The sole purpose of the

corporation is to maximize wealth for the shareholders. Likewise, the aim of corporate
governance is to control the agency costs that arise from the implicit delegation of authority from
shareholders to management. 296 This is justified on three grounds. 297 Contractions put faith in
market mechanisms to impose constraints on management’s tendency to divert wealth from
shareholders or to withhold their maximum effort. Due to the contractual nature of corporate
relations and the view that forces of competition in markets constrain the private choices of the
parties, corporate law is seen as playing an enabling role. 298

SECTION A: Shareholder Primacy's Normative Claims
Proponents of the nexus of contracts model and the concomitant norm of shareholder
primacy theorize that running the corporation in the interests of shareholders creates maximum
societal welfare. The basis for this claim stems from neoclassical economic assumptions best
encapsulated as follows:
“A successful firm provides jobs for workers and goods and services for consumers. The more
appealing the goods to consumers, the more profit (and jobs). Prosperity for stockholders,
workers and communities goes hand in glove with better products for consumers. Other
objectives, too, come with profit. Wealthy firms provide better working conditions and clean up
their outfalls; high profits produce social wealth that strengthens the demand for
cleanliness...wealthy societies purchase much cleaner and healthier environments than do
poorer nations-in part because well-to-do citizens want cleaner air and water, and in part because
they can afford to pay for it.” 299

The alleged triumph of the shareholder primacy model came to a climax in 2000 with the
publication of the seminal and heavily disputed article by corporate legal scholars Henry
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Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman “The End of History of Corporate Law” also known as the
'end of history claim'. The following excerpt reflects the crux of the claim:
“Despite the apparent divergence in institutions of governance, share ownership, capital markets,
and business culture across developed economies, the basic law of the corporate form has already
achieved a high degree of uniformity, and continued convergence is likely. A principal reason for
convergence is a widespread normative consensus that corporate managers should act exclusively
in the economic interests of shareholders, including non-controlling shareholders. This consensus
on a shareholder-oriented model of the corporation results in part from the failure of alternative
models of the corporation...Other reasons for the new consensus include the competitive success
of contemporary British and American firms, the growing influence worldwide of the academic
disciplines of economics and finance, the diffusion of share ownership in developed countries,
and the emergence of active shareholder representatives and interest groups in major jurisdictions.
Since the dominant corporate ideology of shareholder primacy is unlikely to be undone, its
success represents the "end of history" for corporate law.” 300

SECTION B: Shareholder Primacy's Internal Conflict: The Case of Takeovers
The shareholder primacy model's internal conflict is manifest in the hostile takeover
debate over the correct role of law in either protecting or constraining directors' discretion to
resist a hostile bid. It divides contractarians essentially into two camps, shareholder-rights and
director-primacy contractarians. These viewpoints in turn underpin competing accounts of the
executive compensation issue in the nexus-of-contracts paradigm, the managerial power and
optimal contracting approaches respectively.
I. The Contractarian Justification for Takeovers
The nexus of contracts model began to emerge in the late 1970's to explain and legitimate
the wave of corporate takeovers that began to sweep across the U.S. corporate world. Law and
economics scholars embraced this newly emerging form of capital market activity as the
disciplining function of efficient markets against managerial slack and the rents of corporate
control. 301
Efficient capital markets coupled with effective disclosure rules in theory signaled to
investors the presence of high agency costs which would prompt them to purchase control of the
firm at what they perceived to be a bargain. This strategy, made possible by a competitive market
Hansmann and Kraakman, supra note 154.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, “The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender
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for capital, provided a solution for the various difficulties that shareholders faced in monitoring,
replacing or disciplining directors who failed to reduce agency costs in the firm. 302
II. The Politics of Discretion: Stakeholder Statutes
In response to the wave of takeovers that swept the US business world in the 1980s,
several states enacted stakeholder statutes as a means of strengthening directors' ability to resist
hostile bids and to mitigate the harmful outwards effects of hostile takeovers. 303 Given that such
transactions were feasible in the current framework of directors' discretion, Boards were able to
block takeover bids for their firms, allowing them to protect their positions, despite generating
agency costs. 304 The divide in contractarian thinking in the takeover context is underpinned by
two competing theories discussed for blocking hostile bids. These in turn can be situated into
broader theoretical frameworks that represent a fundamental disagreement over the role of
directorial discretion in corporate governance and the efficacy of market forces.
This engendered conflict between capital and incumbent Boards, the former of which
would often allege that directors were in breach of their fiduciary duties. An early debate
emerged on whether the existing level of discretion under the 'business judgment' rule represents
an optimal and enduring arrangement produced by the market or whether it constitutes an
arrangement which interferes with how the market functions. 305 The key issue was whether
corporate judiciaries should uphold a legal duty to maximize shareholder wealth in the takeover
context or whether discretion to pursue the long-term best interests of the corporation should be
protected. 306

III. Shareholder Rights Contractarians
A core premise of this perspective is that legally protected discretion amounts to State and
judicial interference in the market for corporate control which leads to weak constraints on
managerial power. Alternatively, allowing the market for corporate control to operate unimpeded
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would control agency costs and lead to optimal arrangements between shareholders and
management. Shareholder rights advocates propose several changes to increase shareholder
power, their most pressing agenda is to 'unfetter' the market for corporate control. Arguing that
shareholders should be able to exercise undistorted choice when faced with a takeover bid,
Professor Bebchuk advocates for legal limits on takeover defenses. 307 When a takeover bid is
made against a firm, management's and shareholders' interests sharply diverge, as directors'
independence is threatened.

308

IV. Director Primacy Contractarians
A core premise of this perspective is that the current configuration of corporate law,
including legally protected discretion is an optimal outcome of market forces. State and judicial
protection of directorial discretion to block a hostile bid stems from self-imposed limitations on
the market for corporate control. While the end governance goal is shareholder wealth
maximization, existing market forces and legal arrangements are said to be ideal for achieving
the requisite norms of directorial conduct for achieving this end. 309

SECTION C: The Outcome of Existing Market Forces
Gordon Smith argues that the shareholder value norm remains the operative decision-rule
for managing the firm, due to market forces, despite uncertainty whether a legal duty to
maximize profits exists. Smith's fundamental position is that “changes in corporate law cannot
eradicate poverty or materially change existing distributions of wealth, except by impairing the
creation of wealth” and that changes in corporate law that will have an effect on labor inequality
and the environment will make things worse not better.
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made by progressive corporate law scholars that changing corporate decision-making by either
changing the structure of the Board or the shareholder value norm will not improve aggregate
social wealth. More specifically, Smith argues that changing the composition of the Board to
include stakeholder interests “would not significantly change the profit-maximizing orientation
of those firms” due to the power of product, capital, and managerial labor markets which
“severely constrain the options available to managers”. 311
Smith argues that existing Board structures persist because Boards recognize that the
current structure and the discretion it affords to directors to pursue efficiency and profitmaximization as the corporation’s predominant goal, are what ultimately makes sense for
shareholders because it yields the most value and the best use of the corporation’s productive
capacity. Smith addresses the assertion made by Greenfield and other scholars that corporate law
should not prevent directors from taking into account the societal interests that the corporation is
ultimately meant to serve. 312 He argues that such a statement is actually irrelevant because the
shareholder primacy norm in corporate law “is both unenforced and unenforceable” meaning that
it is not an outcome of the law but of markets.
I. Team Production Theory
Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair advance Team Production Theory (“TPT”) which is
ultimately rooted in the nexus-of-contracts model of the firm. Like the above claim, it posits that
the rules governing corporate actors, namely Board power and discretion is an efficient outcome
of market forces. 313 However, TPT departs somewhat from shareholder primacy's core concepts.
TPT rejects the principle-agent theory of shareholder-management relations and posits
the Board of Directors as a mediating hierarchy with shareholders necessarily having limited
power over corporate decisions. 314 TPT claims that economic organization often requires the
combined investment and coordinated effort of multiple groups. 315 If these inputs are firm
specific and cannot be separated from the collective enterprise, serious problems arise with how
to divide-up the economic surpluses generated, especially where the corporation's activities and
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environment are highly dynamic and complex. 316 Preset rules guaranteeing claims encourage
parties to reduce optimal efforts. 317 Attempts to divide surpluses during production, create
opportunities for rent-extraction by managers, shareholders or labor. 318
Corporate law is an institutional substitute for explicit contracting. Parties opt into a
governance structure, what Blair and Stout call, a mediating hierarchy, giving up property rights
over their inputs and the venture's joint outputs to the corporate entity. A key function played by
corporate law is to ensure the Board's independence from team members. Shareholders are given
voting and legal rights only to discipline ineffective Board governance. TPT fundamentally
differs from the organizational model in that it rejects the imposition of mandatory norms of
behavior onto the Board that are shareholder or stakeholder based. 319
The most intriguing part of TPT is that it recognizes the effects of political forces on
management orientation, coalition formation in the firm, and on how the Board allocates
resources and risk between stakeholders. 320 Implicitly it recognizes a nexus between politics and
market forces and attempts to explain why management orientation before the 1980s favored
labor in the US. They suggest that shifting market and political forces in the 1980s re-configured
the extent to which the Board considered shareholders' interests over those of labor, resulting in
the current framework of director primacy. While they posit that director primacy has persevered
due to the efficiency and optimality of this arrangement, they recognize a wide range of
possibilities for how the firm can be run.

SECTION D: Shareholder Primacy’s External Conflict
Outside the nexus-of-contracts paradigm, State and judicial protection of directorial
discretion can also be viewed as regulation against the outwards negative effects of the market
for corporate control. Accepting that takeovers create efficiency and shareholder value, this view
recognizes that such forces simultaneously impact societal welfare in a negative way. Rejecting
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shareholder primacy’s normative claims that profit-seeking maximizes net societal welfare this
perspective views the effects of capital market expansion as undermining the well-being of the
firm’s non-shareholder constituent groups.
Proponents of both director primacy and shareholder rights models periodically engage
with the normative claims made under this perspective. A well-known exchange between Gordon
Smith and Kent Greenfield accurately characterizes this debate. Greenfield employs an
organizational/regulatory view to argue that other stakeholders such as creditors and employees
should have legal rights in corporate law in some capacity. 321 Greenfield's view can be distilled
to two general proposals to change corporate law. One is to change the decision rule which
currently guides managerial conduct. The other is to change the decision-maker or at least reconfigure the existing framework of decision-makers to include stakeholders' voice.
Greenfield focuses on the pervasive effects of corporate power on society which he refers
to as “breaches of the public trust or the imposition of costly externalities on stakeholders or
communities.” 322 Greenfield's concern is that “as globalization intensifies, the narrow
shareholder/executive focus of U.S. corporate law is increasingly exported, displacing the more
expansive, public-oriented view of corporations in other nations.” 323 He argues that the divide
between internal shareholder and external stakeholder regulation is misguided and that nonshareholder interests are better protected by internal rules governing managerial conduct. 324

SECTION E: Executive Pay from a Contractual Perspective
When applied to executive compensation, the contractual metaphor shifts the interests of
shareholders to the forefront, misaligning their interests from the corporate entity. It focuses on
the relationship between shareholders and management and problematizes managerial power as
agency costs, defined as a failure of managers to pursue only strategies that maximize
shareholder value. At the Board level, this translates into a failure of directors to ensure that
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managers adhere to shareholder interests alone. This suppresses the relevance of other interests
to overall corporate performance and precludes governance orientations that serve a balancing
function, justifying the shareholder value norm.
I. Why Bureaucratic Compensation Schemes?
Contractarians claim that corporate governance was previously ineffective due to
pressures from labor and pro-social groups to reduce the size of executive compensation. This
resulted in bureaucratic compensation schemes which failed to reward high levels of profitmaximization. This gives rise to a puzzling question, if market forces lead to optimal outcomes,
then why did such schemes pervade the corporate landscape before the 1990's? Contractarians
explain that a lack of takeover activity previous to this model's emergence is attributable to a
legal framework highly supportive of protections and benefits for labor, which interfered with
optimal market outcomes. Moreover, market pressures were previously weak and allowed for
managerial slack, making it easier for labor to influence management orientation. In corporate
governance, the underlying paradigm shift that needed to occur was for directors to understand
their role as agents of the shareholders and to set compensation schemes that would compel
efficiency, greater levels of risk, and profit-seeking.
II. Why Is Executive Pay Still A Problem?
The optimal contracting and managerial power approaches previously addressed,
represent competing views within the contractarian model over why this model fails to create
good corporate governance through efficiency, high performance and maximum profits. These
approaches can be overlaid onto the competing assertions of director versus shareholder primacy
theorists.
The optimal contracting approach is supported by director primacy's claim that the
current balance of power between shareholders and management and the existing level of
directorial discretion do not interfere prohibitively with how markets function. 325 Current
market forces exert adequate pressure on directors to focus on shareholder value maximization
and to create optimal pay incentives between executives and the corporation. In other words,
notwithstanding inadequacies in design and best practice, there is no fundamental problem with
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compensation contracts from a director primacy perspective. Proponents of optimal contracting
attribute the role that incentive compensation played in the short-sighted management and
excessive risk-taking that contributed to the crisis to perverse incentives. The potential role of
capital markets and myopic inventors in precipitating perverse incentives is not acknowledged by
this approach. Instead, optimal contracting theorists view the solution as better incentive
structures and practices that more closely align shareholders' and management's interest without
canvassing the possibility that many short-term investors might be satisfied with extracting shortterm wealth at the corporation's long-term expense.
The managerial power approach is supported by the claims of shareholder rights theorists
that corporate law, namely the business judgment rule and the current balance of power between
shareholders and the Board interferes with the disciplinary force of the market. 326 Despite the
liberalization of markets that occurred in the 1980s, corporate law needs further reform to ensure
that corporate takeovers occur without regulatory and judicial interference. The result is weak
market forces which fail to exert pressure onto Boards to serve shareholders' interests by creating
optimal performance incentives and controlling rent extraction. Executives exert counterpressure onto directors, permitting then to extract excessive levels pay and undermine incentives
designed to constrain their own behavior.

SECTION F: An Alternative Approach to Conceptualizing the Executive Pay Problem?
A third possible approach posits that if markets do exert significant pressure as the
optimal contracting model suggests than the advent of these forces are responsible for the current
phenomena of short-term behavior and excessive risk. Incentive compensation in fact does work
as intended and effectively ties managerial behavior directly to the capital market. Being highly
responsive to market forces managers exploit fundamental flaws in this market model.
The combination of significantly higher levels of pay and market forces prompt managers
326
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to extract greater levels of rent while necessarily satisfying market demands. Thus, high powered
incentive pay creates two sets of conflicting incentives. One, to create results in share price and
two, to extract high amounts of rent. This is more a product of tying performance incentives to
the capital market than a result of flawed design. In contrast, where market pressures are weak,
the easier alternative is for executives to bargain for generous pay and take less risk, exert less
effort, or engage in empire building. The fact that managers actually pursue short-term gains
indicates that market pressures do significantly influence managerial conduct. This approach be
summarized as follows:
In order to maximize his personal wealth, the executive has a perverse incentive to focus
on only those programs and factors most closely affecting the amount of his compensation. Since
his compensation depends on the company’s performance, and the company’s performance is
measured primarily by earnings-per-share or market price, the executive has incentive to do
whatever is necessary to prop up this quarter’s earnings or increase the market price of shares.
Instead of positioning the company for the future, which is an important objective of the
the executive’s attention is diverted to positioning the company to meet short-term goals.” 327

Unlike the managerial power theory, which holds that managers weaken the terms which
bind them to perform optimally, this approach posits that managers do not manipulate their pay
incentives to bind themselves to excessive risk-taking and extreme short-term strategies. This is
better explained by powerful market forces and a pervasive shareholder value norm which
compel directors to develop incentives which succeed in compelling executives to raise share
price and take-on more risk.

While incentive compensation purports to solve the performance issue, it fails to address
and potentially worsens other aspects of managerial power. Furthermore, it conflates differing
aspects of managerial power, such as rent extraction and the outwards effects of risk-taking, with
a lack of adequate performance. In sum, this third approach posits that the current outcome of
market forces, short-sighted management and excessive risk-taking, is an inherent flaw of the
market-based governance approach itself stemming from an over-reliance on efficiency and
profit-based governance norms. The proposed solution then would be to introduce long-term
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oriented norms of conduct for Boards to follow when setting executive pay to counter short-term
orientations. This could include limiting the size of maximum compensation payable to insulate
executives from myopic market forces.
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PART III- Can Shareholder Primacy Accommodate Sustainable
Long-Term Governance?

CHAPTER SEVEN:
The Executive Compensation Debate as Competing Theories of the Firm

These distinct perspectives of corporate law’s role are simultaneously instantiated in
corporate legal statutes. 328 They are also reflected in the corporate judiciary’s treatment of
corporate governance disputes which at certain times can be viewed as facilitating contracting
while at others as imposing mandatory norms. 329 However, since its rise in the late 1970’s the
presence of law and economics thinking in corporate law has increasingly challenged established
corporate law doctrine. 330 By rejecting the imposition of behavioral norms in favor of marketbased solutions to a narrowly defined principle-agent problem between shareholders and
management, the contractual view advocates for a 'laissez-faire' approach to corporate
governance that suppresses the relevance of the entity metaphor under which the interests of nonshareholder constituents can be accounted for. 331
Where the contractual approach attempts to prevail is the limitation it places on
management's normative discretion to consider interests other than shareholder wealth
maximization in the context of running the firm. Yet, up to a certain point, it is not necessary for
this prerogative to conflict with what corporate law attempts to achieve in terms of defining and
imposing appropriate norms of conduct. However, we have reached a point at which we now
stand in the post-crisis debate over executive compensation which has demonstrated that this
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prerogative has gone too far. The quest for higher performance has exacerbated managerial
power and has significantly undermined the function that corporate law plays in protecting the
corporation from damage at the hands of its management.
Not only is this reflected in the post-crisis theoretical debate over the shareholder
primacy norm that has since ensued, but it is central to the debate over executive compensation
reform which to a large extent has failed to acknowledge the significance of this conflict for the
optimal contracting paradigm from which compensation reform is being approached. As the
dominant approach to solving the managerial power problem in the firm, incentive compensation
arguably has succeeded in displacing the entity model, thus weakening its mitigating function
between the competing demands of capital and labor markets. While this approach of enabling
capital and product markets to discipline managers was the inevitable consequence of the
corporatist legacy, the important question raised is whether it addresses the full extent of
managerial power in the firm or whether it provides further opportunities for managers to
appropriate wealth by overemphasizing the profit motive and transmitting risk to other
stakeholders?
While strong product and capital are inevitable results of the LME framework’s historical
development, the danger lies in allowing managers to advance shareholder interests in the
interim, past the point where it begins to harm the corporate entity. There needs to be a
mechanism for reconciling the competing demands of these market forces with the interests of
other groups to achieve an overall level of stability in the political economy. While the previous
solution has attempted to achieve this end by allowing for some level of agency costs, placing
limits in effect on profit maximization, the current dilemma for achieving an appropriate
discretionary balance is between increasing shareholder rights or accepting a ‘director primacy’
model of the firm. Questions arise whether either model results in sustainable governance and
management practices.
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SECTION A: What Would Increasing Shareholder Power Result In?
A relevant line of inquiry in the post-crisis context is whether the existing structure of
corporate law conforms to a shareholder or director-centric model of governance. While this
debate is academic, it underpins a normative debate on whether the current balance of power
between capital and management should be maintained.
I. Theories of Director Governance
Professor Lynn Stout poses a challenge to the existing presumption that the shareholder
primacy model best explains corporate law. She argues that “shareholders do not have ultimate
control over directors, directors do not always seek to maximize share price [and that] the rights
granted to shareholders are limited in scope and they do not enable shareholders, as a matter of
law or fact, to insist that managers act as their agents serving only their interests.” 332 She further
asserts that promoters of companies will often seek to weaken shareholder powers and that
shareholders do not object. 333 While the thrust of Stout’s argument is to assess whether corporate
law and the corporation’s structure is consistent in actuality with the shareholder model, she also
lays out several theoretical arguments against shareholder primacy as a basis for corporate
governance reform.
The most relevant is the ‘Market Inefficiency and Director Primacy’ model. This view
highlights the weakness of agency theory's assertion that efficient markets price a company’s
stock accurately so that it accounts for future risks and returns. Emerging literature points to the
fact that stock prices diverge from real value creating the opportunity for strategies to boost value
in the short-term but harm the firm in the long-term. 334 This theory holds that all shareholders
are better off to give control to a Board so that it can run the company for the benefit of longterm stakeholders. 335 Thus, reforming corporate governance should not entail further reliance on
capital markets but on stronger directorial decision-making and arguably on clearer norms of
conduct.
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II. The Merits of Shifting Power to Shareholders
Professor Bainbridge argues that increasing shareholder involvement in corporate
decisions can disrupt the mechanisms that make the public corporation feasible, the vesting of
authority in the Board of Directors. 336 He cites that such a model is based on an organizational
model of decision-making premised on consensus and authority. 337 Consensus is employed
when voting stakeholders in a firm have similar interests and information and occurs at low cost
while authority is exercised by the Board when the interests of voting stakeholders conflict and
information is uneven. The Board balances interests in a manner consistent with the
organization’s interests as a whole and stakeholders must live with this compromise, as it’s the
most efficient.
III. “Ten Ways to Create Shareholder Value”
In response to the claim that increasing shareholder rights will increase shareholder
value, the work of Alfred Rappaport suggests many firms sacrifice sustained growth for shortterm gain to satisfy short-term earnings expectations. He cites that 80% of executives would
sacrifice critical R & D spending to bolster quarterly earnings, limiting opportunity to create
enduring value for shareholders. He identifies 10 principles that firms can follow to create lasting
value:
1)

Do not manage earnings or provide earnings guidance;

2)

Make strategic decisions that maximize expected value, even at the expense
of near-term earnings;

3)

Make acquisitions that maximize expected value, even at the expense of nearterm earnings;

4)

Carry only assets that maximize value;

5)

Return cash to shareholder when there are no credible value-creating
opportunities to invest in the business;

6)

Reward CEOs and other senior executives for delivering superior long-term
results;

7)

Reward operating-unit executives for adding superior multi-year value;

8)

Rewards middle managers and front-line employees for delivering superior
performance on the key value drivers that they influence directly;
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9)

Require senior executives to bear the risks of ownership just as shareholders do;

10)

Provide investors with value-relevant information.

In sum, these principles are underpinned by a strong claim that director primacy is
necessary to allow Boards to implement lasting long-term sustainable performance. Shareholders
themselves lack an incentive to sacrifice short-term gains in the manner described. Thus,
incentive contracts which tie shareholder expectations directly to management strategies
preclude managers from implementing long-term strategies. Reliance on incentive contracts by
Boards displaces the exercise of discretion to create long-term shareholder value.
However, the case against increasing shareholder power advanced by director primacy
theorists fails to assess whether the manner in which directors currently balance the interests of
voting versus non-voting stakeholders in the presence of existing market forces leads to
sustainable wealth creation. If directors succumb to short-term pressures and implement policies
which tie shareholders’ myopic expectations directly to managerial decision-making, can existing
compensation arrangements be said to be optimal? Bainbridge seems to suggest that overall
current arrangements are optimal. However, these are not entirely consistent with Rappaport’s
principles for creating shareholder value.

SECTION B: What Arrangements Do Existing Market Forces Lead To?
The key question then is what director primacy actually looks like in practice and how
recent events surrounding the crisis and executive pay should be explained. Is rejecting greater
shareholder control in favour of allowing Boards to retain their discretion suitable for
constraining short-term behaviour, excessive risk-taking and the outwards effects of corporate
power? The claim of E. Merrick Dodd in the post-Depression context is essentially the claim of
director primacy theorists today. However the effects of existing market forces on management
orientation need to be better accounted for.
I.

The Politics of Finance

The politics of finance literature offers an explanation for why and how the shareholder
primacy model is unsustainable. Being rooted in political economy, it overlaps with newly
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emerging corporate legal theory that challenges shareholder primacy. Its key contributions are
that it alternatively explains what drives the market and what the prospects are for market based
governance norms. 338 Written after the financial crisis, the work of Sanford Jacoby on finance
and labor is concerned more generally with examining patterns of economic development and
crises on the one hand and financial inequality and the distribution of economic risk in society on
the other to explain how corporate governance might be changing in response to the latest
financial crisis. In particular the literature seeks to explain the increased economic and political
significance of finance and the shift that most developed countries have made away from
“industrial capitalism” towards “financial capitalism” and how it might be changing in the postcrisis period. The changes associated with this shift that he refers to as financial development
pertain mostly to how business corporations are operated and governed. They include, the
expansion and fluctuation of capital markets since the 1980’s; the rise in finance-derived
incomes and occupations; the increasing role of corporations as short-term investment vehicles
and; the dominant influence of shareholders over corporate decision making and executive pay.
The literature also seeks to explain the concomitant rises in income inequality,
employment risk, wage and employment volatility, and the shifting of responsibility to
employees for pensions that have also occurred since the 1980’s and whether they have any
relationship to this process of financial development and the changes that have occurred in
corporate governance. In attempting to account for and explain these changes it explores the
relationship between a rise in financial capitalism and levels of income and risk inequality. In
doing so it challenges the dominant view of 'economic liberalism' that purports to explain these
phenomena as a natural expansion of the self-regulating market. In particular it focuses on the
corporate governance aspects of these phenomena by examining the relationship between how
business corporations are governed and why swings in financial development and inequality
occur. Its premise directly challenges not only the law and economics assertion that markets can
adequately regulate corporate agents but also the view put forth by contractarians that the
solutions to reforming corporate governance to avoid or mitigate future crises lie in bolstering
how these liberal market mechanisms work.
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The crux of the argument is that the past and current trajectory of economic development
and patterns of crises can be explained as a political contest between those who drive and benefit
from financial development and those who experience income and risk inequality. The
prominence and decline of finance and financial interests over the last century and the rise and
fall of inequality are interrelated by cause and effect and are driven by a political process. This is
referred to as “the politics of finance” which holds that the economic changes since the 1980’s
can be explained as a prominent period for finance which creates a rise in inequality and risk.
Elite beneficiaries of finance exert political pressure on governments and regulators to develop
policies that favor the expansion of finance and the establishment of the unregulated or “selfregulating market”. This is evidenced by corporate governance arrangements that emphasize
short-term returns for shareholders, executive pay incentives aimed at creating short-term value,
self-regulatory governance arrangements such as stock options aimed at aligning shareholder and
manager interests and much of the corporate takeover activity in the 1980’s which resulted in
firms being used as short-term investment vehicles and arbitrage.
This in turn causes wealth to flow to top income groups in the form of increased
investment gains and finance-based incomes such as executive pay. At the same time a wide
coalition of groups in the lower income brackets such as workers and sometimes middle class
income earners exert political pressure to resist financial expansion and sometimes succeed in
causing finance to contract. This is evidenced by labor union activity and the prevalence of
institutions aimed at smoothing inequality and risk such as pension schemes and employer
funded safety nets for employment and health risk.
To politics of finance premise is founded on the work of Karl Polanyi written in the
1940’s about a phenomenon called the “Double Movement” which provides the underlying
theory for the relationship between financial expansion and inequality. 339 Accordingly Polanyi’s
theory challenges the economic liberalism paradigm by showing that the expansion of the “free”
and “self-regulating” market is actually embedded in the politics and culture of a society and that
markets themselves are ineffective at correcting the negative effects of market expansion. As
market expansion intensifies, counter-movements against market expansion erupt to resist these
negative effects. Elites in society aim to establish an unregulated market that operates in their
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favor until that particular market reaches a turning point signaled by a crisis or failure at which
its negative effects are the most intense. This is usually followed by a movement to contain the
market failure and establish a new economic order which better protects society.
The politics of financial development view not only applies to contests that happen in
policy arenas but inside the corporation as well. Within corporations there is a contest over the
allocation of a corporation’s surplus or “value-added” between shareholders, executives, workers
and the corporation’s retained earnings. Corporate governance arrangements affect this
distribution. Different actors within the corporation over time have been arranged into different
factions. The historical arrangement of these factions within the firm is consistent with and
explains the swings in financial development and inequality over the last century. The period
before the Great Depression was characteristic of a coalition of shareholders and executives
against worker interests. Consequently, income and risk inequality for workers was increasing
up until the crisis in 1929. After this period, there was a progressive shift towards the alignment
of executive and worker interests against shareholders, which saw significant improvements in
income inequality and the establishment of mechanisms to smooth and mitigate the wage and
unemployment risks faced by employees. This arrangement continued until 1980 which marked
a turning point at which shareholder interests started to become aligned with executives against
the interests of workers due to the deregulation of policies that supported wealth distributing and
risk smoothing mechanisms. The period since 1980 saw an unprecedented rise in financial
development which has come to an end with the financial crisis.
A key premise of the liberal market claim is that the alignment of executive and
shareholder interests requires self-regulating market mechanisms. Managerial power is held in
check through the self-interest and greed of shareholders. The politics of finance demonstrates
that profit seeking as a means of holding managers accountable damages the long-term prospects
of the firm in which employees, communities, and the public have a long-term interest. In other
words the self-regulating market as a governance mechanism is prone to failure because it allows
some constituents to extract significant wealth from the corporation at the corporation’s expense
which damages other interests in the process. This challenges the view that inadequate adherence
to shareholder interests leads to breakdowns in corporate governance and also that existing
market forces lead to optimal outcomes.
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II.

Post-Crisis Assessments of the Market’s Governance Prospects

The post-crisis debate over corporate governance amongst leading corporate law scholars
engages with the debate in corporate law “over whether directors should consider the interests of
shareholders only or a wider constituency of stakeholders that includes groups such as
consumers”. 340 While this question is at the heart of the matter, the consequences of how this
question is answered relate directly to the question of what types of economic arrangements put
the corporation’s productive resources to their best use; ensure that those who exercise power
and control over deploying these resources do so in a responsible manner; and enhance our
aggregate social welfare. Written in the context of the financial crisis where we saw the near
demise of long-standing financial institutions, this debate questions some the key tenets that
underpin our current economic systems. It calls into question our current approach to the social
control of economic life, the self-regulating market, and our understanding of what the business
corporation is. Several of the scholars who engage with this debate respond directly to
Hansmann and Kraakman’s “End of History of Corporate Law” claim which asserted in 2001
that shareholder primacy was the dominant uncontested form of economic ordering.

341

One line of inquiry advance by Professor David Millon, looks at the shareholder primacy
model more in terms of how the corporation is run as a matter of governance. It focuses on the
interplay between corporate law and how the corporation is run and also on the non-legal factors
that shape corporate behavior. It provides a basis for proposing how the corporation should be
run as a matter of practice, which governance theory provides a better working model, and
whether the practice of shareholder primacy, defined here as running the corporation in
shareholders’ short-term interests, is changing. Millon assesses whether a shift is occurring in the
post-crisis period away from shareholder primacy towards a model called Enlightened
Shareholder Value which holds that “the corporation should pursue shareholder wealth with a
long-run orientation that seeks sustainable growth and profits based on responsible attention to
the full range of relevant stakeholder interests”. 342 His main argument is “risk management
practices are helping in reinterpreting the corporate goal and in promoting the consideration of
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stakeholder interests in ways that resonate with notions of corporate social responsibility”. 343 He
asserts as a testable hypothesis that market forces are exerting pressure onto business to shift
away from myopic labor and environmental tendencies because of the realization that these
practices carry significant risk. He concludes that market forces are currently not oriented
towards affecting a significant shift towards ESV and legislation and corporate law must
therefore play a role in influencing corporate behavior.
Another line of inquiry advanced by Professor Leonard I. Rotman, focuses more heavily
on assessing the efficacy of the shareholder primacy norm as an underlying basis for corporate
governance. This view looks more at shareholder primacy’s track record, its impact on social
wealth, and its effectiveness in constraining managerial power and whether corporate governance
should continue to rely on the shareholder primacy norm or embrace a longer-term more
stakeholder-inclusive view to managing the corporation. Rotman argues that the two major
corporate law cases that shareholder primacy theorists rely upon to make their case, Dodge v
Ford Motor Co (1919) and Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc (1986) do not in
fact establish a shareholder primacy norm and are more consistent with a stakeholder inclusive
view of governance. From this he concludes that the foundational corporate law issues of
corporate identity (what is the corporation in law?) and corporate purpose (who should the
corporation be run for?) are not resolved as Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman
suggested a decade earlier. He addresses some flaws he sees in the shareholder primacy model,
namely that “shareholder primacy unduly skews the focus of corporate directors” and refers to
Enron and the recent financial crisis as examples of how “market pressures and managerial
incentives cause unwarranted risk-taking that benefits management and shareholders in the shortterm, but may ultimately lead to the demise of the corporation.” 344

343

Ibid.

344

See Rotman, supra note 21.

89

SECTION C: To What Extent Can Directors Consider the Interests of Other Stakeholders?
Both director and shareholder primacy contractarians argue that market forces lead, or
could lead if unfettered, to optimal management orientations. The extreme view, that of Gordon
Smith, is that such forces cannot be readily resisted by management and militate towards profit
maximizing activities. Shareholder rights advocates accept implicitly (by failing to refute) that
such forces are strong enough to counter pressure from labor to form a coalition with
management, but argue that such forces are not strong enough to counter managerial slack and
rent extraction itself. By removing obstacles to effective operation of the market for corporate
control, Board veto and poison pills, market forces would inevitably compel greater profit
seeking. The Varieties of Capitalism literature, earlier discussed, also predicts that managers and
capital are more likely to coordinate on short-term strategies, as institutional complementarities
like fluid labor markets, highly liquid capital markets, strong investor protection, and widely held
ownership make these strategies more feasible in the LME. However, there is reason to question
the extent to which capital market pressures can be resisted by directors and whether doing so
could still result in productive and efficient firms.
A recent study from Australia, typically an LME, demonstrates that management of
public and privately owned corporations, although strongly affected by product and capital
market pressures, can for the most part, resist pressure from investors for immediate gains and
still be successful over the long-run. The particularly intriguing aspect of this study is that firms
with widely held ownership in the context of strong investor protection and fluid labor markets
can develop partnership style relations with their employees defined as “situations in which
business organizations are seen to work closely and cooperatively with their employees rather
than contrary to their interests.” 345 The authors focus their study on three principle factors
dominant in the Varieties of Capitalism literature: corporate governance arrangements, the
ownership structure of firms, and systems of employment and examine their intersection within
the context of the legal-institutional environment to assess their impact on employeemanagement partnerships. Their findings challenge the dual model classification that underpins
the comparative capitalism literature, demonstrating that significant variations of governance
arrangements can exist within a particular LME due to other sets of factors that give rise to
Richard Mitchell, Anthony O’Donnell, Shelley Marshall, Ian Ramsay and Meredith Jones, Law, Corporate
Governance and Partnerships at Work: A Study of Australian Regulatory Style and Business Practice (Ashgate Publishing 2011).
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partnership type scenarios between workers and the corporation.
Several of the companies in the study, despite undergoing significant internal change as a
result of their capital reorganization were able to exercise a fair degree of autonomy over
corporate strategy. Using a company study and survey of corporate directors, the authors tested
the presuppositions they made based on the VOC literature that the governance of a widely held
company is more likely to correspond with prioritizing shareholder over stakeholder interests
while a closely held company is less likely to be governed in the short-term interests of its
shareholders. 346 Some of the results of the survey were that 44% of directors ranked
shareholders as their first priority while 40.4% ranked the company as their first priority. 347
More notably, 55% percent of directors viewed acting in the best interests of the corporation as
balancing stakeholder interests including employees despite the ownership structure of the
company. 348 Interestingly, the authors found that employees were highly ranked in other areas of
the survey and where a shareholder-oriented governance outlook persisted it was not at the
extreme end of the spectrum. 349
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PART IV-What is the Magnitude of the Current Shift in Governance Thinking? Is it
Compatible with a Market-Based Approach?

CHAPTER EIGHT:
Indicators of a Post Crisis Shift in Thinking
After analyzing how the current approach conflicts with corporate law's function in
protecting the entity, we can examine post-crisis responses to compensation reform with a view
to determining the extent to which the existing paradigm can accommodate the challenges
identified. This is performed as a comparative exercise between two governance regimes,
Germany's coordinated market economy and the liberal market economy of the United States.
The significance of comparing these jurisdictions is not only that their approaches to
market regulation contrast but that they're equally subject to the Financial Stability Board's
directive on executive pay reform. While several assessments of post-crisis responses to
compensation reform, namely the implementation of the FSB Principles on Sound Remuneration
Practices across the LME and CME spectrum, gravitate towards the conclusion that marketbased norms of governance need to be improved through better contracting, 350 a deeper
assessment stands to reveal that such changes cannot be accommodated from this paradigm.
The overarching theme of controlling excessive risk-taking and advancing a longer term
approach to running the firm, when implemented in either jurisdiction, calls forward an
economic rationale on the part of directors that is inconsistent with efficiency and performance
based norms of directorial conduct. Despite the attempt by mainstream scholarship to reconcile
some of the differences that appear in regulatory responses between jurisdictions as fitting within
the optimal contracting paradigm, these differences, it is argued, represent fundamentally
divergent approaches to market governance.
While this has potentially significant implications for the convergence/divergence debate
which underlies post-crisis assessments of compensation reform, from a methodological

For post-crisis assessments of regulatory responses to executive pay that gravitate towards this conclusion see
Hausmann and Bechtold-Orth, supra note 18; Ferrarini and Ungureanu, supra note 23. See also Stephen Bainbridge, supra note
82 (arguing there is no real problem with executive pay in the post crisis context).
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standpoint the issue is two-fold. First, it is important to assess whether differences in regulatory
approach can be reconciled with shareholder primacy or whether they diverge. The result of this
determines the position we can take on whether corporate governance is continuing to converge
towards a more liberal market based model or whether the approaches of certain jurisdictions are
diverging. While this in itself is instructive of shareholder primacy's efficacy in the post-crisis
era, it does not show whether shareholder primacy in its own context reveals any internal
consistencies with the need to constrain risk-taking and the pursuit of short-term profit. This
gives rise to the second issue, whether post-crisis responses in the United States reveal at best a
shift away from shareholder primacy and at least inconsistency with the need to run large public
corporations sustainably and in the public interest. However, to determine whether such a shift is
evident, we need a basis of comparison to determine where along a spectrum of governance
approaches they might fit, hence again the need to rely on a comparative approach.

SECTION A: Framework of Analysis
The principal criterion of selection for these regulatory responses is that they have some
type of impact on the Board of Directors’ role moving forward from the crisis. These initiatives
are not necessarily direct changes to directors’ duties, although in the German context this seems
to be the case. Many of these initiatives represent changes or refinements in the context that
director’s duties are understood. To examine these initiatives the following questions will be
asked:
1. Does the provision represent a new behavioral norm for directors requiring additional due
diligence, a consideration of new circumstances or the following of new procedures when
setting or approving compensation?
2.

Is it mandatory or enabling? Does it impose extra-economic or efficiency based norms of
conduct? Does it require directors to account for how executive pay impacts the corporate
entity or to engage predominantly in arm’s length bargaining?

3. Is the effect of the provision such that it results in the interests of other stakeholders being
taken into account by directors when setting executive pay and does it result in directors
prioritizing the firm’s well-being over immediate shareholder returns?
4. Is the effect of the provision such that directors utilize performance criteria other than share
price to gauge whether executive compensation schemes are acceptable?
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SECTION B: Norm Generation at the International Level: FSF Principles
As a response to the events that led to the crisis, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)
developed 9 principles for remuneration which pertain to senior employees in large firms. 351 At
the time of their release and anticipated implementation by national banking and securities
regulators in OECD nations, there was speculation that these principles would extend to large
and systemically important firms outside the financial sector. 352 The 9 principles are as follows:

1.

The firm’s board of directors must actively oversee compensation system
design and operation.

2.

The firm’s board of directors must monitor and review the compensation system
to ensure the system operates as intended.

3.

Staff engaged in financial and risk control must be independent, have
appropriate authority, and be compensated in a manner that is independent of
the business areas they oversee and commensurate with their key role.

4.

Compensation must be adjusted for all types of risk.

5.

Compensation outcomes must be symmetric with risk outcomes.

6.

Compensation payout schedules must be sensitive to the time horizon of risks.

7.

The mix of cash, equity and other forms of compensation must be consistent with
risk alignment.

8.

Supervisory review of compensation practices must be rigorous and sustained,
and deficiencies must be addressed promptly with supervisory action.

9.

Firms must disclose clear, comprehensive and timely information about their
compensation practices to facilitate constructive engagement by all stakeholders.

In its final report which was a product of several consultations and reports engaged in by
its Workstream Group, the FSF set-out its rationale behind such changes and particular issues
that needed to be addressed. 353 Of general importance was the shared belief by market

Financial Stability Forum, “FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices” FSF (2009), Online: FSF,
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participants that executive remuneration practices were responsible for driving inappropriate
risk-taking practices which culminated in the crisis. 354 Of specific importance is the recognition
that up until the crisis compensation systems for senior executives have been viewed
predominantly as performance or risk-enhancing tools not related to risk management and
governance. Risk management was handled outside the corporate governance realm and
executive compensation was conceptualized as the principle governance tool, implemented to
control managerial slack by spurring short-term profit creation.
This process of norm creation at the supra-national level, has identified the need to focus
on how compensation systems can encourage managers to overwhelm existing risk management
and control systems. 355 In line with this rationale, is the need to recognize the risk implications
of basing compensation systems strictly on the profit motive. The FSF makes it clear that the
traditional risk management policies of financial institutions which focus on prudent credit
granting and underwriting practices are not adequate to address the issue of risk-taking and the
pursuit of aggressive short-term growth at the upper echelons of the organization. 356 Thus, the
norms developed by the FSF have broader implications for corporate governance practices
outside the typical purview of banking regulation and financial sector governance.
The 9 principles can be divided across three areas. 357 The FSF provides further rationale
for why these are necessary:
1. Effective governance of compensation contained in principles 1 to 3.
2. Effective alignment of compensation with prudent risk-taking contained in principles 4 to 7.
3. Effective supervisory oversight and engagement by stakeholders contained in principles 8-9.

I. Effective Governance
According to the FSF, improving the effectiveness of how compensation is governed
entails recognizing that directors must account for how compensation interacts with the
institution's risk governance. Otherwise firms enacting enhanced risk governance measures risk
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not complying with the substance of the required changes. 358 A key development in this area is
that Boards should be responsible for the compensation system's design and operation. The key
thrust of this change is that delegation of compensation to independent experts or auditors is not
a substitute for the Board's requirement to have their own expertise at understanding issues
pertaining to risk in compensation. Boards can no longer rely on the self-regulating nature and
design of executive pay incentives and must take actual charge in monitoring how compensation
contributes to risk and to readily control and adjust compensation in relation to the firm.
The actual outcomes of compensation must be assessed against the compensation's intent
with a view to ensuring these outcomes don't harm the firm. Of principal importance is to that
current credit is not given for future revenue or growth within the compensation arrangement.
Directors must actively monitor compensation systems to ensure they do not reward performance
which hasn't yet materialized and concurrently to ensure that failed yet non-materialized risk is
accounted for in the compensation structure.
II. Effective Alignment
According to the FSF, the second area focuses on the risk imposed by the senior
employee on the firm which has not yet materialized. 359 It highlights the need to make
compensation sensitive to future risk outcomes, especially in the case of short-term profits
generated by that employee. This is especially important where the executive's tenure is near its
end and it pays for the executive to engage in short-term behavior and risk-taking, knowing that
he will escape the consequences under current arrangements. Moreover, poor risk management
results should in theory result in directors reducing payment to managers. With respect to
ensuring that compensation is aligned with prudent risk-taking, FSF Principles 4-7 seek to ensure
that directors assess outcomes of compensation against risk-management goals, ensuring
compensation pay-out schedules reflect the potential for future risks.
These principles are a direct response to the problems in existing compensation schemes
consisting largely of stock ownership. The FSF recognizes that such incentives expose managers
to losses in stock value for poor performance, resulting in excessive risk-taking potentially to
offset these losses, with little attention being paid to downside risk. Accordingly if weak relative
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performance from managerial slack or exogenous forces punishes managers, then taking more
risk is a way to offset this by boosting short-term performance. This is driven by the fact that
many shareholders are focusing on short-term results, making equity prices sensitive to shortterm performance criteria. The FSF concludes that traditionally structured options and bonus
grants create incentives to take too much risk and that the goal should be to match executive
incentives with the long-term stewardship of the firm. The FSF recognizes that the use of such
tools would likely have to be curtailed and that this might have an impact on incentives for
performance and talent retention.
III. Effective Supervisory Oversight
The FSF identifies the need for long-term supervisory oversight to offset countervailing
pressures, presumably for short-term returns. 360 It advocates for greater engagement by the
firm's stakeholders in compensation related decisions which includes but is not limited to a
greater role for shareholders. It can be reasonably inferred that this is not meant as a substitute
for other measures proposed, but as a complementing measure. Principles 8-9 relate directly to
the need for greater information disclosure, not only to shareholders but to regulators and
governments where firms are systemically important, and for greater engagement with
compensation decisions. Principles 8-9 in effect represent the FSF's endorsement of non-binding
say on pay provisions. The FSF also identifies the need for supervisory authorities such as
banking and securities regulators to actively monitor and identify and bring to the Board's
attention, deficiencies in a firm's compensation arrangements. Direct intervention in
compensation practices that are unsound from a risk standpoint is recommended for large
systemically important financial institutions and possibly for other large non-financial
institutions.
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SECTION C: Norm Generation at the EU Level: CEBS Guidelines
The European Banking Authority “EBA” is an independent EU authority tasked with the
prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions in EU member states and for
harmonizing prudential rules into a European Single Rulebook. The predecessor of the EBA was
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors “CEBS” established in 2004 as an independent
advisory group on banking supervision by the European Commission “EC”. Tasked with a
directive of facilitating the convergence of financial supervisory practices in the EU, the
committee played a key role on the European scene, developing standards for reforming
executive compensation practices in response to the financial crisis. Mirroring to a large extent
the principles disseminated by the FSF, the CEBS developed the 'High-level Principles for
Remuneration Policies in response to the crisis. 361 The set of principles is as follows:
1.

The financial institution should adopt an overall remuneration policy that is in line with
its business strategy and risk tolerance, objectives, values and long-term interests. It
should not encourage excessive risk-taking. The remuneration policy should cover
the institution as a whole and contain specific arrangements that take into account the
respective roles of senior management, risk takers and control functions. Control
functions should be adequately rewarded to attract skilled individuals.

2.

The remuneration policy should be transparent internally and adequately disclosed
externally.

3.
The management body, in its supervisory function, should determine the remuneration of
the management body in its management function. In addition the management body,
in its supervisory function, should approve the principles of the overall remuneration
policy of the institution and maintain oversight of their application. The implementation
of the remuneration policy should be subject to central and independent review.
4.
Where the pay award is performance related, remuneration should be based on a
combination of individual and collective performance. When defining individual
performance, factors apart from financial performance should be considered. The
measurement of performance, as a basis for bonus awards, should include adjustments for
risks and the cost of capital.
5.

There should be a proportionate ratio between base pay and bonus. Where a significant
bonus is paid, the bonus should not be a pure up-front cash payment but contain a
flexible, deferred component; it should consider the risk horizon of the underlying
performance.

For an explanation of the principles see, CEBS, “High-level Principles for Remuneration Policies', CEBS (20 April
2009), Online: <https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/16094/High-level+principles+for+remuneration+policies.pdf>.
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Of key importance in these principles, is a focus on clearly separating supervisory and
managerial roles at the upper echelons of the organization. 362 This distinction is characteristic of
most corporate entities, but more pronounced in some EU members' corporate governance
regimes such as Germany's co-determined board system. Following this distinction, the CEBS
guidelines further emphasize the need to insulate performance-based aspects of an organization's
internal governance from risk-management aspects. 363 Thus, employees in risk-management and
oversight positions are not to be rewarded based on the financial performance of the enterprise
but on sound governance practices instead.
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CHAPTER NINE:
Conflicting Views on the Significance of Post-Crisis Responses to Compensation

Implementation of the FSF principles was intended to be executed by banking and
securities regulators of OECD states and in the case of the CEBS Guidelines, by regulators in EU
member states. Corporate law was to play a role, but its extent was unclear at the time. In the
twelve month period after the crisis began to subside, legislators began to roll out various
measures aimed at regulating executive compensation. This provided an opportunity for
corporate scholarship to analyze these legal provisions and the approaches to governance they
represent. The debates inherent in this analysis require further exploration to understand the
conflict entrenched in narratives of compensation reform. Several differences and similarities
exist with how nations choose to regulate compensation in response to the goals identified by the
FSF and CEBS. These, for the most part, are accounted for as differences in the scope and
intensity of the application of these principles and differing sets of compromises between rules
versus principles based approaches. 364 While comprehensive, such a legal analysis is limited for
understanding the deeper issues at play. A legal analysis superficially reconciles differences in
approach and takes for granted the underlying paradigm shift that might be occurring. 365
In the post crisis analysis of compensation reform across several jurisdictions, two views
to appear to exist. One is that current regulatory approaches are consistent with the shareholder
primacy paradigm and represent improvements to how the optimal contracting model functions
while the other is that post-crisis responses represent a paradigm shift away from optimal
contracting. In the LME context each approach corresponds with either leaving directorial
discretion intact or constraining business judgement with stakeholder based norms. In the case of

This is the mainstream view consistent with optimal contracting and a law and economics perspective more generally.
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corporate governance in the CME context, namely Germany, the debate manifests as either a
continuation of convergence towards market based governance norms, with the consensus that
the self-regulatory approach needs to be improved versus the view that coordinated market
economies have renewed their path of divergence away from such norms. 366

SECTION A: Compensation Reform as Market-Based Regulation
One branch of the literature can be viewed as fitting into a perspective on post-crisis
regulation that accepts the optimal contracting model's efficacy as its core assumption. This view
reconciles differences in approach using a legal perspective and by doing so is able to conclude
that post-crisis responses are aimed at better aligning shareholder and manager interests to
achieve better performance.
The fundamental objective of compensation reform identified is sustaining market
confidence and promoting financial stability by removing incentives for inappropriate risk-taking
by managers. Yet this analysis falls short of recognizing key differences between mandatory
versus enabling rules. 367 Without this distinction the law and economics approach's dominance
can be taken for granted. A greater focus on whether enabling rules are being displaced by
mandatory norms of conduct could lend itself to a more accurate analysis of whether a paradigm
shift is occurring. While this approach clearly recognizes the need for firms to focus on longterm rather than short-term performance, 368 it fails to assess how this is possible, what it actually
takes and why it hasn't occurred up until now under current market-based arrangements.
The assumption seems to be that adjustments to compensation incentives can be made
without considering the magnitude of such a shift or its structural significance. A primary means
identified to long-term firm stewardship is the linking of total variable compensation to the
overall condition of the firm. 369 Yet, the extent to which a long-term governance orientation in
Mainstream scholarship views Germany's response as reinforcing markets and market mechanisms. See Ferrarrini and
Ungureanu, supra note 23. The other view is that German responses represent a shift away from relying on market forces towards
increased reliance on mandatory norms of conduct defined by corporate law.
367
Hausmann and Bechtold-Orth for instance fail to make this distinction in explaining differences in post-crisis
responses.
368
This is a consistent theme across most of the literature.
369
Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano propose for instance propose that restricted stock options be used to align
executive compensation with the firm's overall condition as opposed to short-term share price. This approach still relies
exclusively on market-based criteria and does not consider how long-term stewardship can be achieved, See Bhagat and Romano,
supra note 15.
366
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the LME context is possible is not assessed let alone acknowledged, taking for granted what a
long-term shift actually entails in the current legal institutional-framework. The question arising
is whether such a proposal can be accommodated or whether it requires a different set of norms
that insulate directorial decision-making from the economic dictates of the market.

SECTION B: Compensation Reform as Regulation of the Market
Another branch of the literature fits into the perspective that post-crisis regulation of
executive pay represents a paradigm shift away from the non-interventionist approach. 370 This
approach recognizes the significance of executive pay being a corporate governance problem
before the 1990s after which it was re-conceptualized as a corporate governance tool.

371

By

recognizing the primary focus of this paradigm as the design of optimal contracts, this view is
able to take account of any shift in approach that might be occurring.
The evidence to support the premise that such shift is occurring is multifaceted and can
be found in a limited number of post crisis analyses of compensation reform. The first point
observed from this viewpoint about the post-financial crisis landscape is that unlike Enron,
executive pay is a major focal point of reform. 372 This is significant because under the previous
post-Enron round of regulation, the focus was on the CEO's entitlement to their compensation
and the misstating of earnings to appropriate more pay. 373 This response tackled issues of fraud
which to a large extent fell under the purview of fiduciary duties. The expanded focus on
compensation incentives in the post-crisis round demonstrates a focus on how incentives work.
Given that short-termism and excessive risk are problematized as issues with wide
ranging societal implications, this preoccupation extends well past the issue of performance and
managerial slack. The framework used to analyze post-crisis regulatory responses by OECD
nations is telling of a paradigm shift that might be occurring. However, the analysis is still
limited by the legal lens employed. However, it is recognized that the choice between the arm’s
length bargaining or managerial power approaches presented in the previous version of this
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debate has shifted. 374 Thus by appreciating the evolution of the pay debate and its transition into
the law and economics paradigm, this approach is equipped to recognize developments outside
of its confines, making it possible to identify several regulatory themes which serve as evidence
that compensation reform currently focuses on a wider set of actors.

SECTION C: Regulatory Themes Identified
This viewpoint identifies incentive compensation and the performance-based approach as
giving rise to previously uncontemplated governance problems. Professor Hill identifies five key
regulatory themes aimed at tackling these issues. 375 They are as follows:
1. A risk-based approach to setting executive pay.
2. A focus on long-term sustainability of the corporation when setting pay.
3. A re-evaluation of the previous concept of interest alignment.
4. A re-evaluation of previous short-term market-based performance measures.

5. A focus on income inequality when setting pay.

I. Risk and Executive Pay
Further evidence of an emerging risk-based approach includes a focus on the outwards
effects of risk, namely the public’s exposure to financial market risk. This includes recognition
by mainstream law and economics academia that compensation incentives create a moral hazard
situation for risk-taking by top executives 376 accompanied by the now prevalent view that
compensation incentives have themselves become a risk management problem. The Federal
Reserve for instance emphasizes the importance of incentive compensation not jeopardizing the
soundness of an institution. 377
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376
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377
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II. Short-termism versus Long-termism
Evidence of a shifting focus from short-termism to long-termism that supports this
perspective can be found in the scholarship. 378 The concern amongst regulators is that incentive
compensation currently drives executives to focus on short-term profits while creating long-term
organizational risk. 379 A consensus seems to be emerging that the new goal of executive
remuneration is to promote sustainable corporate performance. 380 This is consistent with the
FSB’s principles and is also acknowledged by the self-regulatory approach as a key goal of
compensation reform. It is not, on its face, evidence of a paradigm shift. Contractarians argue
that a longer term focus is possible with the market-based approach. 381 However, the broader
approach to reform taken by contractarians, gives rise to questions over what a long-term
sustainable approach entails. Yet these questions fade into the background when the broader
scope of executive pay’s conceptual evolution in the LME context is not taken into account.
The consensus on how to achieve a longer-term approach is two-fold: modifying
compensation design and claw-back provisions. 382 A solution in the former area is for Boards to
re-design pay by tying total remuneration to long-term outcomes. This includes using mandatory
holding periods for equity pay and deferred vesting of options built into contracts. 383 Claw-back
provisions while implemented in the wake of the Enron scandal in the U.S. have been proposed
as a regulatory constraint on short-termism in several jurisdictions. 384 This includes the
requirement for all public firms to have a claw-back policy regardless of misconduct. 385 This is
an extension of the previous measure permitting the Board to recover compensation awarded as a

See Hill, supra note 14; Lucian Ayre Bebchuck and Jesse M. Fried, “Paying for Long-Term Performance” (2009) 158
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result of misstatement or fraud. 386 In sum, several jurisdictions have adopted the claw-back
measure to address negative long-term developments which crystallize as a result of short-term
strategies aimed at bolstering the executive’s compensation in the current period. 387
III. Re-evaluation of Interest Alignment
This compelling observation demonstrates a possible paradigm shift away from optimal
contracting towards a regulatory-oriented model implicating mandatory norms as opposed to a
‘governance by self-interest’ approach. Hill cites that aligning shareholder and executive
interests through compensation is no longer the principal rhetoric of governance reform. 388 The
evidence includes statements by the U.S. Treasury that pay should be aligned with the interests
of taxpayers who provided financial assistance to bail-out the largest firms.

389

Again, the

justification cited was that the shareholder-centred approach to governance, in the case of banks,
allows shareholders to benefit from and exploit a greater level of risk than what is appropriate for
the corporation’s stability. 390 Accordingly, part of this re-assessment includes determining
whether the size of pay is publicly defensible. 391
IV. Re-evaluation of Performance Measures
The observations supporting the view that a shift is occurring away from optimal
contracting include the adoption of non-financial performance criteria in several jurisdictions
which represent goals tied to sustainable performance. 392 Accordingly, the CEBS guidelines hold
that unethical behavior should trump positive financial performance 393 and the AICD guidelines
in Australia state that improved workplace safety should be a criterion for evaluating the CEO’s
Claw-back provision were initially brought in under Sarbanes-Oxley. See Gibson Dunn, “Claw-backs” of Executive
Compensation” Gibson Dunn (9 July 2008), Online:
<http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/ClawbacksOfExecutiveCompensation.aspx.
387
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performance. 394 While these examples are not mandatory in LME jurisdictions, they depart from
the optimal contracting model's focus on shareholder returns as the principal measure of good
governance. The issue is whether Boards will adopt such measures and whether shareholders
have an incentive to do the same.
V. Income Inequality
The final regulatory theme evident in the literature is an increased focus on the link
between income inequality and the CEO’s pay. 395 The crux of this concern is that a high level of
income disparity between the work force and top management of the firm demotivates front-line
workers and contributes to poor long-term sustainability. 396 This observation is congruent with
the stakeholder perspective on executive pay discussed earlier in this paper. Part of this focus has
been on the actual fairness of compensation and not just on how production is affected.

Australian Institute of Company Directors, “Executive Remuneration: Guidelines for Listed Company Boards” AICD
(29 May 2009), Online: AICD,
<http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1584/PDF/Australian_Institute_of_Company_Directors.pdf>.
394

395
396

Hill, supra note 14.
See ALF-CIO, supra note 132; Randall Thomas, supra note 122.

106

CHAPTER TEN:
Executive Pay in the United States

SECTION A: Background and Context
The context of US pay reform involved addressing particular practices that led to the US
financial collapse. In 2007 the prevalence of excessive risk-taking practices in major US banks
came to light when the market for mortgage securities, including Collateralized Debt obligations
(“CDOs”) experienced major downgrades. 397 Similar failed debt securities prompted major
bank-write downs, causing even triple “A” rated debt to lose its value. In January of 2008, the
market for CDOs collapsed throughout the world causing more than $2 trillion of wealth to
evaporate overnight. The social effects of this market instability were far reaching.
From the outset, perverse executive compensation incentives were purported to have
caused managers to engage in extreme profit-seeking which overwhelmed the checks and
balances of existing governance systems in banks. 398 Unlike the Enron debacle which reflected a
concern over inadequate checks and balances in the accounting and disclosure realms and with
the ability of managers to extract rents from the firm by misstating earnings, this time around the
focus was on the drivers of such behaviours. 399
Another back-drop against which specific and general measures to compensation reform
were engaged with, was the recognition of the widespread systemic effects of such events and
the significance they have for how capitalism in the US is organized. 400 Legislators were
concerned quite intensely with the prospect that taxpayer money was used to bail-out the biggest
banks in the US who arrived at this position by their preoccupation with short-term earnings
fuelled essentially by investor and managerial greed.
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to protect future taxpayers from such an event reoccurring, evident in the acute response by the
US Department of Treasury to controlling the size and structure of executive compensation in
firms requiring government bail-out assistance. 402 Managers' of such firms could not avoid such
harsh regulatory measures without first paying back the government and exiting the program.

SECTION B: The U.S. Response to Compensation Reform
The response in the U.S. consists of an initial response to the specific issues surrounding
executive pay in distressed firms falling under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (“TARP”)

403

followed by general reforms to corporate governance through the “Dodd-Frank” Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”). 404 Other responses include the
Compensation Fairness Act and the Corporate Governance Reform Act 405 which was passed by
Congress only to be defeated by the Senate. The provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act to a certain
extent mirror the goals and provisions of these acts notwithstanding the changes made.

SECTION C: Specific Measures (Overview)
Being a temporary and drastic measure, the TARP program and specific measures taken
to stabilise the economy are outside the scope of this analysis. Instead, general measures will be
analysed in detail as they relate to executive compensation because they represent purported
long-term changes to corporate governance geared towards preventing another crisis. Briefly the
specific measures can be categorised as followed:
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A. TARP Program
i.

Office of the Special Pay Master

ii.

Claw-back Requirements

iii.

Limitations on Bonuses

iv.

Limitations on Severance Pay

v.

Say on Pay

B. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies
i.

Balanced risk taking incentives

ii.

Compatibility with effective controls and risk-management

iii.

Strong corporate governance

iv.

Proposed supervisory initiatives

SECTION D: General Measures (Overview)
The Dodd-Frank Act as it relates to the reform of executive compensation in the U.S. can
be assessed across 5 key areas. These areas act as general measures to reform how executive
compensation is set in public companies regulated by the SEC. The key provisions in the area of
executive pay are as follows:


Say on pay



Publication of worker to CEO wage ratio



Enhanced disclosure obligations



Mandatory claw-back policy for public companies



Independent compensation committees

SECTION E: Say on Pay
Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act provides shareholders with an advisory vote on
disclosed executive compensation plans. 406 The provisions amend the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 407 by inserting section 14A. It provides shareholders with a right to approve executive
compensation not less frequently than once every 3 years at the annual general meeting or other
406
407

Dodd-Frank Wall Reform and Consumer Protection Act, s 951.
15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.
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meeting where SEC rules require compensation disclosure. 408 The vote must be exercised
through a separate resolution included in proxy, consent or authorization materials. 409 The
provision also requires shareholder approval of golden parachute compensation in a separate
resolution and disclosure of any such arrangements or understandings between an executive
officer and an acquiring firm. The rules of construction under this provision prevent the
shareholder vote from being binding on the Board or the corporation. Having final say, the Board
cannot be overruled on matters relating to executive pay and directors’ fiduciary duties are not
extended or changed in any way either explicitly or by implication.

SECTION F: Enhanced Disclosure Obligations
Section 953 (a) of the Dodd-Frank Act creates enhanced general disclosure requirements
for executive compensation in publicly listed corporations. 410 The final rules require
corporations to disclose how they handle and reward safe and excessive risk-taking. The aim of
this amendment is to curtail undue risk-taking by providing greater information to shareholders
who can exercise their right to sell or not to buy. 411 With enhanced disclosure of such risk, the
capital market in theory can discount a corporation’s share price where excessive levels of risk
are rewarded by the compensations structure. The disclosure threshold is whether the
compensation for any employee in the firm is reasonably likely to create a materially adverse
effect on the company. Another key feature is the requirement to provide “a non-exclusive
situational list of when a compensation practice is reasonably likely to create materially adverse
risk to the company.” 412
SECTION G: Publication of Worker to CEO Wage Ratio

For a summary of this provision's proposed content, scope and application see Gary Shorter, “Say on Pay and Other
Corporate Governance Reform Initiatives” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report to Congress (13 August 2009), Online:
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409
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Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act creates additional disclosure requirements,
requiring publicly listed firms to disclose a) the median annual compensation of all employees,
b) the annual total compensation of the CEO and c) the ratio between these two figures. 413 The
provision requires the SEC to create rules implementing a requirement for firms to disclose these
figures. 414 On Sept 18, 2013 the SEC released proposals to implement such requirements.415 The
disclosure is mandatory on a quarterly basis. The aim of this amendment is to provide public data
that is more comprehensive with regard to the effects of wage disparity on corporate
performance, with the expectation that shareholders and the public will pressure corporate
Boards to be more restrained. 416 The provision addresses a Board-CEO dynamic where directors
feel beholden to the CEO. The managerial power approach provides theoretical support for the
problem this provision seeks to address. However, this solution is at odds with the optimal
contracting approach which posits that CEOs operate in a competitive marketplace in which the
value that they give to shareholders is fairly compensated. Also consistent with managerial
power theory, the provision enables public outrage constraints to operate by enhancing the ability
of consumers, labor groups, and pension funds to assess whether compensation is appropriate in
relation to workers’ compensation. 417

SECTION H: Mandatory Claw-back Policy for Public Companies
Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act dealing with “recovery of erroneously awarded
compensation” establishes a requirement for publicly listed companies to develop and implement
claw back policies which obligate the Board to recover excessive pay obtained through the
misrepresentation of earnings or the inaccuracy of assessment criteria. 418 By imposing a
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requirement for directors to directly confront the problem of managerial rent extraction, this
provision deals with the excessiveness problem and is consistent with protecting the corporate
entity. The claw-back provision is not intended to address factors which purportedly exacerbate
the propensity of managers to commit fraud, such as perverse incentives, but instead seeks to
raise a greater barrier to such conduct. 419 The approach is also consistent with the understanding
that this particular manifestation of managerial power cannot be fully restrained through an
improved version of performance based incentive compensation.
In contrast to the claw-back provisions under section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(“SOX”), the Dodd-Frank Act provisions do not enhance the SEC's authority to prosecute for
excessive compensation obtained through misconduct. 420 This existing SOX provision remains
intact. Cited as the most significant federal intervention into corporate governance since the
1930’s, section 304 of SOX gives the SEC the power to require a CEO or CFO to return any
bonuses or incentive compensation, including profits from the sale of stock, if the firm is
required to prepare an accounting re-statement due to material non-compliance. 421 There
however, must be an accounting re-statement and a finding of misconduct otherwise the SEC
cannot act if the compensation awarded is simply excessive. 422 The SOX provision also
provides the Board of Directors with the right to recover excess pay stemming from the use of
improper assessment criteria or errors in calculation. 423 This legal tool benefits shareholders by
helping to recover funds that would otherwise constitute earnings, improving pay-toperformance sensitivity by making rent extraction less feasible and counterbalancing incentives
to engage in fraudulent conduct which can weaken or destroy a firm. 424
The SOX claw-back provision is purported to have several weaknesses some of which the
Dodd-Frank Act seeks to improve upon. Despite, the SEC’s ability to require a firm’s CEO or
CFO to disgorge the benefits obtained from misstated earnings, the SOX provision can only be
deployed in cases where the SEC can demonstrate misconduct which is often difficult to
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establish. 425 Neither directors nor shareholders have a right to sue on behalf of the corporation to
enforce this provision. 426 Even without the SEC’s involvement, directors are highly reluctant to
implement claw back policies let alone enforce their provisions. 427 A majority of excess clawback policies before Dodd-Frank Act came into force gave discretion to directors not to re-coup
excess pay even if the executive had engaged in misconduct. 428

SECTION I: Analysis
 Does the provision represent a new behavioral norm for directors requiring additional
due diligence, a consideration of new circumstances or the following of new
procedures when setting or approving compensation?

I.

Say-on-pay

While say-on-pay requires taking additional procedural steps when setting executive pay
there is no direct impact on directors’ duties. In fact, the rules of construction prohibit fiduciary
duties from being construed as altered or enhanced. 429 However, the precatory vote does exert
some degree of pressure onto directors, by expressing at the very least that shareholders disagree
with the size of the executive’s compensation or whether it rewards risk. As many critiques have
suggested, the effectiveness of this pressure remains to be seen. 430
Accepting that a potential exists for the precatory vote to influence directors’ discretion,
the amendment can be viewed as either enhancing shareholders’ ability to discipline managers on
behalf of the entity or as increasing their ability to endorse higher levels of pay and risk-taking
for the chance to make short-term profits. This is dependent on shareholders’ willingness to
disapprove of high levels of pay and risk-taking, which will likely be influenced by current share
price and individual investment horizons.
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II.

Enhanced disclosure obligations

By creating additional requirements to disclose risks that are materially adverse to the
firm and how they are rewarded, this provision introduces a new behavioral norm from a
procedural standpoint only. Otherwise, it merely provides shareholders with greater information
on which they can assess risk. While this information includes specifically how executive pay
impacts risk-taking by executives, directors are not faced with following a new behavioral norm,
however are forced to think about how executive pay corresponds to risk, which might have an
indirect effect on their decisions. This has not been studied let alone proven.

III.

Publication of Worker to CEO Wage Ratio

The publication of the CEO-to-worker pay ratio does require directors to consider new
circumstances, namely the relationship between front line worker and CEO pay and how this
might affect long-term firm performance. The potential exists for directors to act according to a
new set of stakeholders-based norms. This entails considering how worker morale might be
affected by high levels of internal wage disparity, how poor worker morale might impact
workers’ productivity and commitment to the firm and how this impacts sustainability and
overall firm performance in the long-run. 431

IV.

Mandatory Claw-back Policy for Public Companies

This provision represents a strengthening of existing norms centred on protecting the
corporate entity. This serves as an extension of the post-Enron response to fraudulent conduct by
managers. The response itself focuses on raising a stronger barrier to fraudulent conduct and not
on curbing pay incentives which create a stronger incentive to misrepresent earnings.

 Is it mandatory or enabling? Does it impose extra-economic or efficiency based
norms of conduct? Does it require directors to account for how executive pay
impacts the corporate entity or to engage predominantly in arm’s length bargaining?

431

This is consistent with a stakeholder perspective on executive compensation. See Thomas, supra note 122.

114

I.

Say-on-pay

From a procedural standpoint, the provision is mandatory in that Boards must provide for
and allow the shareholder vote. However, there is no substantive right for shareholders to enforce
their preferences and no mandatory norms of conduct are imposed. 432 Given that pressure
arising from a majority vote against compensation could influence directors’ discretion,
shareholders could exhibit pressures to favor efficiency based governance norms, approving only
compensation that is structured to reward high levels of profit and risk-taking and not necessary
sound risk management practices. However, the possibility exists for shareholders, as a majority,
to approve only those compensation arrangements that include stakeholder-friendly norms such
as non-financial performance criteria and lower levels of pay more generally.

II.

Enhanced disclosure obligations

Again, from a procedural standpoint, the provision is mandatory, however no additional
extra-economic norms based on trust, loyalty, stewardship of the entity, or stakeholder well-being
are imposed by this requirement.

III.

Publication of Worker to CEO Wage Ratio

In short, disclosure of the CEO-to-worker pay ratio imposes mandatory norms of conduct
but in a procedural sense. Aside from prompting directors to consider how executive pay impacts
stakeholders and how this in turn impacts long-term performance, the enforcement of these
norms rests in the hands of shareholders who may see a benefit in reducing the corporation’s
internal pay gap. 433 Extra-economic norms of conduct are not imposed and neither are directors
required to consider how executive pay impacts the entity. In fact, shareholders would likely
implement these norms only if it translates into greater efficiency and profit.

IV.

Mandatory Claw-back Policy for Public Companies

The norms underlying this provision are consistent with an extra-economic understanding
of directors’ duties. The provision requires directors to assess how fraudulent behavior by
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management amounts to appropriation of the firm’s assets. This is consistent with corporate
law’s traditional role in controlling self-interested behavior. In fact, the enforcement mechanism
behind this provision, the threat of de-listing for non-complying issuers is arguably an effective
and less onerous process than the derivative action available to shareholders. However, directors
are not required to actually reduce pay under this provision, only to implement a policy for how
such pay should be reduced. The enforcement mechanism for achieving a substantive result is
still within the discretion of directors, subject to pressure from shareholders.
 Is the effect of the provision such that it results in the interests of other stakeholders
being taken into account by directors when setting executive pay and does it result in
directors prioritizing the firm’s well-being over immediate shareholder returns?

I.

Say-on-pay

Again, the provision creates no substantive rights for shareholders nor does it instruct
directors to follow a particular set of norms. Shareholders might indirectly influence directors,
however there is no certainty that shareholders will advocate for stakeholder interests being
taken into consideration or that executive pay incentives are aligned with long-term sustainable
management of the firm.
II.

Enhanced disclosure obligations

In assessing the relationship between the executive’s pay and different levels of risk
taking for the purposes of disclosure, directors might be required to assess the risk on different
stakeholders, including taxpayers, workers, shareholders and the corporation. Thus, for the
purposes of disclosure they might contemplate the entity’s well-being over those of shareholders.
However, assuming that shareholder pressure through the precatory vote exists, directors might
prioritize short-term profit ahead of the corporation’s well-being to gain the support of
shareholders in the vote.

III.

Publication of Worker to CEO Wage Ratio

As mentioned the provision does require directors to consider how CEO pay might
impact workers, but only for the purpose of satisfying a procedural requirement. There is no
certainty that disclosing this stakeholder-based measurement criteria will result in directors
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prioritizing the firm’s well-being over immediate returns. The potential for such a management
orientation arises from two sources. One is the propensity of directors to act on stakeholderbased norms of conduct if they fall in line with the corporation’s best interests. The consideration
of this new relationship between stakeholders and long-term firm performance might prompt
such an orientation. Two is pressure from shareholders to lower CEO pay to reduce internal wage
disparity. This depends on shareholders recognizing the possible detriments of not lowering pay.

IV.

Mandatory Claw-back Policy for Public Companies

In short, this provision does not result in the interests of stakeholders being taken into account. It
is a straightforward application of fiduciary duties towards the entity. Because it focuses on a
narrow aspect of managerial power, fraud, the provision is limited in scope to addressing the
symptoms of managerial power and not the causes. This fails to recognize that other governance
measures, namely the high-powered pay incentive, can exacerbate managerial power and conflict
with the goal of this provision.
 Is the effect of the provision such that directors utilize performance criteria other than
share price to gauge whether executive compensation schemes are acceptable?

I.

Say-on-pay

Directors have the same discretion as before to establish and reward a wide range of
corporate purposes. There is no guidance provided to shareholders or standards articulated to
utilize non-market based performance criteria. This is strictly optional. Although the disclosure
of the CEO-to-worker pay ratio and materially adverse risks discussed above, might inform how
shareholders assess the appropriateness of the pay they are voting on.

II.

Enhanced disclosure obligations

While, disclosing the relationship between executive pay and adverse risks to the firm
introduces new and potentially long-term criteria for assessing performance, directors are not
required to act on this criteria. Provided that directors take cues from shareholder voting when
setting executive pay, they might not consider these criteria if shareholders opt for more risktaking and larger executive pay for the promise of aggressive growth.
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III.

Publication of Worker to CEO Wage Ratio

Again, by requiring directors to calculate and disclose this ratio, they are prompted to
contemplate non-financial criteria as a basis for assessing the corporation’s best interests. If a
positive correlation is contemplated between high CEO pay and unsustainable long-term
performance then directors might assess such compensation negatively and reduce it. Another
factor not previously discussed, is the effect of managerial power on directors and how strong
managerial influence might prevent directors from acting on this alternative criteria.

IV.

Mandatory Claw-back Policy for Public Companies

In short, this provision is not geared towards assessing the appropriateness of pay, nor
does it address its substantive effects. It deals instead with mitigating the effects of inappropriate
incentives by strengthening directors’ role to discipline rent-seeking.

CHAPTER ELEVEN:
Executive Pay in Germany

SECTION A: Background and Context
Recent developments in Germany around executive pay follow a period of relative
controversy surrounding both its size and structure. 434 Amidst uncertainty and intense debate
over the path of corporate governance in Germany, executive compensation has emerged as a
regulatory contest between the influence of Anglo-American liberal market pay practices and the
stakeholder-oriented goals which underlie how German executives are paid. German corporate
governance in the years before the Financial Crisis was marked by a heated debate over the
appropriateness and legality of paying large, American-style bonuses to German executives on
the Management Boards of public corporations, for orchestrating stupendous short-term gains for

The late 1990's in Germany marked a controversial period of reform for German company law characterized by the
liberalization of finance while at the same time, the persistence of Co-determination. See Cioffi, infra note 454.
434
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shareholders. At the heart of this debate was the Mannesmann ordeal which several
commentators referred to as placing Germany’s entire system of embedded capitalism on trial. 435

I. The Broader Context of EU Market Integration and Reform
The broader context in which to assess the drivers of executive pay reform in Germany is
the European Commission's market building initiative. Ongoing since 1986, the Single Market
project has increasingly integrated European product, financial and labour markets, giving rise to
various rounds of harmonization of regulatory norms and practices. 436 Beginning with the First
Council Directive in 1968, European company law regulation and its push to provide an
equivalent level of investor protection across member states has played a crucial role in this
process of harmonization and integration. 437
The Commission's Modernization of Company Law and the Enhancement of Corporate
Governance body has been an active site for the generation and dissemination of corporate
governance norms and practices. 438 The source of several proposals, recommendations, highlevel reports, and action plans, this diverse and amorphous collective of state and non-state
experts have driven the process of European Corporate Governance Regulation (ECGR) along its
current trajectory. 439 Having entered the scene in 2001 with the Commission's White Paper, the
concept of EU governance is now entrenched in the semi-autonomous field of ECGR. 440
The European Corporate Governance Forum (ECGF), established in 2004 by the
European Commission, consists of member state representatives, issuers of securities, investors
and academics that meet regularly to advise the Commission on the effectiveness of members'

Peter Kolla, “The Mannesmann Trial and the Role of the Courts” (2004) 5 German Law Journal 829; Stefan Maier, “A
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(2006) 25(12) International Financial Law Review 52.
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monitoring systems and to assist in developing corporate governance codes. 441 Of notable
importance before the crisis was its “comply or explain” principle, now a key feature of the EU
approach to governance. 442 A flexible alternative to detailed regulation, the principle underpins
non-binding rules or recommendations found in members' corporate governance codes. 443
Interestingly, the Forum took the position that the 'comply-or-explain principle should be
enforced by Member States as a mandatory norm of conduct either through their corporate law or
regulatory authority, but that regulators should limit their role to verifying the existence of the
disclosure while deferring to the business judgement of directors with respect to its content and
the prerogative of shareholders to enforce the disclosure's quality. 444 The Forum's ongoing role
in ECGR has impacted the German Corporate Governance Code (“GCGC”) and legislative
initiatives in German corporate governance.
Developed in 2002 by the German Government Commission the GCGC contains
“essential statutory regulations for the management and supervision (governance) of German
listed companies [and] internationally and nationally recognized standards for good and
responsible governance [and] aims at making the German corporate governance system
transparent and understandable [and] promotes the trust of international and national investors,
customers, employees and the general public in the management and supervision of listed
German stock corporations.” 445 Most of the rules are not legally binding, but companies who do
not comply must publicly disclose “how and why their practices differ from those recommended
by the Code.” 446
The GCGC has six main components: 1) the shareholders and general meeting; 2) the
cooperation of the Management Board and Supervisory Board; 3) tasks and responsibilities of
the Management Board; 4) tasks and responsibilities of the Supervisory Board; 5) transparency
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and; 6) accounting and auditing of annual financial statements. 447 Key developments in the
GCGC include changes to the shareholders' annual general meeting and to the Management
Board's remuneration in 2006. 448 The latter reflects amendments made to Management Board
compensation under the German Board Member Monetary Compensation Disclosure Act
“VorstOG". 449
Pertaining to enhanced disclosure requirements for Management Board pay, the VorstOG
resulted from a heated debate over the policy goals served by requiring such disclosure. 450 The
major change effected by this provision was to require the publication of Management Board
members' individual salaries as opposed to mere disclosure of total pay to the shareholders. Also
worthy of mention is the 2005 relaxing of the business judgement rule to better insulate directors
for decisions with respect to increasing company performance and taking additional risk. 451 The
ten-point program in the UMAG amends the German Stock Corporations Act in several respects.
Under the first point, management decisions will no longer constitute a breach of directors' duties
where the Board member “reasonably believes that he acted for the good of the company and if
his decision was based on appropriate information.” 452
II. The EU Takeover Directive
Of notable importance to the broader story surrounding executive pay in Germany was
the process leading up to the EU Takeover Directive's defeat. Unfolding contemporaneously with
the Mannesmann ordeal during a tumultuous period for German corporate governance, this
regulatory contest exemplifies the politics of corporate governance liberalization in the decade
preceding the crisis. Characterized as a “broad political backlash led by managerial and labour
interests against the adoption of Anglo-American shareholder capitalism” the directive's defeat
can be viewed as a push-back against concessions made to neo-liberal trends under the Control
and Transparency Act “KonTraG” which rendered German firms more vulnerable to hostile
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takeovers. 453 The simultaneous unfolding of the Mannesmann ordeal can be viewed as a parallel
narrative characterized by a push-back by Mannesmann prosecutors against the infiltration of
liberal market pay norms into Germany Inc.'s corporate culture. Professor John Cioffi states the
following in response to the defeat of the Commission's 13th Directive on Takeover Bids:
“The draft Directive was the clearest and most far-reaching attempt to introduce Anglo-American
concepts of shareholder value, and shareholder capitalism generally, into the European
political economy. And for this reason, the Directive became one of the most divisive pieces of
legislation to ever come before the European Parliament, sparking fierce opposition and unusual
alliances that reveal the substantial social and political differences between Anglo-American
neo-liberalism and the legacies of Continental statist and corporatist political economic
institutions.” 454

Tensions between a broader EU-driven integration into competitive global markets and
the embedded capitalisms of EU member states are deeply implicated in these processes.
Germany's experience with the EU Takeover Directive, viewed as regulatory reflex to earlier
pressures to liberalize its corporate governance regime, is a telling example of these tensions at
play. Likewise, the unfolding of the executive pay debate in Germany leading up to the crisis
tells a parallel story and provides a background against which to assess post-crisis reforms.
III. The Mannesmann Ordeal
The Mannesmann ordeal illustrates a friction between Germany Inc.'s corporate culture
and shareholder-centric pay practices which reward management exclusively for serving
shareholder interests. 455 Prosecutors in an unprecedented move resorted to using Germany’s
criminal code to sanction the approval of excessive compensation, typically dealt with under s.
87 of the German Stock Corporations Act, the Aktiengesetz (AktG), as a breach of fiduciary
duties. In response to Supervisory Board directors approving unusually large bonuses for the
Chief Executive's role in facilitating a takeover, prosecutors alleged that five supervisory board
directors and one executive “breached their duty to the broader interests of the company, which
John Cioffi, “The Collapse of the European Union Directive on Corporate Takeovers: The EU, National Politics, and
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consequently damaged the company”. 456
Prosecutors alleged a criminal breach of fiduciary duty, carrying a maximum sentence of
ten years. Some have commented that despite condemning the size of the bonus payments
awarded, prosecutors were more concerned with sanctioning the use of Anglo-American style
pay incentives designed to reward short-term price appreciation. 457 While the outcome of the
trial resulted in the acquittal of all six defendants for criminal wrongdoing, the judge concluded
that the bonuses awarded to outgoing executives were inappropriate and violated Germany’s
stock law governing executive compensation. 458
In determining whether the accused managers committed “a criminal breach of duty to
manage the assets of another” the German Federal Court looked to section 87(1) as a guideline to
determine whether the bonus awards constituted a misappropriation of the company’s assets and
fixed reserves. 459 Absent a clear standard under s.87 for determining a breach of fiduciary
duties in the remuneration context, the Court was unable to overcome the burden of proving a
criminal breach, leading to the 2006 acquittal of all defendants.

460

The accused managers had argued the awards were justifiable in light of the staggering
wealth created by management's facilitation of the takeover. While the awards totaled an
unprecedented 50Million Euros, over 50 Billion Euros had been created for shareholders, many
of which were foreign entities integrated into capital markets outside of Germany. In doing so,
they repudiated Germany's model of stakeholder capitalism in favor of a shareholder value norm.
The Court found however, that the awards failed to benefit the corporation first despite the gains
created for shareholders and held them as falling below the standard set out in the AktG.
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Despite the vagueness of s.87 for determining the appropriateness of the bonus awards,
the prosecution argued for an interpretation based on Germany's broader context of stakeholder
capitalism, which the judge eventually accepted, though the criminal threshold had not been
breached. It became clear during the trial to commentators that prosecutors were attempting to
serve the broader goal of deterring large executive bonuses that threatened to create improper
incentives for management in Germany to maximize short-term shareholder value. 461 These
sentiments, however, did not crystallize into binding norms until after the financial crisis.
IV. The Commission's Pre-Crisis Remuneration Initiatives
While much of the business and legal community in Germany and abroad awaited the
final Mannesmann verdict, the Commission released its 2004 recommendations on director
remuneration. Focusing mainly on disclosure and shareholders rights, it represented a continued
push towards aligning shareholder and manager interests, a development resisted in the
Mannesmann debate. The recommendations, which were subsequently adopted, set-out
guidelines for disclosure and shareholder control with respect to director remuneration. 462 The
Internal Market Commissioner recognized the conflict in executive directors setting their own
pay. At the time, this initiative was consistent with US developments in corporate legal
scholarship, namely the debut of the managerial power approach, outlining this same
phenomenon. 463 The Commissioner further recognized that shareholders should be better
informed and able to ensure that sufficient incentives exist for directors through proper
disclosure and effective control rights. However, the initiative focused on providing guidance to
Member States on implementing such soft or hard law provisions supporting greater shareholder
involvement. 464
Tensions between the role of corporate and capital market law on the one hand and the
competing interests of labour and finance on the other are less visible in this thread of corporate
governance norm generation aimed largely at standardizing disclosure practices and investor
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rights across the EU. This initiative seems to highlight the frictions instead between managers
and investors in a push to bolster and restore confidence to European markets. 465
However, in the background of these multilevel consultations, exists visible threads of a
debate over the size and subsequent fairness of executive compensation. The eventual unfolding
of the Mannesmann verdict in 2006 amplifies these tensions between the need to harmonize
executive pay levels in a manner compatible to the liberal market dynamics of ECGR on the one
hand and Germany's embedded system of capitalism and concomitant corporate culture on the
other.
These concurrent developments concerning executive pay in Germany bring these
tensions into sharper relief by pitting the need to create sufficient incentives for shareholders on
the one hand, against the need to keep executive pay reasonably in-line with labour's sensitivities
over the distribution of corporate wealth in society on the other. The point where pressures to
adopt a liberal market approach to executive remuneration appear to converge in the
Mannesmann ordeal, is the ambiguously worded s. 87 of the German Stock Corporations Act in
its previous format, a weak-point in Germany's corporate-legal matrix which allegedly placed
Germany's entire system of embedded capitalism on trial.
V. The Exposure of German Banks to the Crisis
Given these developments at the European level to ensure that directors are adequately
incentivized to perform in the context of a need to restore confidence to European markets, it is
not surprising that German banks were exposed to and implicated in some of the risky
transactions which led to the crisis. This was likely contributed to by the fact that a rejection of
the liberalization trend in Mannesmann failed to crystallize into governance norms until after the
crisis, when the ambiguity in s. 87 AktG was eventually clarified in the VorstAG.
Despite the origins of the crisis being in the US, German legislators were concerned over
the exposure of German banks to its effects. It became apparent early on that German banks had
engaged in risky strategies and failed to assess the risks associated with their investments in US
toxic assets. According to Kaal and Painter, some of Germany's largest banks “made these
investments through special purpose entities and other conduits in foreign jurisdictions that held
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CDOs and other long-term mortgage loans that had been financed with the proceeds of shortterm financed Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) and Asset Backed Securities (ABS).” 466
Because of the complexity of these investments, many fell outside the jurisdiction of the
German banking regulators but came apparent when the market for CDOs collapsed. 467 Such
unprecedented exposure to risk by German banks prompted regulators to implement
comparatively harsher reforms against risk-taking not only in the banking sector but also in the
governance of large public corporations.
VI. The Commission's Post-Crisis Remuneration Initiatives
In 2009, both the European Commission and the FSF developed a set of
recommendations on executive remuneration in the financial sector in response to Financial
Crisis. 468 The Internal Market Commissioner recognizes the prevalence of perverse incentives in
the financial industry leading up to the crisis and their role in encouraging excessive risk-taking.
469

In this case, the Commission has accepted the FSF's principles on remuneration and is taking

the lead on their implementation. 470 Interestingly, while the need to maintain performance based
incentives is recognized, the need to constrain such incentives in line with long-term sustainable
performance and sound risk management is the dominant feature of this approach. 471
The ECGF also set-out its recommendations on executive remuneration in the wake of
the crisis.

472

Articulated as a set of best practices that should govern the remuneration of

executive directors going forward, the ECGF released the following principles: 473
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1.

The level of variable pay (typically with both a short term and a long term element)
should be reasonable in relation to total pay level. Generally, the larger the variable
pay element is, the stronger the focus on the beneficiary's personal interests becomes,
to the possible detriment of the long term interests of the company and its shareholders.
Companies should develop a clear policy on variable pay, within the remuneration
policy subject to approval by shareholders. That policy should set maximum limits on
all elements of variable pay.

2.

Variable pay should be linked to factors that represent real growth of the company and
real creation of wealth for the company and its shareholders. The factors to be taken into
account for variable pay should be independently reviewed by non-executive directors.

3.

In order to reduce the short term focus of variable pay, companies should consider
deferring a substantial part of annual bonus payments to be released subject to continuing
positive performance by the company over a period of, say two to four years.

4.

Stock options (rights to acquire shares for a pre-determined exercise price) carry an
increased risk of market manipulation and gaming as the upside potential is
leveraged. These risks can be mitigated if vesting of the options is deferred and subject
to performance conditions. Underperformanced stock options should be excluded
from the remuneration policy.

5.

Shares granted to executive directors under long term incentive plans should vest only
after a period during which performance conditions are met. At least a certain number of
those shares as determined by the non-executive directors (e.g. two times the value of
total annual pay) should be held by directors until the end of their employment, with
the exception of such part of those shares that need to be sold in order to be able to
pay taxes due as a result of the grant of shares.

6.

To the extent possible under applicable employment laws and companies’ legislation,
the company should reserve the right, at the discretion of non-executive directors, to
reclaim performance linked remuneration elements which were paid to or vested on
executive directors on the basis of results that afterwards were found to have been
significantly misstated because of wrongdoing or malpractice.

7.

Severance pay for executive directors should be restricted to two years of annual
remuneration and should not be paid if the termination is for poor performance. The
two years restriction should not be circumvented by long notice periods or otherwise.

8.

Entitlements should be fully disclosed and discretionary increases for departing
executives should be avoided. Any benefit in kind should also be part of the remuneration
package and should be fully disclosed.

9.

Benchmarking the remuneration of executive directors with the remuneration of directors
of companies in a peer group, combined with the practice of aiming to reward directors at
the median or upper quartile of such peer group, creates an autonomous upward pressure
(“ratchet effect”) on the remuneration of directors of all companies which has no relation
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to underlying performance of these companies or personal performance of directors. Nonexecutive directors should not only benchmark the remuneration of executive directors
externally with peers but should also benchmark their remuneration internally with the
remuneration of other employees within the company in order to ensure a consistent and
fair remuneration policy throughout the company.
10.

Non-executive directors should have and exercise discretion to change the actual
remuneration calculated on the basis of formulae, targets and benchmarks in order to
ensure that the total pay executive directors receive is fair in relation to the company's
and their personal performance and not excessive. Any adjustment to the operation of
established remuneration schemes should be fully disclosed.

SECTION B: The German Response to Compensation Reform
In the wake of the financial crisis, the German government enacted new legislation on the
appropriateness of Management Board compensation, clarifying the role of existing law in a
manner consistent with the court’s interpretation in Mannesmann. The new Act regarding the
Appropriateness of Management Board Remuneration (“VorstAG”), 474 imposes amendments to
the German Stock Corporations Act (“AktG”), 475 which directly impact the fiduciary duties of
Supervisory Board directors. 476 The following sections are amended:


Section 87 Subsection 1 AktG



Section 87 Subsection 2 AktG



Section 193 Subsection 2 Clause 4 AktG



Section 116 AktG



Section 107 Subsection 3 Clause 3 AktG



Section 100 Subsection 2 Clause 1 No. 4 AktG



Section 93 Subsection 2 Clause 3 AktG
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These amendments result in stricter obligations for directors to implement compensation
that is appropriate in size and aligns the interests of the Management Board with the long-term
interests of the corporation and its stakeholders. 477 The Act has 6 key features which impact how
the Supervisory Board sets the Management Board's remuneration:


Limits on remuneration and the requirement to assess



Remuneration structure to promote sustainable development of company



Requirement to reduce remuneration when situation of company deteriorates



Increased liability for approving inappropriate remuneration



Cooling-off period for executives to serve on Supervisory Board



Enhanced disclosure requirements

SECTION C: Limitations on Remuneration and the Requirement to Assess
By imposing limits onto executive compensation 87(1) 1 AktG in its amended form
constrains the discretion and business judgment of Supervisory Board directors, making the
implementation of excessive pay and short-term incentives less feasible. More specifically this
provision requires executive pay to bear a relationship to executive responsibilities and a
company’s performance. 478 Section 87(1) 1 AktG now states:
When fixing the total remuneration of an individual management board member (salary,
profit participation, expense allowances, insurance premiums, commissions, incentive-based
remuneration commitments like...stock options and fringe benefits of any kind), the supervisory
board shall make sure that the remuneration is in adequate proportion to the duties and
responsibilities and the performance of the management board member as well as to the situation
of the company and does not exceed the customary remuneration without particular reasons.

This amended version increases the Supervisory Board's obligation to assess the
appropriateness of executive remuneration. This includes an obligation to examine comparable
environments such as the company's size, industry norms and wage levels within the company
including those of front-line employees.
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SECTION D: Remuneration Structure to Promote Sustainable Development of Company

Through these constraints on discretion, directors are restricted to creating particular
incentives for management that better align their interests with the best interests of the
corporation. Section 87(1) 2 now states:
“The remuneration structure for listed stock corporations shall be geared towards a
sustainable development of the company. Variable components of the remuneration shall
therefore be based on a perennial assessment; the supervisory board shall agree on means of
limitation in case of extraordinary developments.”

This provision creates an obligation for Supervisory Board directors to adjust
compensation incentives in line with the company's development based on several years of
assessment data. Section 93(2) 4 AktG as amended by VorstAG goes a step further by requiring
Supervisory Board Directors to place a 4 year limit on the exercise of their stock options. Section
87(2) in its amended form also requires the Supervisory Board to limit pay if extreme
developments arise. This refers to large rises in the company's share price from events such as a
takeover or an upwards market trend that might spur extreme demands from managers for
increased levels of pay. This addresses the events that transpired in Mannesmann where
Supervisor Board directors felt justified in paying the Management Board unprecedented
bonuses based on the company’s overnight share value appreciation.
The general assembly of shareholders can approve the remuneration structure by issuing
a non-binding declaration of their opinion. This right to vote remains non-binding for two
substantial reasons. One is to prevent shareholders from limiting the liability of directors by
shifting decision making power away from the Board. Two is to avoid situations in which
shareholders might approve compensation that serves their interests but is not compliant with
statutory norms. This relates more directly to foreign investors of large public companies in
Germany, who might have shorter investment horizons than ‘patient capital’ in Germany.
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SECTION E: Requirement to Reduce Remuneration When Situation of Company
Deteriorates

Despite having a similar function, this provision is not a claw-back provision for
remuneration earned from the fraudulent misrepresentation of earnings. It relates instead to the
state of the company as measured through various indicators. In the past if there was substantial
decline in the corporation's state the Supervisory Board was required to reduce the Management
Board's pay if continuing at existing levels was grossly unfair to the corporation. The company’s
economic difficulties did not justify a reduction if management acted in good faith under the
business judgment rule. They now have an enhanced responsibility to reduce pay if the
corporation is distressed. Continued payment at the existing level does not have to be grossly
unfair nor does the reduction have to be based on a substantial decline in the company's situation.
Indicators of a decline include reductions in employee wages, terminations or layoffs of
the workforce, inability of the company to distribute profits and a crisis or insolvency. While the
latter will always require reduction, there is no order of priority for the other criteria. Thus, if the
company's market price is high but substantial lay-offs are required, the obligation could be
triggered. This statutory provision is mandatory and amounts to a legal obligation for the
Supervisory Board. It also supersedes the employment contract, but allows affected Management
Board members to terminate the contract with notice.
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SECTION F: Increased Liability for Approving Inappropriately High Remuneration

While sections 116 AktG and 93 AktG already make the Supervisory Board liable for
breach of obligations, including inappropriately high pay, section 116 AtkG now includes
explicit liability for inappropriate pay, which is emphasized as a most important duty. Members
who breach the duty to pay appropriately are personally liable. Section 93 AktG increases the
effects of this liability on Supervisory Board directors by mandating a deductible of at least 10%
on directors’ liability insurance, creating a stronger incentive to comply. According to the
amended version of section 107(3) 3 AktG the Board can no longer delegate new employment
agreements to a committee including decisions on the structure and size of the remuneration. The
entire plenum of the Supervisory Board has an obligation to determine and continually adjust the
Management Board’s compensation.

SECTION G: Cooling-off period for executives to serve on Supervisory Board

Section 100(2) 1 (4) AktG creates a restriction on the ability of former Management
Board members to sit on the Supervisory Board. The amended provision imposes a two-year
cooling-off period for Management Board members seeking a position on the company’s
Supervisory Board after serving their term.

SECTION H: Enhanced disclosure requirements

Supervisory Board members are now required to disclose in greater detail, an executive
directors’ compensation scheme. The must explain how the compensation structure creates
incentives for sustainable firm performance and how they have complied with appropriateness
requirements. Moreover, if the compensation exceeds customary levels, the Supervisory Board is
required to explain and justify why this is required.

132

SECTION I: Analysis
1. Does the provision represent a new behavioral norm for directors requiring additional due
diligence, a consideration of new circumstances or the following of new procedures when
setting or approving compensation?
The legislation in its entirety represents new behavioral norms for directors as well as the
enhancement of existing norms of conduct. While the Supervisory Board was previously
required under section 87(1) to set the appropriate level of remuneration based on the duties and
performance of the Management Board member, the provision was overbroad. Subsection 87(1)
was originally meant to be interpreted in a stakeholder-based context, but provided no guidance
as to what constitutes an appropriate value on executive labor or how to reconcile the state of the
company with shareholder interests. 479 While shareholder interests are meant to be aligned with
those of the corporation, there was previously no distinction between short and long-term. Courts
in Germany arguably interpret these provisions in the context of fairer wealth distribution
between stakeholders and the absence of a shareholder value norm. 480 The lack of a clear
distinction between rewarding short-term or long-term profit proved to be particularly
problematic in Mannesmann where the defendant’s argued for an interpretation based on
shareholder primacy to justify the payments made. 481
The standard established by the German Federal Court (BHG) in Mannesmann 482 and the
amendment to 87(1) of the AktG clarifies the standard by which directors must measure
performance and the correct context for interpreting the appropriateness of pay. By specifying

See Economist, supra note 462.
The German Federal Court (BHG) in the Mannesmann trial interpreted section 87(1) par. 1 of the AktG in line with the
values of Germany’s stakeholder model in that the remuneration of an executive’s contribution to the firm was supposed to be fair
in comparison to how a worker’s contribution is valued and appropriate in relation to how executives contribute to the firm’s
ongoing success. This implies that the firm’s long-term success must be put before short-term gains. See Bauer, supra note 370
(noting that it was clarified by the BHG that incentives arising from executive compensation should always benefit the company
and should never damage the company in the long-run. The court indicated that a breach of fiduciary occurs when appreciation
awards fail to benefit the company. “In the Mannesmann ruling the BGH held generally that the Supervisory Board must always
act in the interests of the company. It is obliged to preserve acquired benefits and avert damage to the company. This obligation
also affects the approval of appreciation awards to management board members “),(“with regards to the criminal responsibility of
the accused supervisory board members, the BHG held that the approval of appreciation awards that do not benefit the company
also constitutes a criminal breach of fiduciary duties”.)
481
See Economist, supra note 462.
482
Bauer, supra note 436 (Noting that the BHG concluded that appreciation awards of the type granted are only
admissible if the company first and foremost receives a benefit in return).
479
480
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that “the remuneration structure for listed stock corporations shall be geared towards a
sustainable development of the company” 483 the provisions instruct the Supervisory Board to
correlate executive compensation with long-term development.
This also equates the best interests of the corporation to its long-term interests and the
standard set is that Management Board compensation cannot be so excessive as to promote
unsustainable management practices. 484 This limits the extent to which directors can equate the
state of the company with its short-term share value when setting executive pay, representing a
narrowing of the business judgment rule in this area.
2. Is it mandatory or enabling? Does it impose extra-economic or efficiency based norms of
conduct? Does it require directors to account for how executive pay impacts the
corporate entity or to engage predominantly in arm’s length bargaining?
Several aspects of this legislation are mandatory legal norms of behavior that are extraeconomic or non-market-based and require directors to account for the substantive effects of
executive pay on the corporate entity as opposed to engaging in arm’s length bargaining on
behalf of shareholders. The entire Supervisory Board is now responsible for ensuring an
appropriate size and structure of executive compensation. It clarifies and expands their fiduciary
duties. They face liability for 1) the size of pay being inappropriate, 2) for not reducing pay if the
situation of the company deteriorates and 3) for not reducing pay in the case of extraordinary
developments in the company’s share price.
In situations where directors are obligated to reduce pay or to approve appropriate levels
in the first place, liability is triggered when the size of pay amounts to a mismanagement of the
corporation’s assets. In this case, directors are personally liable to repay the compensation and
are limited by statute from seeking a low deductible for D & O insurance. The enhanced duties
of directors are extra-economic in nature and are premised on principles of loyalty towards the
entity and proper stewardship of its assets. These duties are not discharged and do not fall outside
the scope of scrutiny if performance is high in relation to compensation.

Ek, supra note 477.
Given the background of the financial crisis and the criticism of traditional payment systems for top managers, the
German legislative body tried to introduce a tool that would guide directors’ and officers’ remuneration and introduce a
compensation structure that promotes long-term company development.
483
484
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While the term “shall” implies that directors are obligated to create long-term incentives
geared towards sustainable firm development, liability in the case of failed risk or improper
short-term incentives would be difficult to establish, especially where significant time has
elapsed and the cause of a negative future development is uncertain. While the structure of a
company’s incentive plan might appear to be short-term oriented, liability cannot be incurred ex
ante.
Inappropriate incentives must be attributed to future loss or damage to the company. As
discussed, the provision sets out various criteria for directors to consider when determining the
appropriateness of pay. Directors are not liable for failing to consider each and every criterion
individually or for improperly weighing one against the other. This range of discretion remains
protected under the business judgment rule. However, directors are expected to act reasonably in
the circumstances.

3. Is the effect of the provision such that it results in the interests of other stakeholders being
taken into account by directors when setting executive pay and does it result in directors
prioritizing the corporation over immediate shareholder returns?

The provision relates the appropriateness of executive compensation to the tasks, duties and
responsibilities performed by the Management Board. As a result, it imposes a limit onto how
high an executive’s labor can ultimately be valued. Although, the wording is not explicit as to
what an appropriate limit might be on the remuneration of a particular managerial task, the fact
that the law equates the value of an executive’s labor with the complexity of the task performed
485

implies that the market is not the ultimate determinant of how executive labor is valued.

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, “Germany Introduces New Rules on Management Board Compensation”
Freshfields Briefing (August 2009), Online: Freshfields,
<http://m.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Knowledge/Germany%20introduces%20new%20rules_26499.pdf>.
See also Ek, supra note 477.
485
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By denoting that executive pay must be appropriate “in relation to the tasks performed” or
“in adequate proportion to the duties and responsibilities and [to] the performance of the
management board member” this provision acknowledges that the value of a particular task or
contribution has a maximum limit, beyond which it can no longer be justified by increases in the
company’s share price. From a viewpoint of substantive fairness, an executive’s pay structure
under these circumstances is a fairer reflection of their actual contributions to the firm and not
merely a reflection of what shareholders are willing to pay for sharp increases in short-term
performance. 486
Section 87(1) 1 states that Supervisory Board directors have the duty to ensure that
executive pay “does not exceed the customary remuneration without particular reasons.” 487 The
term “customary remuneration” in this case refers to the level accepted throughout the industry
for similar tasks, duties and responsibilities. 488 Although not quantified, the existence of such a
level implies that the maximum amount of executive pay is restricted to what the corporate
culture deems as being acceptable which is relative to worker pay and the distribution of societal
wealth either regionally or nationally. 489
The criteria for assessing the appropriateness of executive compensation reflect the
interests of labor, creditors and long-term shareholders. By relying on these criteria, directors are
prompted to contemplate whether the size of executive compensation is such that it will
undermine worker morale and the willingness of workers to make wage concessions during

See Ronald Dore, “Comment: Paper on Employees and Corporate Governance” (2000) 22 COMP LAB L & POL’Y J.159
(argues that the debate over executive pay actually debates normative questions of social justice in respect to the equitable
compensation of one’s contribution to the firm.)
487
Ek, supra note 477.
488
See Freshfields, supra note 486 (Noting that “according to the legislative material, one must look to the branch, size and
country to determine what remuneration would be customary…furthermore, the salaries paid within the company must be
considered…thus the supervisory board has to make sure that the remuneration of the management board members remains in
proportion to the remuneration system within the company.”) See also Ek, supra note 477 (noting that “The appropriateness of the
total remuneration of the individual management board members is therefore based on the member's duties, responsibilities, and
performance, as well as on the situation of the company. Furthermore, the remuneration of the individual members must not exceed
the remuneration customary in the industry or country without particular reasons…When fixing the management board
compensation, the supervisory board must ensure that such compensation is on a level with that of companies of the same trade
with comparable size and complexity, but it should also take into account the particular salary and wage structure within the
company. In addition, the supervisory board must consider what salary is deemed "customary" within the statute's area of
application.”)
489
Ek, ibid.
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economically difficult periods. Directors have an interest in considering these factors because
they impact the corporation’s ability to operate sustainably. Labor unrest and dissatisfaction with
wages and working conditions impact operations. German industrial firms are sensitive to this
because employees are highly skilled, trained extensively by their companies at high cost, and
possess firm specific skills.
Placing substantive limits on executive compensation through criteria other than share
price limits the extent to which executive compensation can be linked to the capital market.
Large bonuses that reward sharp increases in profitability become less feasible. 490 This is further
reinforced by the Supervisory Board’s obligation to limit the size compensation in the case of
extraordinary developments stemming from market events. The extent to which executives are
incentivized to take measures that maximize profits at the expense of worker’s interests or
without considering the firm’s future well-being is reduced.
4. Is the effect of the provision such that directors utilize performance criteria other than
share price to gauge whether executive compensation schemes are acceptable?
The requirement that the total amount of remuneration to appropriately reflect the state or
situation of the company sets out a different standard for measuring performance than what is
used by Anglo-American directors. Corporate directors in the U.S. have no explicit legal
constraints on how they should correlate firm performance with executive pay and as a result
rely on their business judgment to determine which pay incentives are in the best interests of the
corporation. This usually amounts to short-term performance criteria.

By denoting that executive compensation must be kept in appropriate relation to the state
or situation of the firm, this part of the provision limits the extent to which performance can be
correlated to short-term profit or share value, further weakening the relationship between
executive compensation and share price. Section 87 (1) 1 in effect instructs directors to prioritize
the state of the firm over the short-term interests of shareholders, ensuring a consistent outcome

See Freshfields, supra note 486 (Noting that the Supervisory Board, in setting variable executive remuneration shall
include a cap on the maximum allowable remuneration to limit the possibility of extraordinary developments such as large increases
in share price. The objective of such a cap is to ensure that the Management does not profit from extraordinary developments such
as takeovers, the sale of assets or the realization of hidden reserves.)
490
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in the incentives created for management. 491 This restricts the Supervisory Board’s ability to
implement excessive bonuses that incentivize executives to focus exclusively on profits,
resulting in moderate compensation levels correlated to the well-being of the firm itself. 492

CHAPTER TWELVE:
Assessing the Current Approach to Compensation Reform
Here we assess our initial questions asked about executive pay in 1.10 and whether the
goals of compensation reform identified can be achieved from within the confines of optimal
contracting and shareholder primacy or whether effective compensation reform entails a
repudiation of certain aspects of these models and a greater focus on and use of stakeholderbased norms through corporate law. The following two questions were asked:

1.

Should managerial power in the firm be predominantly defined as a lack of
performance and does attempting to constrain managerial power through
performance-based norms of conduct exacerbate its outwards effects?

2.

Can excessive risk-taking and short-term profit-seeking be effectively constrained
by adjusting the structure of executive compensation to better align shareholder
and manager interests without changing the existing level of directors’ discretion
and exposure to capital market pressures?

See Bauer, supra note 436 (noting that “In the Mannesmann ruling the BHG held generally that the Supervisory Board
must always act in the interests of the company. It is obliged to preserve acquired benefits and avert damage to the company. This
obligation also affects the approval of appreciation awards to management board members. The BHG stated that the level of
management remuneration must be in proportion to a management board member’s responsibilities and the company’s performance
subject to section 87 AktG.”)
492
See Max Phillip Rolshoven, “The Last Word? - The July 22, 2004 Acquittals in the Mannesmann Trial” (2004) 5(8)
German Law Journal 939 (noting that the German Federal Court in Mannesmann reiterated that the issuance of executive pay must
be correlated with the interests of the firm. Citing that in the Mannesmann trial “the [bonus] payments nevertheless were found [by
the Court] to violate the German stock corporation law, because they did not, according the Court, lie in the firm's, i.e.
Mannesmann's, interest.”)
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I.

Answer to Question 1

Conceptualizing the problem of managerial power in the firm strictly in terms of agency
costs and then employing compensation incentives as a mechanism for controlling these costs is
geared towards diverting a higher level of profit to the shareholder by incentivizing managers to
create new efficiencies in the firm. In fact, agency costs are synonymous in the literature with
sub-standard share price performance, inadequate risk-taking and the use of directorial discretion
to consider other interests which might benefit the firm in the long-run or represent a socially
responsible use of the corporation’s resources. Constraining managerial power as defined in such
narrow terms benefits a particular set of constituents in the firm, the executive and the short-term
shareholder by raising the corporation’s market value. What is not so obvious from the confines
of the optimal contracting paradigm is that if taken too far, it can do so at the expense of other
constituents, including shareholders’ own long-term interests.
Compensation incentives as opposed to being a comprehensive solution to the managerial
power problem geared towards producing an outcome which benefits and enhances the
corporation, instead shifts how the costs and benefits of managerial power are distributed and
harnesses managerial power to a particular end. Other aspects of managerial power remain
unaddressed. The propensity of managers to extract excessive rent from the corporation,
interfere with and undermine the checks and balances designed to constrain their behaviour,
harm the firm in order to favour the interests of a particular constituent, or oppress the interests
of a particular group to benefit another fall outside of what the compensation incentive can
achieve as a governance tool.
Before the paradigm shift in the executive pay debate, circa 1990, rent extraction was
clearly a problem, but the extent to which managers could do this and the lengths they would go
through were a lot less because the sums of money on the table were significantly smaller. With
the introduction of the optimal contracting approach and high-powered compensation incentives,
a whole new set of problems of a much larger magnitude are introduced into corporate
governance. Performance incentives are geared towards solving the issue of excessive pay but
only in relation to performance by justifying high levels of pay as long as performance is
improved. This approach fails to address the propensity of managers to extract rents from the
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firm. In fact, high-powered compensation plans create new avenues for rent extraction of a
greater magnitude then before thus creating a new set of problems with respect to managerial
power in the firm. Thus the governance by performance approach that characterizes the intended
role of incentive compensation has the potential to magnify the problem of rent extraction and
managerial misconduct in the public corporation.
II.

A Possible Solution

Looking at the German approach to compensation reform, rent extraction and the
propensity of managers to impose the costs of short-term profit seeking onto groups outside the
firm can be addressed by placing limits on compensation. The German reform achieves this by
articulating a legal standard for the overall compensation amount. Compensation which is
inappropriate triggers liability for the Board. This works in conjunction with an interpretation of
the corporation’s best interests that rejects short-term gains in share price as an appropriate
corporate goal. Thus, payment of large bonuses for high levels of share price appreciation,
despite creating shareholder wealth, triggers liability unless the corporation itself benefits in the
long-run.
Such an approach is suitable in the German context because long-term oriented
shareholders or patient capital are prevalent. Capital markets are less developed than in the US
and market pressures on management are less intense. This equilibrium is an outcome of political
choices made by a multitude of political and economic actors.
The latest of these is Germany’s repudiation of the European Takeover Directive, partially
insulating German corporations from short-term value creating corporate takeovers. The
remaining challenge in the US is the myopia generated by capital markets amongst investors
which militates against long-term investment horizons, even amongst pension funds traditionally
thought to pursue long-term strategies for the benefit of the labour constituency they supposedly
represent.
However, with the articulation of a clear standard for inappropriately high executive
compensation and enhanced mechanisms to pursue such claims, long-term oriented shareholders
in the US might be inclined to keep managerial power in check. Legally limiting executive
compensation in conjunction with a longer-term articulation of corporate purpose could begin to
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address the extreme short-termism which led to the crisis. In practice, this could mean that
current market value would be insufficient to justify large payments to executives. Alternative
indicators of long-term performance might be necessary as a basis for calculating compensation.
III.

Answer to Question 2

Constraining risk in the firm requires shareholders to make concessions in immediate
performance meaning that they must give up higher short-term returns for the sake of sustainable
long-term value. This would mean that some strategies and behaviours which typically benefited
some investors, those seeking high short-term returns on the market, are now off limits. Yet it is
unclear how an incentive contract, the premise of which is based on providing managers with
incentives to raise share price, can now be modified not only to raise share price but place
constraints on how high share price can be raised in the short-term. This would entail placing
limits on the size of compensation that executives could draw from the firm in a given period.
This approach is not popular in the LME context because placing limits on the size of pay
could dilute managerial incentives for performance. This was the problem identified by the
Jensen and Murphy literature in the first place. Moreover, how would shareholders know
whether a company’s current market value reflects an adjustment for excessive risk and
unsustainable returns? The typical assumption under the optimal contracting approach is that the
higher the share price the better the incentive contract is working to reduce agency costs. With
the onset of the excessive risk problem, higher share price can now represent excessive risktaking that is undertaken to drive-up the firm’s short-term market value having drastic
repercussions in the long-run.
Short of having detailed inside knowledge of management’s strategy, shareholders just
can’t know from share price alone whether compensation incentives are creating the right levels
of risk-taking and performance and not too much performance. What is now required of
executive compensation in the post-crisis period poses a challenge to the efficient markets
hypothesis on which the efficacy of this approach is based. Even if shareholders could discern
between share price that was sustainable or too good to be true, their interests are not by any
means homogenous. There are short-term investors that stand to benefit extensively from an ex
ante bonding device that aligns their interests in extracting short-term wealth from the firm with
those of managers who seek to do the same.
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The trade-off between short-term versus long-term time horizons that exists in large
organizations creates a dynamic that separates the interests of the entity itself as an ongoing
concern and the prerogative of a few of its constituents to derive benefits at the entity’s expense.
Some shareholders in fact might be comfortable with excessive levels of risk that pose a threat to
the firm’s long-term viability because their investment horizons are very short-term, their risk is
highly diversified, or the potential pay-off is large enough to compensate for their prospects of
failed risk. Improving mechanisms that better align managerial behaviour with the demands of
shareholders trading on the capital market seems counter-intuitive to constraining short-termism
and excessive risk. Certain shareholders through their market power could support
compensations incentives that enable them to extract short-term gains at the corporate entity’s
expense.
The assumption that most shareholders seek long-term sustainable returns in the context
of a global market economy dominated by finance and will discipline managers for creating
short-term returns that are in effect too high due to excessive risk-taking and unsustainable
strategies, is at best unsubstantiated. Corporate law scholarship has raised the argument that
shareholders in the widely held public corporation suffer from a collective action problem and
lack an incentive to discipline managers. Why then would any shareholder discipline a Board if
short-term returns begin to climb to high but potentially unsustainable levels when they can
simply exit the investment? By giving shareholders a voice without any objective standard for
constraining risk and curbing short-termism they run the risk of approving compensation plans
that further contribute to the pursuit of short-term profits. As long as share price remains as the
predominant signal that managerial power is being adequately constrained in the firm,
shareholders could rubber stamp compensation schemes that encourage excessive risk.
The term optimal contract is re-evaluated in the post crisis law and economics literature
to be synonymous with performance which has been adjusted for risk and short-termism, taking
for granted that such new norms might in fact call on directors to approach corporate governance
not as the agents of shareholders but as the agents of the corporation. However, the role of
directors in this post-crisis literature is rather limited to ensuring that this ex-ante bonding device
between executives and shareholders is properly negotiated and competently devised. Taking
into consideration systemic risk, requires that directors look at a wide range of interests and
exercise a higher level of discretion in how these interests are balanced in order to serve the best
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interests if the firm over the long-run. This in fact is what post-crisis regulatory responses to
executive pay entail and the responses in some jurisdictions call forth a need to account for how
corporate power impacts taxpayers and other corporate constituents. Yet the optimal contracting
approach and shareholder primacy more generally views managerial discretion and the
consideration of non-shareholder interests as a source of agency costs and as a principle reason
for why compensation incentives are not high powered enough to create the requisite level of
share value.
IV.

A Possible Solution

It is clear that the German approach requires directors, on penalty of increased liability, to
place the interests of the corporate entity ahead of shareholder profits. This is achieved through
several tools, namely a limit on the size of compensation and an articulation of legitimate
corporate purpose based on the corporation’s interests as an ongoing concern. Thus, directors
could be held liable for and required to pay back inappropriately high pay which rewards even
the highest gains in short-term share price if they fail to benefit the corporation.
While incentive compensation is still permitted to make up a large portion of the overall
arrangement, a notable feature of the legislation is the requirement for directors to limit pay
when extraordinary developments occur. Thus if market fluctuations or an exogenous event, such
as a takeover, drives up current value, directors cannot permit the executive to benefit from the
full extent of the short-term gain in value. This reduces any incentive to manipulate earnings or
to place short-term earnings ahead of long-term value. This approach demonstrates that
controlling the size of pay is essential to producing a sustainable management orientation.
Another key feature is the requirement to create long-term incentives. This entails using
restricted stock options which cannot be exercised until a set period has elapsed after the
executive's term on the Management Board is complete. This means that executives could wait
several years from the date of vesting to exercise their options. This ensures the executive is held
responsible for long-term negative developments that arise from short-sighted decisions made
during their term. Several US scholars have proposed this as a viable option in the US context.
However, it has yet to be adopted there. A key difference between US and German approaches is
that the German corporate statute mandates such long-term incentives. The proposed US
approach on the other hand relies on the directors to voluntary adopt such incentive contracts.
143

This again is premised on the belief that current market forces will militate towards such an
outcome.
Finally, the German approach implements several non-financial criteria for assessing firm
performance. These criteria guide directors in assessing the appropriateness of pay and in
determining when to reduce pay in response to the situation of the company changing. When
assessing appropriateness, directors must look at the Management Board compensation in
relation to front-line worker pay, amongst other things. When assessing the situation of the
company with a view to exercising the requirement to reduce pay, directors must take into
account the company's ability to maintain current employment levels.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN:
Conclusion
The goal of this work from the outset was to relocate the executive pay issue outside the
confines of agency theory and explore the broader dimensions of this debate from the standpoint
of corporate legal history and political economy. While the debate within agency theory over
how to define and approach the problems associated with excessive compensation and poorly
functioning incentives occupied the dominant discourse leading up to the crisis, the extreme
short-termism and excessive risk-taking which contributed to the collapse of Wall Street firms
has challenged the efficacy of the market-based governance model at a global level.
At the national and supra-national level, the need to bring firm management in line with
sustainable, long-term governance practices has been at the center of post-crisis governance
reform. As examined, post crisis responses to compensation reform and the underlying goals
identified represent a shift in governance thinking of a magnitude which entails placing limits on
risk-taking and the profit motive in large public companies.
The approach taken in LME countries, namely the US, in many ways fails to recognize
the significance of this shift in thinking and what it entails for governance moving forward from
the crisis. The ongoing debate over compensation reform in the US is framed from an agency
theory perspective which accepts shareholder primacy's efficacy and unproblematic continued
existence. This entails the same intensity of reliance on capital markets and performance-based
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governance norms as before. Proponents of this model continue to argue that global responses to
the compensation problem are rooted firmly within this paradigm, intimating that convergence of
corporate governance to a liberal market based model persists. However, we examined several
indicators that the crisis has called into question various aspects of this approach.
Yet the failure of agency theory and the optimal contacting model to deliver as promised
and the subsequent criticisms of this governance orthodoxy, does not address what sustainable
governance entails and whether shareholder primacy is equipped to accommodate a shift to longterm sustainable governance. To explore the former, a review of how corporate law has evolved
since the Great Depression, and the executive pay issue within it, was a necessary undertaking,
as was a comparative approach. Such an enquiry demonstrated the complexity of such a question
and how a longstanding debate over the issue has evolved over time. Comparative political
economy assisted us with understanding what precipitated this shift from a legally grounded
organizational model of the corporation to a market-based model which has reduced this debate
to a choice between constraining director's discretion and increasing market forces on the Board
on the one hand and essentially leaving them as they stand and introducing better compensation
practices on the other.
While the former model has been vociferously challenged by director primacy theorists
and for many reasons appears to be unsuitable for effecting long-term, sustainable governance, it
has also been rejected, albeit implicitly, in the context of post-crisis compensation reform. This
leaves director primacy and the premise that existing market forces lead to optimal governance
arrangements as the remaining model on which reform is to be based.
Yet, restructuring compensation incentives to better align shareholder and manager
interests is unsatisfactory at best. After assessing what increasing shareholder power would
result in, we asked the question what existing directorial discretion and capital market forces
have led us to. Relying on alternative explanations to how markets and their supporting political
and legal frameworks impact management orientation, namely the politics of finance approach,
but also the critiques advanced by progressive scholars, demonstrates the dichotomous effects of
such an approach on societal welfare. Thus, if capital markets coupled with existing directorial
discretion have led us to unsustainable short-term management orientations, how can we base
our approach to compensation reform on such a framework?
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Agency theory and shareholder primacy paradigm served a necessary function in
addressing the problem of managerial slack and stagnation in large public corporations in the
1980s during the transition from a corporatist political-economic model to a liberal market model
dominated by finance. To a certain extent, this transition was inevitable. However, empirical
evidence demonstrates the costs of such a regime on societal welfare.
However, the more provocative claim is that such a regime is unsustainable and prone to
implosion, as the latest financial crisis has demonstrated. The debate over executive
compensation and the global reform agenda identified after the crisis demonstrates that this
model has gone too far. Understanding what the organizational model of the firm and corporate
law originally sought to achieve, helped us to uncover how these functions have been
undermined by the current approach's focus on improving efficiency, risk-taking and the pursuit
of profits. In many ways, the essential functions served by corporate law conflict with the
market-based governance approach. Yet, the question raised is whether the benefits of this
approach to solving one aspect of managerial power will be undermined by constraining risktaking and the profit motive. Couched in the language of agency costs, the current orthodoxy
stands firm on the belief that any deviation from the shareholder value norm and the
consideration of outside interests is detrimental to effective governance.
Yet, recent work in the area of comparative political economy demonstrates that while
market forces strongly influence management orientation, they can be resisted by Boards of
Directors in favour of a longer-term, stakeholder inclusive approach referred to as the 'high road'
to economic production. How then to reform executive pay in the LME in a manner consistent
with such an approach? The German response to compensation reform shows not only a
repudiation of the market-based approach, in favour of a legal one, dispelling the claim that
convergence of corporate governance persists in the post-crisis context, but that the corporate
entity must be placed ahead of shareholder wealth maximization. In many ways the German
response has crystallized into a rejection of shareholder value and market based criteria.
The main attribute of such an approach has been a constraining of the business judgement
rule, but not in favour of increased shareholder power. Instead the German approach imposes
stakeholder-based norms of conduct which are tied to the long-term success of the corporation
not only as a vehicle for profit but as a vehicle for improving constituent welfare. This highlights
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the need to carefully re-assess the balance between profit maximization and the need to constrain
risk and consider the interests of other groups tied up with the firm's success.
This raises a much broader question, for a business corporation to be sustainable in the
first place, can its purpose be defined as solely to make a profit for its shareholders or is its
inherent nature such that it must take other interests into account more readily than the current
approach permits? While this work has begun to answer this question, much more needs to done.
However we choose to undertake this, comparative political economy and an appreciation of
corporate legal history are essential to subsequent studies of the topic, as confining ourselves to
the boundaries of agency theory has been ineffective so far.
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